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Early reformers reasoned that by changing institutional structure in local
government you could solve organizational problems. Institutional structural reform in
local government has interested scholars ever since. The reform movement in the early
20th century firmly established the council-manager (administrative) model of
government, which along with the mayor-council (political) model, is now utilized in
92% of all U.S. municipalities. Recent scholars have observed and reported on the fact
that, increasingly, mayor-council municipalities are adopting structural changes that
resemble characteristics found in council-manager municipalities and vice-versa. This
research seeks to examine the question of whether these structural changes have any
effect on these local governments by examining the behavior of Chief Administrative
Officer’s (CAO) and municipal outputs. The author examines a representative sample of
266 administrative and political municipalities within the U.S. having a population
between 10,000 and 250,000. The institutional structures of these 266 municipalities are
measured for political model and administrative model characteristics using three
separate independent variables. The effects of institutional structural change is measured

Template Created By: James Nail 2010

using group mean T-tests, ANOVA analysis, and multiple regression for per capita
expenditures, working time allocation between the management, policy, and political role
activities for the CAO, the quality of services provided, and the involvement level of the
CAO compared to the council in the mission, policy, administrative, and management
dimensions of municipal responsibilities.
The study findings are mixed; significant effects are found in some but not all
variables. Changing local government structures from characteristics found in the
political model to characteristics found in the administrative model: makes no difference
in municipal expenditures; makes a difference in how a CAO allocates his time in
management and political activities but not policy activities; makes a difference in how
the CAO perceives quality of services; makes a difference in the level of involvement for
the CAO in the policy, administrative, and management dimensions of responsibility but
not the mission dimension. Overall, this study has found that, by using more complex
methods to measure institutional structure change, changes in institutional structures do
make a difference in important areas of CAO behavior and outputs in local governments.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Since the reform movement in the early 1900’s the institutional structure of local
governments within the United States has interested scholars. Most research centered on
local government structure has focused on the two most dominant structural forms found
within local government, namely mayor-council and council-manager. However, for local
government scholars there has also developed substantial diversity in how they describe
the various structures that local governments in the United States adopt.
Every five years the International City/County Management Association (ICMA)
conducts a national Municipal Form of Government survey of municipalities within the
United States. For the purposes of this survey the ICMA recognizes the five most
common forms of local government in the U.S. today. These five forms of local
government include the mayor-council, council-manager, commission, town-meeting,
and representative-town-meeting forms (DeSantis & Renner, 2002; MacManus &
Bullock, 2003).
According to data collected by this ICMA survey in 2006, the data indicates that
the vast majority of municipalities surveyed within the U.S. (89%) operate under either
the mayor-council plan (34%) or the council-manager plan (55%) form of government
(Moulder, 2008). 2010 survey data (ICMA, 2010) show that this percentage has now
grown to over 92% of all municipalities. The remaining communities either did not report
1

what form of government that they operated under (4%) or reported operating under the
Commission (1%), Town meeting (5%), or Representative Town meeting (1%) forms.
The mayor-council plan is defined in the ICMA survey as,
An elected council or board serves as the legislative body.
The chief elected official (CEO) is the head of government,
with significant administrative authority, generally elected
separately from the council” (Moulder, 2008, p.27).
The council-manager plan is defined as,
An elected council or board and CEO (e.g. mayor) are
responsible for making policy with advice of the CAO. A
professional administrator appointed by the board or
council has full responsibility for the day-to-day operations
of the government (Moulder, 2008, p.27).
In some instances these two dominate municipal forms are referred to as reformed
(council-manager) or unreformed (mayor-council) local government. Scholars have
utilized this classification system (or one very similar to it), usually limiting their studies
to the two most dominate forms of government (mayor-council and council-manager), to
analyze the affects of form of government on a number of research variables.
Scholars have examined the characteristic differences between the Chief
Executive Officers (CEOs) of the two dominate forms of government (mayors and city
managers) (Nolting, 1969; Stillman, 1974; Stillman, 1982; Wikstrom, 1990; DeSantis and
Newell, 1996). The daily activities of mayors and city managers has been studied in a
number of ways including how each divides their time between the policy,
administrative, and political roles that they must perform (Newell & Ammons, 1995).
Scholars have also examined the influence that socio-demographic aspects has on the
form of government chosen (Sherbenou, 1961; Kessel, 1962; Schnore and Alford, 1963;
Alford and Scoble, 1965; Dye and MacManus, 1976; Sanders, 1979; Giles, Gabris, and
2

Krane, 1980) including geographic region (Sanders, 1979; Farnham, 1986) and the age of
the city as well as the change in population (Sanders, 1979).
In recent years, however, “Increasing evidence in existing literature…suggests
that the two major municipal government structures…may be inadequate to describe the
various hybrid forms of government that have been evolving” (DeSantis, 2002, p.95).
Scholars have observed and reported on a number of structural changes that are
taking place in municipalities across the country. Researchers show that changes such as
an increased use of appointed chief administrative officers (CAOs) in mayor-council
form cities, direct election of mayors and an increased use of ward or district elections for
city council members in council-manager municipalities have occurred in recent years
(Adrian, 1988; Moulder, 2008; MacManus & Bullock, 2003; Ebdon & Brucato, 2000;
Frederickson, Logan & Wood, 2003).
The most comprehensive empirical attempt to reexamine the traditional mayorcouncil/council-manager typology in recent years is put forward by Frederickson,
Johnson and Wood in the form of their “Adapted Cities Framework”. Through a number
of articles published during the early 2000’s (Frederickson & Johnson, 2001;
Frederickson, Wood, and & Logan, 2001; Frederickson, Logan, & Wood, 2003;
Frederickson, Johnson ,& Wood, 2004a) and cumulating in the book The Adapted City:
Institutional Dynamics and Structural Change (Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004b),
Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood undertake a thorough review of the existing
institutional structures that exists in cities within the U.S. and develop a classification
system based upon a number of structural variables that exist within contemporary
municipalities. In an effort to present a more accurate description of the similarities and
differences present in cities today, these scholars develop an entirely new nomenclature,
3

along with a new set of categories to describe each municipality’s form of government.
Frederickson et al. uses an array of structural features present within a municipality to
identify similarities and differences between cities. Using these identified features, they
then create a framework consisting of five categories in which to classify cities. These
five categories include “Political Cities”, “Administrative Cities”, “Adapted Political
Cities”, “Adapted Administrative Cities”, and “Conciliated Cities” (Frederickson et al.,
2004b). These categories can be described as follows.
1. Political Cities: these cities represent the classical political extreme, they utilize a
separation of powers structure between the council and the mayor with the mayor
acting as CEO and not serving on the city council.
2. Adapted Political Cities: these cities are most clearly distinguished from pure
political cities by the presence of a professional CAO appointed by the mayor.
3. Conciliated Cities: these cities are no longer obviously based solely on a
separation of powers model or a unity of powers model. They have a CAO that is
appointed jointly by the mayor and council and the council may be elected atlarge or by district in the city.
4. Adapted Administrative Cities: these cities are usually distinguished from pure
administrative cities in that the mayor is directly elected, may have the veto, may
be full-time, and may have additional input into the manager’s appointment.
5. Administrative Cities: these cities represent the classical council-manager unityof-power form. The mayor is a member of council with no separate executive
duties and is appointed from among the council. Council is part-time and is
elected at-large in the city. Council terms are usually short (2 year terms). The
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CEO is appointed by the entire council and is in charge of all administrative
functions.
These three scholars utilize this new classification system to illustrate how over
time most cities within the U.S. (especially those over 50,000 in population) have
incrementally changed their institutional structure. Their study indicates that structural
features found in most municipalities today are such that the majority of these
municipalities no longer fit clearly into either the traditional mayor-council (their
“political cities”) or the council-manager (their “administrative cities”) distinctions. It is
Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood’s assertion that most municipalities are now better
classified using one of their two adapted cities types (Frederickson et al., 2004b). If
indeed this new classification system better explains the differences in modern
municipalities, then applying this framework to municipalities should assist in explaining
many important variables of concern to researchers.
Significance of the Study
While most of the relevant studies of local governments within the U.S. have
concentrated on an analysis of differences found between the two dominant forms of
local government described above (mayor-council and council-manager), assuming a
dichotomous relationship between them, this study intends to compare and contrast
between these same local governments utilizing the more complex structures such as
those found in Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood’s ‘Adapted Cities’ framework.
Although the commission form of government is acknowledged to exist as a
successful local government form in the U.S., because of the small number of
municipalities that operate under this form of government within the country (less than
5

2%), it is excluded from this study. The town meeting and representative town meeting
forms, found primarily in the New England region of the country, are also excluded from
this study for similar reasons.
Building upon the basic structural characteristics found within Frederickson,
Johnson, and Wood’s five types of municipalities in the ‘Adapted Cities’ framework,
each municipality will be classified as either political, adapted political, conciliated,
adapted administrative, or administrative.
Using data captured from a representative national survey of municipalities within
the United States, the author intends to establish whether classifying a municipality
under the ‘adapted cities’ classification system helps to explain differences for a number
of different research variables. One would assume that as a city adapts from a political
type city, taking on the characteristics of a more reformed administrative type city, one
should observe differences in the roles performed by the various system actors and that
attributes usually associated with more reformed cities will become more prevalent.
In this study the author randomly surveyed eight hundred municipalities in the
United States with populations between 10,000 and 250,000 in order to obtain a
representative sample from which to make comparisons and to draw inferences.
Participants for this survey are obtained from a probability sample drawn from the listing
of municipalities in the 2010 ICMA Municipal Year Book. From these responses,
information concerning the institutional structural characteristics concerning the mayor,
council, staff, and the municipality in general are collected in order to properly classify
each city using the basic ‘adapted cities’ framework. Additionally, information
concerning the municipalities CAOs (the mayor or city manager) individual
characteristics is also collected along with their individual perceptions of the level of
6

involvement that both themselves and the members of the council that they work with
have concerning a number of activities. Information concerning the quantity and quality
of services provided by the municipality and time spent on policy, management, and
political activities are also obtained. From this study the author hopes to determine that a
significant difference is shown to exist between the five types of political and
administrative cities identified and that the institutional structural changes that are taking
place in municipalities in the U.S. in recent years have affects on important variables.
There are not an abundance of research studies conducted using the adapted cities
framework. As Carr and Karuppusamy (2008) comment concerning the claims put
forward by Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood in their ‘Adapted Cities’ framework, if
their claims are correct then ,“the value of the adapted cities framework to empirical
scholarship is potentially enormous” (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2008, p.876). One possible
reason for lack of study, advocated by Carr and Karuppusamy (2008) and mentioned
earlier in this paper, is the lack of an explicit process for coding cities into the framework
and the difficulty in operationalizing the five categories.
In an extensive literature review on the adapted cities framework, only three
studies that actually use the framework to perform empirical analysis are located (Wood,
2002; Wood & Fan, 2008; Carr & Karuppusamy, 2010). In addition, one that examines
the framework compared to the traditional dichotomous typology (Carr & Karuppusamy,
2009) and one study that attempts to improve the analysis value of the framework are
also discovered (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2008) (these are outside, of course, of the original
Frederickson et al. articles).
In a 2002 study, Wood (2002) examines 57 cities between 25k and 1million in
population to analyze if there is any relationship between voter turnout and the
7

classification of a city. In this study Wood finds that voter turnout is dependent on form
of government, with political cities having the highest voter turnout and administrative
cities the lowest. He determines that direct election of mayors, separation of political
powers between the mayor and council, full-time status and expanded executive authority
of the mayor are likely contributors to higher voter turnout.
Another study published in 2008, is conducted by Wood and Fan (2008). They
use the adapted cities framework to evaluate whether citizens in adapted cities are more
likely to rate the quality of services higher than those in non-adapted cities. In a study of
74 cities in 30 states they find that citizens in administrative cities are more likely to rate
the quality of services in the top rating than are those in adapted cities.
A study published in 2010 by Carr and Karuppusamy (2010) looks at the
relationship between type of city and expenditure levels in 263 Michigan municipalities.
They conclude that no evidence can be found that links city structure with per capita
expenditures.
The 2009 study written by Carr and Karuppusamy (2009) is an attempt to assess
whether the two ideal types of municipal structure are adequate in describing the
structure of Michigan cities and to use the adapted cities framework to examine the
patterns of adaptation in these same cities. This study examines the charters of 263 cities
in Michigan to look at the patterns of adaptation in these cities utilizing the adapted cities
framework. They find that most adaptations in these cities take place in mayor-council
cities with much less adaptation occurring within council-manager cities (42% of
council-manager cities remained as pure administrative cities). They call for more
studies to 1) build upon and refine their approach to coding cities; 2) apply studies to
cities in other states; 3) address whether the adapted city is indeed a new form of
8

government; and 4) use the adapted cities framework to reexamine the link between
government structure and municipal policy.
Have adaptations that are instituted in administrative cities such as the direct
election of a mayor or the election of council members from wards or districts actually
have any significant effects? Has the introduction of an appointed chief administrative
professional in political cities actually increased efficiency? Does the mixture of the
activities that each participant becomes involved in change as a city adapts to become
more administrative or more political? Is a combination of these institutional changes
also responsible for changes in important variables within these cities? This study’s
intent is to test whether the well documented structural changes that have taken place in
many municipalities in the U.S. in recent decades has any effect, based upon variables
designed to measure municipal functions and role activities. This study is important to
public administration because it can provide evidence that such structural changes do
matter and that professionally administered cities are substantially different than those
not professionally administered.

9

CHAPTER II
DEVELOPEMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
A Brief History of City Government Development
A review of the literature concerning form of local government reveals that there
is not any one single and independent method that can be utilized to classify the various
periods that have transpired in the history of municipal government within the United
States. Although the various authors use differing methods to describe the periods of
American city government development occurring over the past two centuries, they all do
agree that change has occurred and that different time periods do exist.
Adrian (1988) puts forward a theme of perpetual change when describing the
form of government that cities in the United States have taken over the past 200 years.
While he does concede that there is still much room for debate when discussing the actual
effects of structure and form on a city’s administration and policymaking functions, he
posits that there can be little debate on its effects upon one particular institution of
democracy, elections. According to Adrian, cities originally inherited the traditions
common to English cities in colonial times. Cities then ‘Americanized’ city governments
after the adoption of the new federal Constitution to conform to the new and unique
American ideas of separation of powers, including a bicameral council within their
structures. In the early 1800s Jacksonian democracy and the accompanying long ballot
took hold in American cities. These ideas persisted in local governments until the
complexities associated with larger populations and the introduction of a plethora of
10

services that cities were required to perform led to the popular dissatisfaction of machine
politics. This dissatisfaction helped to introduce the progressive movement and the
related reforms that it helped to blossom in the late 1800s and early 1900s. These
reforms first moved city governments toward the adoption of a strong mayor form
government, then to a commission form of government, and finally to council-manager
government (which has endured ever since). Adrian states that the reform movement of
the early 20th century was “an effort to return to the simplicity of the American colonial
system, a system in which there was no separation of powers” (Adrian, 1988, p. 9). The
conception of the council-manager system is more Hamiltonian than Jeffersonian with its
emphasis of professionalism and efficiency over political leadership and subgroup
representation. Overall, Adrian’s theme centers on a continuous pattern of change for
reform within the American city over the entire time of the republic.
Svara (1994) divides local government reform into five time periods since 1884.
He illustrates how that in each of the five time periods the institutional reforms that are
put forward are reflective of the conditions present during that particular period. For
example, early reformers wanted to reconcile support for representative democracy with
principles of hierarchy and merit. Svara’s five periods include:
1. Innovation: 1894-1919. Reformers believed that structural and legal change were
pre-conditions for other changes. Major problems addressed by reformers in this
period included fragmented authority, conflict, corruption, poor service quality,
and lack of competence in staff. The council manager plan was promoted because
it is based on a unitary model that lessens conflict and promotes citywide interest
while at the same time it strengthens (and controlls) the chief executive (City
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Manager). These early reformers use the council-manager plan to promote
democratic aspirations, not just efficiency.
2. Expansion and Orthodoxy: 1920-1945. Some began to think that the manager is
assuming too much power. The dichotomy model comes into prominence perhaps
to allay this fear. The great depression then exaggerates the need for efficiency.
Dominant values in this second period become efficiency, economy, and fairness.
These dominant values begin to obscure the wider values of the first period.
3. Consolidation of Reform: 1946-1965. After WWII the major new problems
facing municipalities are population growth, shortages in services, and inadequate
infrastructure. These problems are spawned by the two great American
revolutions of the time; the rise of the suburbs and the rise of the new middle
class. The council-manager plan offers solutions to these problems and reform
during this period is linked to dynamic urban areas of the country. However, “the
meaning and record of the reform movement…was subject to question as the
period ended” (p.333).
4. Maturity and Challenge: 1966-1988. The civil rights movement during the 1960s
sparks expanded participation and an increase in interest group pressures on local
officials. Incentives and requirements from the federal government placed upon
local governments also broaden the number of programs that local governments
are involved in. This makes cities much more alike in the service ranges that they
offer. Professional politicians win seats in local elections. New Public
Administration (NPA) gives a rationale for managers to become policy leaders
and as a result they lose much of the protective cover of neutrality. ICMA
realizes during this period that professional management is not synonymous with
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the council-manager form of government. Major problems faced during this
period include expanding civil rights, opening processes to wider participation,
and meeting expanding needs with fewer revenues. The values of reform during
this period are equity, openness, and supporting local officials.
5. Reaffirmation and Renewal, or ‘The End of Reform’: 1989-Present. The current
period of reform may be viewed from two alternative perspectives. One view
holds that traditional reform is so established that it is no longer reform. From
this viewpoint it is difficult to distinguish reformed from unreformed government
anymore because of the hybridization of the institutions of government. The
second viewpoint sees local government reform programs as reaffirmed and
renewed in the present period. This second view is supported by looking at the
many measures put into place to advance values of the reform program. These
measures include those that can be found within the 7th model charter. This 1989
document provides for alternative methods of selecting representative leadership
in cities, such as the use of district elections and the direct election of mayors.
These institutional alternatives offer solutions to today’s need for purposeful,
customer-driven, open and inclusive, and productive government.
For Svara the reform movement within each period addresses institutional reforms
that are reflective of conditions that are present within that particular period. The current
period of reform that we now live in is no different.
Chester Newland (1995) uses the idea of four successive periods to describe the
history of the council-manager governmental plan. These are:
1. The Political Reform Period (early progressive era till 1940s)
2. The Structural Orthodoxy Period (1940s into the 1960s)

13

3. The Social Activism Period (1960s through the 1970s)
4. The Diversity and Dynamics Period (1970s thru the 1990s)

Reformers acting during the first period are not trying to ‘escape’ from politics as
many scholars propose. According to Newland, these early reformers are instead trying
to replace the corrupt ‘transactional’ politics of the day and to facilitate ‘transformational’
politics. It is not until the second ‘orthodoxy’ period in the 1940s that the two dominant
doctrines of executive aggrandizement and the politics-administration dichotomy begin to
prevail. Newland (1995) states that it is primarily the idea of the powerful executive that
alters the perception of the council-manager government plan in the 1940s through the
1960s. This strengthening of the manager eventually leads to a call for reform by some in
an effort to change the perceived detached and neutral city government in the 1960s. By
the time the 1960s are reached the old politics of reform has gradually withered and the
greatly expanded powers of the executive have now come to the point where it lacks
popular support and the authority that this popular support brings with it. By the 1980’s
orthodoxy to ‘the plan’ (as Newland refers to the original council-manager plan) is not
only challenged but is significantly eroded institutionally by the advent of council staffs,
district elections, and the popular election of mayors within council-manager cities.
Diversity is the characteristic that can be used to describe council-manager cities in this
latest period.
The evolutionary change of reformed government is described by Frederickson,
Wood, and Logan (2001) viewed through the seven model charters adopted over the past
century. The major evolutionary changes described by Frederickson et al. within the
seven model charters are outlined in the list below:
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1st – 1900 – advocated strong executive mayor system; it was not accepted well –
during interim the commission form of government came forward
2nd – 1915 – advocated council-manager plan for the first time
3rd – 1927 – no big changes from 1915; mentioned mayor pro-tem; mentioned council
staff
4th – 1933 – added department of personnel recommendation; personnel to be removed
by CM
5th – 1941 – complete rewrite; merit mentioned; guidelines for mayor election;
recommended professional executive in mayor-council cities
6th – 1964 – gave alternative for council elections; first mention of directly elected mayor
in council-manager form
7th – 1989 – addressed the “leadership & representation” issues; gave new roles and
responsibilities to mayors

From the first model charter adopted in 1900 through the 7th version adopted in
1989, the complexity and malleability of American cities is clearly illustrated by
Frederickson et al. in the changes contained within each version.
Different Methods of Classifying City Structures
Just as there is diversity in classifying the different periods describing the history
of city government in the United States, there is also diversity in how scholars describe
the various structures that local governments in the U.S. adopt.
As discussed earlier, the ICMA recognizes the five most common forms of local
government in the U.S. today in their regular survey. According to 2001 survey data the
vast majority of cities (91%) within the United States now operate under either the
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mayor-council (38%) or the council-manager (53%) form of government (MacManus &
Bullock, 2003). Scholars in the past, usually look at city structures based upon this
method of classification (and usually only between the two most common types of
mayor-council and council-manager for study). However, recognizing structural changes
in recent years has (DeSantis & Renner, 2002) led many scholars to begin to look for
alternative methods of classification. Several of these proposed schemes are listed here in
order to illustrate the different approaches scholars have taken.
In 1998 the then Executive Director of ICMA, Bill Hansell, wrote two articles in
that association’s monthly publication concerning structural reforms in local city
government (Hansell, 1998a; 1998b). In these articles Hansell points out that almost
every element of the original reform plan (small councils, election at large, nonpartisan
elections, mayor selected from among the council, and elected officials viewed as citizen
volunteers with no compensation) has since been reformed, “to the point where citizens
are having a difficult time telling the difference…” (Hansell, 1998a, p.15). He goes on to
propose four types of council-manager structural forms. These four forms are:
1. Classic Council-Manager Type: The mayor is selected from among the council.
2. Mayor At-Large C-M Type: The mayor has similar power to council but elected
at-large.
3. Mayor (empowered) C-M Type: The mayor is given certain powers such as the
veto, review of manager’s budget, and nomination of the manager.
4. Mayor (separation of powers) C-M Type: The mayor is CEO but the charter
requires a manager that is appointed by mayor but confirmed by council and only
removed by council (this makes it different than mayor-council with a CAO).
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According to Hansell the needs of the community, such as the presence of a lot of
council conflict, dictates the type of structure imposed. Much of this article is a response
to concern over reforms that have taken place in some large council-manager plan cities
(i.e. Cincinnati, Ohio) and have strengthened the mayor at the expense of weakening the
city manager.
A 2002 article by DeSantis and Renner (2002) develops a seven category
classification system for those 3,561 cities in the 1996 ICMA Municipal Form of
Government Survey listed as either mayor-council or council-manager (the other forms
of government included within the survey and those city samples with fewer than 2,500
in population are excluded in their analysis). They expand somewhat on Hansell’s
typology discussed above and classify these cities as: Classical council-manager (894
cities or 25.1%); council-manager with at-large mayor (1125 or 31.6%); councilmanager with an empowered mayor (345 or 9.8%); strong mayor with a CAO (262 or
7.5%); Strong mayor without a CAO (392 or 11.2%); weak mayor with a CAO (245 or
7%); and finally, weak mayor without a CAO (298 or 11.3%). While this classification
system is based upon the role and formal authority given to the mayor of a city, the
authors do also look at the electoral systems in the three types of council-manager cities
to see if there is any correlation between the ‘reformed ‘ (council-manager) structure and
a city’s reformed electoral systems. What they find is surprising. It is not the most
reformed type of cities (the classical council-manager system) as one might expect where
the highest percentage of nonpartisan election systems are found, but rather it is in cities
with a separately elected mayor. In fact the classical council-manager cities in the study
have the lowest percentage of nonpartisan election systems out of the three council-
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manager types. This simply illustrates how much more complicated cities are than the
traditional classification categories suggest (DeSantis & Renner, 2002).
The final method of classifying cities presented here represents the most current
and comprehensive empirical attempt to relook at the traditional mayor-council/council–
manager typology. Throughout a number of articles published during the early 2000s
(Frederickson, Wood, & Logan, 2001; Frederickson & Johnson, 2001; Frederickson,
Logan, & Wood, 2003; Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004a) and cumulating in the
book The Adapted City: Institutional Dynamics and Structural Change (Frederickson,
Johnson, & Wood, 2004b), Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood, and others, undertake a
thorough review of the existing institutional structures in cities within the U.S. and
develop a classification system based upon a number of these structural variables.
This study is the result of the authors’ perceptions, “It is our empirical observation
that categorizing cities as mayor-council or council-manager had little real capacity to
explain how cities were actually democratically structured, organized, and managed”
(Frederickson et al., 2004b, p.4). These traditional mayor-council and council-manager
designations are both legal distinctions (from state incorporation laws) and institutional
concepts. Rather than cities distributed in a bi-modal distribution of structural
characteristics along these two traditional conceptual forms, their research finds that, “the
detailed features of these traditional models have been so mingled as to all but eliminate
the importance of the formal designation of a city as either a mayor-council or councilmanager city” (p.7).
In an article written in 2000, Ebdon and Brucato (2000) find evidence that
election methods utilized within these two traditional types of cities are becoming more
similar (specifically in the use of the direct election for the mayor and the use of the
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district election method for council). They also find that the use of Chief Administrative
Officers (CAOs) in mayor-council form cities is increasing. They conclude that the
convergence that they observe between the two traditional forms of city government
appear to be driven by an emphasis on different values, the complexity of additional
values other than efficiency in council-manager cities, and the increasing importance
council-manager cities are placing on representation. They conclude that both of the
traditional forms are, “increasingly combining these two values in their structural design”
(Ebdon & Brucato, 2000, p.2228).
Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood take this concept even further. To these
scholars the two categories of mayor-council and council-manager, “fail to describe very
important similarities and differences in city structures” (Frederickson, Johnson, &
Wood, 2004b, p. 101). In an effort to present a more accurate description of the
similarities and differences present in cities today they develop an entirely new
nomenclature, along with a new set of categories to use in describing city form. First
they label cities into three separate ‘types’ (Frederickson et al., 2004a) which they label
as type I cities (which describes the original mayor-council type of city, also called
political cities), type II cities (the unity of powers model labeled an administrative city),
and finally type III cities (those cities that are adapted forms). They then create a five
category classification plan for these cities that uses a number of different structural
features to identify similarities and differences among them. The five classifications that
they propose are:
1. Political Cities: (type I) this refers to the classical non-reformed mayor-council
structure with the separation-of-powers between mayor and council.
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2. Administrative City: (type II) this is also referred to as a pure administrative city.
It is the classical reformed city with a unified council and the council-manager
plan.
There are three variations of the Type III or adapted city:
3. Adapted Political Cities: while still a separation-of-powers structure, the major
differences between political and adapted political cities are the presence of a
professional full-time CAO, usually some at-large council members, and the
presence of a part-time council.
4. Adapted Administrative City: the major differences between a pure administrative
city and an adapted administrative city are the direct election of the mayor and the
probable election of some or all council members by district.
5. Conciliated City: the conciliated city is, “a complete mix of the primary
principles and logic of political and administrative cities” (Frederickson et al.,
2004b, p. 107). The primary difference in this and a political adapted city
involves the limited authority of the mayor. In conciliated cities the CAO has
executive authority over departments. The Mayor has no role in council, as is the
case in an administrative city, except possibly a vote in the case of a tie.
These three scholars utilize this new classification system to illustrate how that
over time most cities in the U.S. have incrementally changed structurally so that today the
majority should be classified as one of the type III or adapted city types rather than the
classical mayor-council or council-manager. Their findings do indicate a trend in
council-manager cities away from a “preoccupation with efficiency and toward political
problem solving” (Frederickson et al., 2004b, p. 105) and in mayor-council cities an
adaptation, “toward greater efficiency and managerial capacity” (p.105).
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In a more recent article, Carr and Karuppusamy (2008) propose a process for
coding cities into this ‘adapted framework’ based upon the charter elements that are
identified by Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004b). In their revised classification
process, the statutory distinctions between the council-manager form of government and
the mayor-council form of government are preserved. This additional distinction results
in two types of conciliated cities instead of Frederickson’s one; a ‘conciliated
administrative’ city and a ‘conciliated political’ city. This complicates the typology by
expanding the classification system to six categories instead of the original five, but it
does allow for the preservation of the distinction between the mayor-council and the
council-manager structured cities (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2008).
Recent Structural Changes Found in U.S. Cities
For a number of years scholars have observed structural changes taking place in
cities within the U.S. In an article in 1988 Charles Adrian (1988) identifies 5 trends of
convergence taking place between the two major forms of cities within the U.S. These
trends include an increase in the use of professionals (CAOs), an increase in the use of
mayor’s as political leaders for problems with ‘indeterminate’ resolutions, and the use of
ward systems to increase representation in cities that are growing more heterogeneous.
Numerous other studies have identified similar changes taking place within U.S.
cities. These changes include an increased use of CAOs in mayor-council cities, the
direct election of the mayor in council-manager cities, and the increased use of ward or
district elections for city council members (MacManus & Bullock, 2003; Ebdon &
Brucato, 2000; Frederickson, Logan, & Wood, 2003; Moulder, 2008).

21

The 2008 analysis by Moulder (2008) uses 2006 ICMA survey data to show that,
since the last survey was conducted in 2001, there has been a four percent increase in the
number of cities reporting the use of a CAO and the facts that most cities now allow for
the use of initiatives (58%) and legislative referendums (75%). In most cities that are
included in this survey (76%) the mayor is directly elected, usually is part-time (86%),
and usually has no term limit (91%) (Moulder, 2008). One very interesting finding in
this study is that since 1996 there has been a steady drop in the authority of the CEO to
develop and make recommendations on the budget submitted to the council (from 13%
in 1996 to 11% in 2006). There has, at the same time however, occurred an increase in
authority given to the CAO (up from 57% to 65%) to do the same. They conclude that
the most noteworthy changes are the increases in the use of CAOs in mayor-council cities
and the number of form changes occurring within the council-manager plan cities.
Possible Reasons for these Structural Changes
Scholars have also examined various reasons that may have caused these
structural changes in cities over the past few decades. The two primary types of city
government found in the U.S., the mayor-council and the council-manager forms, are
described as containing the tendency to either experience conflict (as in mayor-council
forms) or cooperation (as in council-manager forms) (Svara, 1990). The unreformed
mayor-council system is built upon the idea of a separation of powers between the
council and the chief executive officer (the mayor). The reformed council-manager
system is built upon the idea of a unified government with a controlled executive (the city
manager). These models are sometimes referred to as the presidential model and the
parliamentary model respectively (Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004a).
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In an earlier article on the subject, Chester Newland (1995) places the blame for
much of the structural change that is taking place in cities on a return to ‘transactional’
politics. Newland says that the emphasis that political science places on ‘politics as
power’ during the 1950s and 1960s coupled with the increase in partisanship in local
politics gives rise to this return to transactional politics. The reform movement and its
use of the council-manager plan are designed to facilitate collaborative authority and the
use of ‘transformational’ politics. The unreformed mayor-council plan, on the other
hand, emphasizes separation of powers and fragmented administration. Transformational
politics and professional expert administration are the ideals of the council-manager plan
while transactional politics and politically sensitive administration are the ideals of the
mayor-council plan (Newland, 1995). To Newland, the positive values within the mayorcouncil plan are being incorporated into the council-manager plan, thus eroding the
orthodoxy and causing diversity to prevail.
In the late 1990s Bill Hansell (then ICMA executive director) puts forward the
idea that there are three reasons that led citizens to question the council-manager form of
government (Hansell, 1998a; 1998b). First, because professionalism has been extended
to all parts of service delivery, people question why a professional manager is required to
manage these professionals. Second, because the profession has never imposed
qualifications on professional city managers, citizens question why a mayor cannot be as
equally qualified as a city manager. And third, because councils lost the ideal of a citizen
volunteer, a real conflict of roles and competencies is now built into the system.
Some scholars see the changes occurring as an offshoot of the accountability
movement (MacManus & Bullock, 2003), or as the result of the increasing convergence
of the values of efficiency and representation within the two major forms (Ebdon &
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Brucato, 2000). Others see the forces of change as coming from the demographic,
economic, environmental, political, technological, and urban patterns taking place within
the country (Kemp, 2000).
In their various articles written on the subject of institutional changes in American
cities and in their 2004 book The Adapted City: Institutional Dynamics and Structural
Change, Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004a; 2004b) make the argument that in
many cases these changes appear to be the result of cities trying to use an institutional fix
to solve leadership and other problems that they are facing. They put forward that the
basic values that typically characterize the two traditional forms of cities are, the ideal of
efficiency, management, and productivity capability within council-manager cities and
political leadership, responsiveness, and accountability within mayor-council cities.
They contend that after the 1970s, “changing values and disappointment with the status
quo would change both political and administrative cities just as the reform movement
had driven earlier change” (Frederickson et al., 2004b, p.51). They describe three forces
that are driving these patterns of change within U.S. cities: 1) the drive for political
responsiveness; 2) the drive for political leadership; and 3) the drive for administrative
efficiency. These forces are manifested in several assumptions that promote change
(Frederickson et al., 2004a).
First, it is assumed that the addition of a CAO in mayor-council cities will lead to
improved efficiency and effectiveness. This assumption is based on studies of councilmanager cities with professional city managers. Svara states that studies show that when
council-manager cities are compared to mayor-council cities, the reformed cities are more
likely to have, “greater efficiency, sounder finances, and stronger management
performance” (Svara, 2008, p.10). Council-manager cities also exhibit a higher minority
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representation on staff and a number of other positive features. Svara goes on to say that
comparative studies usually do not find a distinction between mayor-council cities that
hire or do not hire a professional CAO. As a result, this first assumption may be
questionable.
A second assumption Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004a) express goes as
follows. If a council-manager city increases the role of the mayor within the institutional
system, or the council is elected by district rather than at large, then the results will be
better specific representation (Frederickson et al., 2004a). Their findings indicate that,
beginning over 50 years ago, American cities began a convergence of the two separate
values of administrative efficiency and political representation by imposing structural
changes upon their institutional systems. Changes made in one form added to it the
prominent features that are to be found in the opposite traditional form. For example, the
direct election of mayors and the district election of council member so prominent in the
mayor-council form are adopted in council-manager cities to increase political
representation. Similarly, mayor-council cities begin including professional executives
(CAOs). They state that, “Citizens appear to favor blending the contrasting logic of unity
of powers and separation of powers and believe this blending to be compatible”
(Frederickson et al., 2004a, p.329).
In short, scholars propose a number of different reasons to explain the structural
changes taking place in American cities over the past few decades. The return to
transactional politics; the rise of professionalism in all areas of service delivery leading
citizens to question the need for professional managers at the top; the lack of professional
qualifications for city managers; the rise of the career local politicians bringing with it a
conflict of roles; a rise in the accountability movement; forces of change from
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demographic and other external areas; and disappointment with the status quo leading to
a drive for political responsiveness, political leadership, and administrative efficiency.
All of these reasons are suggested to drive structural change in municipalities.
Possible Consequences of Structural Changes and Reasons to Keep Forms
Separated
While there is little disagreement that structural change is taking place in
American cities over the past few decades, there are divergent views on the desirability pf
these changes or on the effects that these changes are actually having on the processes
taking place in cities. James H. Svara, in particular, is critical of claims made that,
“excessively discounts the significance of form” (Svara, 2005, p.503). In a number of
articles, Svara promotes the idea that the two traditional forms of mayor-council and
council-manager are still relevant for explaining differences in behavior and outcomes
even when structural changes such as those that define ‘adapted cities’ are occurring.
According to Svara, structures make a difference in the attitudes and behavior of
officials and the performance of local government. While discussing the continued need
for model charters that promote the reform ideas within the council-manager plan, Svara
says, “Models are based on values that signal what kind of attitude and behavior is
deemed appropriate” (Svara, 2001a, p.30). Early reformers use the council-manager form
of government not only to advance the administrative performance of cities but also to
promote their democratic aspirations (Svara, 1994). The council-manager plan is
promoted because it is based upon a unitary model that is intended to lessen conflict and
promote city-wide interest. Unlike the mayor-council plan, it strengthens the executive
while at the same time controlling him. The appointed executive has advantages over an
elected executive system where the role of the council can be limited and the possibility
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of debilitating conflict is possible between the mayor and council. Form provides a
contextual setting to the organization (Svara & Nelson, 2008). Mayors in mayor-council
cities are more likely to use a ‘power over’ leadership style while mayors in councilmanager cities are more likely to use a ‘power to’ facilitative leadership style.
The allocation of authority, how executive responsibilities are assigned, and if a
top administrator is responsible to a mayor or to the council (if one is present) are three
features that differentiate the two traditional plans (Svara & Nelson, 2008). The mere
presence of a CAO in a city or the adoption of the direct election of a mayor does not
create a hybrid out of the two systems unless one of the three features mentioned above
are altered. For example, if the council is given sole responsible for the appointment of
the CAO in a mayor-council city or if the directly elected mayor in a council-manager
city is given executive responsibilities, then one might be able to say that an alteration of
the original form has taken place. However, giving the mayor the power of a legislative
veto does not constitute or equate with giving the mayor executive authority in a city
because such a veto is a tool for determining policy not executive power (Svara, 2008a).
In a 2010 article, Kimberly L. Nelson and James H. Svara (2010) propose a
revised method of classifying a city’s form of government based upon two dimensions of
the constitutional principles of separation of powers and integrated authority. In their
classification system they derive seven variations of cities based upon, “The extent to
which the mayor is distinguished from the council” and , “The professional status of the
CAO based on the range of elected officials to which the CAO is accountable and the
CAOs autonomy in determining scope of responsibilities” (Nelson & Svara, 2010, p.
551). Using a data base created from virtually all U.S. cities with population of 10,000 or
more, they make several findings. In council-manager cities, one-third selects the mayor
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internally, though much more so in smaller communities (Nelson & Svara, 2010). In
addition, in council-manager cities direct election of the mayor is more common than
having a mayor selected by council, but only 1% of such cities have a mayor that
nominates a city manager that is then appointed by the council (Nelson & Svara, 2010).
In mayor-council cities it is found that in 16% of these cities the CAO is actually
appointed by the council and not the mayor, however, this is again more common in
smaller cities (under 100,000) than in larger ones. The most common method of CAO
appointment in these mayor-council cities is appointment by the mayor with approval of
the council (Nelson & Svara, 2010). In larger mayor-council cities (over 250,000) the
most common method of appointing a CAO is appointment by the mayor without council
approval needed (12% of all council-manager cities). In most (52%) mayor-council
cities, however, the mayor serves as the chief executive officer and does not have an
appointed CAO. Svara and Nelson (2010) propose that the seven categories they put
forward represent a progression from a city with “low centralized political leadership and
high professional autonomy to high political leadership and low professional autonomy”
(p. 558). Using this seven category variable in research performed in the future may
show different results than using the dichotomous mayor-council, council-manager
system (Nelson & Svara, 2010).
Scholars have the tendency in recent years to assert that CAOs in mayor-council
cities are the functional equivalent of city managers in council-manager cities. As
mentioned earlier in this paper, the idea that the addition of a CAO can bring more
professional administrative efficiency to a mayor-council form city is one of the driving
forces of change. The idea that, “Most CAOs function very much like a city manager…”
(Frederickson et al., 2004a, p. 325) is a common theme.
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In her 2002 article examining CAOs in the twenty six largest cities in the United
States that operated under the mayor-council form of government, Nelson finds that
many of the stereotypical ideas about CAOs do not consistently hold up under close
examination (Nelson, 2002). She looks only at the formal factors involving CAOs, such
as who hires and fires the CAO and how duties and responsibilities are assigned. She
finds that several factors are important in evaluating the role of the CAO in a city. These
formal factors include: who has the authority to appoint and remove the CAO, how the
formal status of the CAO is established (charter, ordinance, or informally), and what
formal authority that the CAO is given (appoint personnel, the budget, daily operations).
The role of the CAO in the cities she studied varies depending on how these factors are
enacted in each city (Nelson, 2002).
David Ammons (2008) examines the differences between the roles of CAOs in
mayor-council cities and City Managers in council-manager cities by asking questions of
those individuals who have served in both capacities during their careers (Ammons,
2008). What he finds in this examination is that while these individuals do not see the
two traditional forms of government as polar opposites they do see mayor-council cities
as distinctly more political than council-manager cities. More than half say that both
CAOs and CMs have an equal influence on the budget (although 46% said that the CM
has more), 80% say that the city manager has more responsibility than the CAO, but a
plurality (30%) say that the CAO’s job is more complex and more political than the city
manager’s. Overall, while the surveyed group did see a lot of similarities between the
jobs, they also saw big differences. These differences include how political the job is, the
influence each has on the budget and personnel functions, and the responsibility level of
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each. They agree on role similarities but reject the idea of role equivalency (Ammons,
2008).
One of the most significant differences that form of government makes concerns
policy choice (Feiock, Jeong, & Jaehoon, 2003). In a panel design study that uses ICMA
surveys on economic development from 1984 and 1989, these authors find some
significant differences between these two forms of government. Their findings help to
confirm the idea that the use of the council-manager form of government promotes
greater consideration toward longer-term interests for citizens while the structure of
incentives that are found in the mayor-council form of government can lead officials to
use developmental policies as a stage to promote personal and political goals. Their
study shows that the council-manager form of government works to constrain
opportunistic behavior. In the discussion of their findings they write:
Finally, this article has argued that the separation of
administration from electoral control enhances efficiency
because it removes high-power incentives for executives,
reduces transaction costs, and makes commitment more
credible for elected officers. If this argument has merit, the
city management profession and scholars of local
institutions may be too sanguine about the movement
toward adapted cities in which council-manager
governments alter the architecture of local institutions by
adding a directly elected mayor (Feiock et al., 2003, p.
623).
The findings of these scholars suggest that there are indeed consequences that are
possible when structural adaptations are made to the two forms of government. There is
a rational reason for keeping the two forms of government separate for analytical study.
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Conclusion
From these readings the evidence is fairly clear; institutional structures in cities
within the United States have undergone changes. Indeed, this change appears to take
place since the beginning of the Republic. The adapted cities framework developed by
Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004a; 2004b) helps to empirically highlight and
describe many of these changes taking place in recent years in both council-manager and
mayor-council form cities.
While there is little debate among scholars concerning the fact that adaptations in
municipalities are taking place, considerably more debate is found concerning what these
changes actually mean. Questions such as ‘when does a change mean a fundamental shift
in institutional orientation?’ and ‘do certain structural changes alter the relationship
between the CAO and the elected body?’ still go mostly unanswered. What do these
changes mean for policy and operational decisions that affect the outputs and outcomes
of these cities?
In a recent article in Public Management, Svara and Nelson (2008) concur that
forms of local government such as the council-manager plan, based on parliamentary
principles, continue to incorporate essential features even as certain electoral and
executive features are altered. These forms can operate with various combinations of
changes in these features and yet still incorporate, “the essential features of unified
authority, assignment of executive responsibilities to the professional top administrator,
and accountability of the administrator to the entire council” (Svara & Nelson, 2008,
p.12).
The debate over the question of ‘what difference does structure make?’ will
continue. Only empirical studies of actual cities’ policies, outputs, and outcomes and
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their association with structures present within those cities will help to answer this
important question.
Developing Independent Variables
Reformers of the early 20th century believe that by changing the institutions of
local government through structural reforms they could replace the political leadership
that so dominates municipal structures at the time and bring efficiency and professional
management to city services (Adrian, 1988). The council manager plan is promoted in an
effort to promote a unitary model of government that will lessen conflict, promote
citywide effort, and strengthen the chief executive (the appointed city manager) (Svara,
1994).
Most research concerning municipal governments has contrasted council-manager
form cities against the non-reformed cities (those based upon an elected mayor that
performs the duties of chief executive officer (CEO) along with a separately elected city
council). This dichotomous comparison is usually employed to ascertain differences
between these two forms regarding service performance levels and other data of interest
to the researchers. As discussed above, scholars have recently begun to point to a
convergence among the structural characteristics between these two classical forms of
local governments. Scholars argue that each of the two separate forms possess adopted
institutional attributes of the other to the point that it is, in many cases, hard to distinguish
one from the other (Frederickson et al., 2004b). Frederickson et al. calls these type cities
‘hybrid’ or ‘adapted’ cities. Their studies indicate that most cities in the U.S. now fit into
this ‘adapted’ category and because of this fact the diagnostic value of using the
dichotomous distinction of council-manager and mayor-council is greatly diminished.
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To enhance the body of knowledge regarding these ‘hybrid’ cities the author uses
form of government as the independent variable in this study. This form is derived based
upon the institutional characteristics designated by Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood in
their ‘Adapted Cities Framework” (Frederickson et al., 2004b). As such, the following
table, adapted from their book, is used to categorize each individual municipality into one
of the five types of cities developed by these authors (political, adapted political,
conciliated, adapted administrative, administrative).
Table 2.1

Summary of Adapted Cities Structural Framework
Variable

1 Key

Howis the Mayor elected
HowAre Most Council
2 Key
Members Elected
3 Key
Is aCAOPresent
4 Key Is Mayor is onthe council
5
Does Mayor have vetopower
6
Mayor Full or Part-time
7
Mayor has astaff
8
Council Full or Part-time
9
Does Council have aStaff
Electionmethod- Partisanor
10
Nonpartisan
WhodoDepartment Heads
11
report to

AdaptedPolitical

Directly

Directly
Directly or by
Directly
District, At-large, District, At-large, District, At-large,
or mixed
or mixed
or mixed
Likely
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Maybe
No
Full-time
either
Usually Part-time
Yes
maybe
No
Either
Either
Part-time
Maybe
No
No
Usually
Either
Either
Nonpartisan

District
No
No
Yes
Full-time
Yes
Full-time
Yes
Either
Mayor

Mayor

12

Whoappoints the CAO

Mayor is CAO

Mayor alone

13
14

Presence of Civil Service
Presence of BiddingSystem

Maybe
Maybe

StatutoryForm

mayor-council

Maybe
Yes
Likely mayorcouncil

15 Key

Conciliated

Adapted
Administrative

Political

CAO
Mayor with
Council Consent
Usually
Yes
Either

Administrative
By Council
Most At-large
Yes
Yes
No
Part-time
No
Part-time
No
Nonpartisan

CAO

CAO

Council

Council

Usually
Yes
Likely councilmanager

Usually
Yes
council-manager

Each variable is measured from a specific question asked in the survey
instrument. The survey questions used and the accompanying response for each category
are as follows:
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Table 2.2

Summary of Study’s Classification method
Variable

Survey
Question #

Political

Adapted
Political

Conciliated

1

How is the Mayor elected

6B

Directly

Directly

Directly or by
Council

2

How Are Most Council
Members Elected

7A

District

Is a CAO Present
Is Mayor is on the council
Does Mayor have veto
power

8A
6E

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

6F

Yes

Yes

Yes or No

No

No

6

Mayor Full or Part-time

6H

Full-time

Full-time

Part-time

Part-time

7

Mayor has a staff

6I

Yes

No

No

8

Council Full or Part-time

7C

Full-time

Yes
Full-time or
Part-time
Yes or No

Full-time or
Part-time
Yes or No
Full-time or
Part-time
No

Part-time

Part-time

No

No

Partisan or Non- Partisan or
Parisan
Non-Parisan

Partisan or
Non-Parisan

Nonpartisan

Nonpartisan

CAO

CAO

Council or Both
Jointly
Yes or No

Council or Both
Jointly
Yes or No

Yes

Yes

councilmanager

council-manager

3
4
5

9

7D

8D

Mayor

Mayor

CAO

12

Who appoints the CAO

8C

none

Mayor

Both Jointly

13
14

Presence of Civil Service
Presence of Bidding System

9A
9C

Yes or No

Yes or No

Yes or No

Yes or No

Yes

15

Statutory Form

9D

2D

mayor-council

Directly

By Council

District, AtDistrict, AtDistrict, Atlarge, or mixed large, or mixed large, or mixed

Does Council have a Staff
Election method - Partisan or
10
Nonpartisan
Who do Department Heads
11
report to

Yes

Adapted
Administrative
Administrative

Yes
mayor-council
mayor-council or councilmanager

At-large

It is important to maintain the integrity of the original adapted cities framework
using the five ordinal categories as shown above. In order, however, to capture a more
elaborate classification system than the multinomial categories developed above, an
interval level independent variable is also developed.
In a 2008 article, Carr and Karuppusamy (2008) suggest several enhancements to
the original adapted cities framework intended to improve the process for coding cities
into the different types. They also propose the importance of keeping the two original
forms of mayor-council and council manager distinct. This separation of form is
important to address criticisms of scholars such as Svara (2005) that stress the differences
in normative values expressed within each separate form. “Our approach preserves the
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statutory platform as the base for coding cities in this framework and limits the
adaptations on each platform to only two categories” (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2008,
p.876). In order to accomplish this separation their enhanced framework includes six
rather than the original five city categories. In their enhanced framework they divided
conciliated type cities into two separate types; one for conciliated political cities and one
for conciliated administrative cities. Their enhanced coding system is found in the
following table.
Table 2.3

Summary of Carr and Karuppusamy Classification System

From the enchanced Charter Framework
Political

1

2

3

4

Adapted Political

Tier one Provisions
Charter permits Mayor
Charter does not allow Charter permits Mayor
to appt CAO w/ ccuncil
appt CAO - Mayor is to appt CAO who report
consent - who reports
CAO
to the Mayor
to the Mayor
Mayor is PT or FT and
Mayor is FT and
Mayor is FT and
directly elected or
directly elected
directly elected
appointed by council
Council is FT & usually Council is FT & usually
elected by district (Atelected by district
Council is FT or PT
large is not uncommon (sometimes by mixed
elected At-large
in large cities)
system)
Mayor does not serves Mayor does not serves Mayor does or does not
on council
on council
serve on the council

5

Mayor has Veto

Mayor has Veto

6

Mayor and council
serve 4 year terms

Mayor and council
usually serve 4 year
terms

7
8
9

10
11

Political Conciliated

Mayor prepares the
Mayor prepares the
budget
budget
Dept heads report to the Dept heads report to the
mayor
mayor
Mayor and council
Mayor appoints most
share authority to
key officials
appoint key officials
Council is large (7-9)
Council is large (7-9)
and standing
and standing
committees are
committees are
authorized
authorized
Mayor and council
Mayor has staff &
have staff
council may have staff

Tier two Provisions
Mayor may have veto
power
Mayor serves term for
less than 4 years and
council terms are 4
years

Administrative
Conciliated

Charter permits CAO
Mayor is PT or FT and
directly elected or
appointed by council
Council is FT or PT
elected At-large or by
district

Adapted
Administrative

Administrative

Charter permits CAO
Charter permits CAO
who reports to Council who reports to Council
Mayor is PT and
directly elected

Mayor is PT and
selected from council

Council is PT & elected
Council is PT & elected
At-large or by mixed
At-large
methods

Mayor usually does not
serve on council

Mayor serves on
council

Mayor serves on
council

Mayor has Veto

Mayor may have veto

No Mayor Veto

Mayor serves 4 years or
Mayor seves 2 yrs & Mayor & council serve
less & council usually
council 4 years or less
2 year terms
serves 4 years

CAO prepares budget

CAO prepares budget

CAO prepares budget

CAO prepares budget

Dept heads report to
CAO
CAO & council share
power to appoint key
officials

Dept heads report to
CAO
CAO, Mayor, & council
share power to appoint
key officials

Dept heads report to
CAO
CAO & council share
power to appoint key
officials

Dept heads report to
CAO
CAO appoints key
officials (some elected
ok)

Council is small (5-7) &
standing committees
not authorized

Council is small (5-7) & Council is small (5-7) &
charter is usually silent standing committees
Council is small (5-7)
on standing committees
not authorized

Mayor has staff &
council may have staff

Mayor & council may
No mayor/council staff No mayor/council staff
have staff
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To develop the continuous independent variable for this study, a combination of
the two frameworks (the original and the enhanced) are utilized. In order to maintain the
distinction between municipalities operating under the mayor-council and councilmanager form of government, two types of conciliated municipalities are recognized
(political and administrative) as suggested by Carr and Karuppusamy (2008). Point
values are assigned to each institutional feature with the value given determined by the
importance that each framework places on that particular feature. For example, in the
original framework several features are labeled as ‘key’ features. In the enhanced
framework structural features are divided between what Carr and Karuppusamy (2008)
describe as ‘tier one’ and ‘tier two’ features. To assign point values for each city those
features considered most important (referred to as tier I features in the Carr &
Karuppusamy framework) are assigned a higher point value than those that are less
important (tier II features). In the table shown below each tier one feature change is
given a value of 2 points and each tier two feature change is given a value of 1 point.
The cumulative point count of each feature change is consistent with this method of
assigning point values. For example, under the Tier one category of ‘CAO
INFORMATION’ in the table, a city that does not allow for appointment of a CAO is
given a point value of ‘0’. If a city allows the mayor to appoint a CAO, that city is
assigned a point value of ‘2’. If the mayor can appoint the CAO but must obtain the
council’s consent two additional points are added to the score making it ‘4’ points total.
Finally, if the CAO is appointed by the council as a whole (the most administrative
feature of all) then two additional points are again added to the score giving that city a
total point count of ‘6’. Using this manner of scoring, as more administrative adaptations

36

are made to any specific feature a higher score is produced. The higher the score the
more administrative the municipality is structured.
To maintain a separation between the two distinct forms of mayor-council and
council-manager, a value of 20 points is assigned to a council-manager city and a zero
value is given to a mayor-council form city.
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Table 2.4

Score variable point allocation system
Political

Adapted Political

Political
Conciliated

Administrative
Conciliated

Adapted
Administrative

na

na

0

0

na

20

20

20

0

na

na

na

0

0

0

20

20

20

Administrative

Keep
Forms
A Separate CITY FORM
1

Council -Manager Form

2

Mayor-Council Form

Subtotal

Charter does not
allow appt CAO Mayor is CAO

B Tier 1-1 CAO INFORMATION

Charter permits
Charter permits
Mayor to appt CAO
Mayor to appt CAO
w/ council consent who reports to the
CAO reports to the
Mayor
Mayor

Charter permits
Charter permits
Council to appt
Council to appt CAO
Charter permits
CAO (usually
(usually called City
Appointment of CAO
called City
Manager) CAO
Manager) CAO
reports to council
reports to council

3

(For M/C) Charter does not allow CAO

0

na

na

na

na

na

4

(For M/C) Charter allows mayor to
appoint CAO

na

2

na

2

na

na

5

Mayor appoints with Council consent

na

na

4

na

4

na

6
7
8

Council appoints CAO

na
na
na

na
0
na

na
0
na

na
na
2

na
na
2

6
na
2

4

6

CAO reports to the Mayor
CAO reports to Council

Subtotal

C Tier 1-2 MAYOR ATTRIBUTES

0

2

4

Mayor is FT and
directly elected by
the public

Mayor is FT and
directly elected by
the public

Mayor is PT or FT
and directly
selected from
council

0
na
0

na
2
na

0
na
0

0
na
0

na
2
na

Mayor is FT and
Mayor is FT and
directly elected or directly elected by
selected by council
the public

8
Mayor is PT and
directly selected
from among
member of the
council

9
10
11

Mayor is Full Time
Mayor is Directly Elected

0
na
0

12

Mayor is Appointed by Council

na

na

2

na

na

2

0

0

4

0

0

4

Mayor is Part Time

Subtotal

D Tier 1-3 COUNCIL ATTRIBUTES
13
14
15
16

Council is Full Time
Council is Part Time
Council Elected by Districts
Council Elected by other method (eg.
At-large)

Subtotal

E Tier 1 - 4 MAYOR ON COUNCIL
17

Mayor does not serves on council

18

Mayor serves on the council

Subtotal

F Tier 2 - 1 MAYOR VETO
19

Mayor has Veto

20

Mayor does not have veto

Council is FT &
Council is FT &
usually elected by
members are
Council is FT or PT,
district although at- elected mostly by
members are
large is not
district and
usually elected Atuncommon in large sometimes by mixed
large
cities
system

Council is FT or PT
and members are
Council is PT &
Council is PT &
usually elected At- usually elected Atusually elected Atlarge and
large or by mixed
large
sometimes by
methods
district

0
na
0

0
na
0

na
2
na

0
na
0

0
na
0

na
2
na

na

na

2

na

na

2

0

0

0

0

4

Mayor does not
serves on council

Mayor does not
serves on council

Mayor does (or not)
serve on the council

Mayor usually does Mayor serves on
not serve on council
council

4
Mayor serves on
council

0

0

na

0

na

na

na

na

2

na

2

2

0

0

2

0

2

2

Mayor has Veto

Mayor has Veto

Mayor may have
veto power

Mayor has Veto

Mayor may have
veto

Mayor does not
have Veto power

0

0

na

0

0

na

na

na

1

na

na

1
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Table 2.4 (Continued)
Adapted Political

Political
Conciliated

Administrative
Conciliated

Adapted
Administrative

Administrative

Mayor prepares the Mayor prepares the
budget
budget

CAO prepares
budget

CAO prepares
budget

CAO prepares
budget

CAO prepares
budget

Political

H Tier 2 - 3a BUDGET PREP
25

Mayor prepares the budget

26

CAO prepares the budget

Subtotal

0

0

na

na

na

na

na

na

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

Dept heads report to Dept heads report to Dept heads report to
the mayor
the mayor
CAO

I Tier 2 - 3b DEPT HEADS REPORT TO
27

Dept heads report to the mayor

28

Dept heads report to the CAO

Subtotal

J Tier 2 - 4 APPT. OF KEY OFF.

Dept heads report to Dept heads report
CAO
to CAO

1
Dept heads report
to CAO

0

0

0

na

na

na

na

na

na

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

CAO, Mayor, &
council share power
to appoint key
officials

CAO & council
share power to
appoint key
officials

CAO appoints key
officials (a few may
be directly elected)

Mayor and council
CAO & council
Mayor appoints
share authority to
share power to
most key officials
appoint key
appoint key
(e.g. clerk, attorney,
officials (e.g. clerk, officials (e.g. clerk,
treasurer)
attorney, treasurer) attorney, treasurer)

29

(M/C Only) Mayor appoints most key
officials

0

na

na

na

na

na

30

Mayor and council share authority to
appoint key officials

na

1

na

1

na

na

31

CAO & council share power to appoint
key officials

na

na

2

na

2

na

32

(C/M only) CAO appoints key officials

na

na

na

na

na

3

Subtotal

0

1

2

1

2

3

K Tier 2 - 5 COUNCIL SIZE
33

Council large (7 members or more)

34

Council is smaller (7 members or less)

35

Standing committees are authorized

36

Standing committees not authorized

Subtotal

L Tier 2 - 6 STAFF
37
38
39
40

Mayor has staff
Mayor does not have staff
Council has staff
Council does not have staff

Subtotal

Council is large (79) and standing
committees are
authorized

Council is large (7- Council is small (59) and standing
7) & standing
committees are
committees not
authorized
authorized

Council is small (57) & charter is
usually silent on
standing
committees

Council is small Council is small (5(5-7) & standing
7) & standing
committees not
committees not
authorized
authorized

0

0

na

na

na

1

1

1

1

0

0

na

0

na

na

na

na

1

na

1

1

0

0

2

1

2

2

Mayor and council
have staff

Mayor has staff &
council may have
staff

Mayor and council
may have staff

Mayor & council
may have staff

0
na
0
na

0
na
0
na

0
na
na
1

0
na
0
na

na
1
na
1

na
1
na
1

0

0

1

0

2

2

0

3

22

28

37

50

Mayor/council do Mayor/council do
not have staff
not have staff

Using the table above to classify each individual city allows the author to depict
where an ideal city in each of the six categories will potentially score. The total point
count for each city results in scores ranging from zero (for an ideal pure political city) to
a score of 50 (for an ideal pure administrative city). Scores for the ideal municipality in
each of the six types of cities is observed at the bottom of the chart. An ideal adapted
political city scores a 3; an ideal political conciliated city scores a 22; an ideal
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administrative conciliated city scores a 28; an ideal adapted administrative city scores a
37; and an ideal pure administrative city scores a perfect 50. Of course, few cities will
exactly meet the ideal scores described above, but rather each falls somewhere along the
continuum.

Figure 2.1

City Continuum
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CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
This literature review chapter presents a discussion of the research available
within the Public Administration field concerning the areas of interest included within
this analysis.
Research conducted concerning the relationship between form of local
government and municipal per capita expenditures is reviewed. Additionally, the existing
literature concerning the management, political, and policy roles of the chief
administrative officer of a municipality are also presented. A discussion of the literature
concerning the provision and quality of municipal services in relation to form of
government is also examined. Finally, literature concerning the involvement levels of the
chief administrative officer in relation with his or her municipal council for activities
associated with the mission, administrative, policy and management dimensions in their
respective municipalities is also reviewed.
Information that is provided in this chapter is meant to enhance the reader’s
knowledge concerning the relationship that exists between the independent variables put
forward in this study and the nine dependent variables analyzed.
Form of Government and Expenditures
Reformers of the early 20th century believe that by changing the institutions of local
government and looking to the corporate model for structure, they can replace the dominant
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system of political leadership and subgroup representation and bring efficiency and professional
management to city services (Adrian, 1988). Searching for evidence of this promised efficiency,
several scholars and researchers, over the years, examine the relationship between form of
government and the expenditure levels of municipalities. Most of these scholars look to find
evidence that reformed municipal government is more efficient. Almost all of the studies utilize
some variant of the dichotomous (mayor-council and council-manager) measure of government
structure in their analysis. The results of these numerous studies often show mixed or contrary
results.
In 1961 Edgar L. Sherbenou (1961) uses data from forty-nine suburban Chicago cities,
with populations greater than 5,000, in order to evaluate expenditure, tax, and debt patterns in
relation to government institutional structure. Within these forty –nine cities, twenty-four have
the council-manager form of government and the remaining twenty-five have a non-councilmanager form. When he compares the averages for total per capita expenditures, per capita debt,
and municipal property tax per capita he discovers that those cities under the council-manager
system of government exhibit higher per capita expenditures and higher per capita property taxes
but lower per capita debt. He also notes that the major variable in this pattern is, in his opinion,
the greater wealth of the citizens found in many of the suburban communities that have adopted
the council-manager plan. Sherbenou asserts that the argument used by council-manager
proponents, that the plan tends to develop a public confidence in the in the efficiency of
municipal government, is supported by this data. An increase in public confidence leads to
demands for the expanding of services and an increase in the willingness to pay (Sherbenou,
1961).
In 1966 Bernard Booms (1966) collects data from seventy-three cities in Ohio and
Michigan with populations between 25,000 and 100,000 in order to examine determinates of
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public expenditures. Thirty- six of these cities are council-manager form cities and the other
thirty-seven are mayor-council form. Using multiple regression analysis Booms looks at the
relationship between per capita expenditures and several independent variables, including a
dummy variable for form of government. The main conclusion of this study, according to
Booms, is that a significant difference exists between the two forms of cities in average per capita
expenditures (Booms, 1966), with mayor-council cities exhibiting higher per capita expenditures
than council-manager cities. He does concede, however, that the absence of controls for several
characteristics found in cities limits the study’s findings.
Also in 1966, Samuel Nunn (1966) conducts a study designed to analyze the
infrastructure policies and per capita spending on capital facilities for seven council-manager
cities in Texas and seven mayor-council cities in Indiana. The populations in these fourteen cities
range from a low of 24,000 to a high of 933,000 persons. In addition to Nunn’s desire to
determine whether different levels of formality and private participation are associated with the
policies between the two types of municipalities, he also wants to determine if the capital
expenditure patterns between the two types of cities vary significantly. Using a variety of
qualitative and quantitative methods, Nunn (1966) is able to determine from the data that the
policies of the two types of cities do appear to utilize two different approaches in the provision of
capital facilities for the public. Policies in council-manager cities are more formalized and
contain more specifications involving cost sharing arrangements with private contractors as
opposed to the more informal and flexible case by case methods mayor-council communities use.
In addition he also finds that the council-manager cities in Texas spent considerable more
resources on infrastructure such as water, sewer, and roads per capita than did the mayor-council
cities in Indiana (Nunn, 1966) and this is true even when demographic, economic and fiscal
differences are controlled.

43

In 1967, Robert T. Lineberry and Edmund Fowler (1967) look at the impact that policy
structures, in both reformed and unreformed cities in America, have on taxation and expenditure
levels in these cities. Using a random sample of 200 of the 309 cities in the United States in 1960
with populations greater than 50,000, these scholars examine the effect of a number of social and
socio-economic factors on government spending and taxation levels. Their conclusions are (with
some exceptions such as expenditures in partisan verses non-partisan cities), reformed cities
spend less and tax less than unreformed cities (Lineberry & Fowler, 1967).
In 1971 Richard L. Cole (1971) examines the relationship the variables of region and
structure of local government have on the policy outputs, put into operational form such as
percentage of civil service employees, per capita expenditures on planning, and per capita urban
renewal requests (Cole, 1971). Using data from all United States cities with a population of more
than 50,000, Cole creates a calculated reform variable based upon a city’s adopted form of
government, manner of election, and its manner of districting council seats. His analysis
indicates that political structure, when used alone, proves an “inadequate predictor” of urban
policy (Cole, 1971, p.651). For the three dependent variables he looks at, only the per capita
spending on planning is found to be significant. Cole concludes that these results have broad
implications for those attempting to base a model of urban politics upon a single phenomenon
such as structure. Any such model, “must account for a variety of socioeconomic cleavages as
well as a variety of political variables” (Cole, 1971, p.655).
In 1974 Roland J. Liebert (1974) takes issue with the earlier findings of Lineberry and
Fowler (1967) concerning municipal expenditures and their relationship to reformed or
unreformed structures. Using data captured from a survey of 676 United States cites with a
population of more than 25,000, Liebert argues that prior studies discount the effects of functional
responsibility on expenditure levels. Municipal spending levels are determined, he argues, more
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by the responsibility of a city to perform a function than by the level of community policy
commitments (Liebert, 1974). For example, he points out the fact that in the vast majority of
cities that he surveyed (516 out of the 676) responsibility for the education function rests with
some other governmental entity. Likewise, in 511 of the 676 cites, the responsibility for the three
major welfare programs for 1965 are either not assumed by or delegated to the municipalities.
When the data from the earlier Lineberry and Fowler study is reevaluated to include a control for
functional inclusiveness Liebert finds only mixed results (Liebert, 1974). Findings indicate that
while one-third of unreformed cities tend to show more responsiveness to minority interest via
higher expenditure levels, reformed cities show only slight responsiveness to middle class
concerns and their predisposition for lower expenditures. Liebert concludes that any evaluation of
structure and expenditures in municipalities must also include controls for functional
inclusiveness (Liebert, 1974).
Building upon Liebert’s (1974) ideas concerning functional responsibility, Thomas Dye
and John Garcia (1978), in 1978, examine 243 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA’s)
along with 340 suburban municipalities with more than 10,000 in populations that surrounded
those SMSA’s. Their analysis finds that municipalities that they call ‘functionally
comprehensive’ cities (those responsible for the functions of education, welfare, and hospitals)
show higher per capita tax revenues, higher per capital general revenues, and higher per capita
intergovernmental revenues compared to those that did not provide these functions (what they
termed ‘functionally specialized’ cities) (Dye & Garcia, 1978). In fact, when functional
responsibility is controlled by using the simple measure of ‘total number of functions’, it explains
42% of the variation in per capita expenditures and 40% of the variation in per capita taxes in the
central cities examined (p.112). They did not find any evidence that increasing functional
responsibility in cities adversely affects spending levels for other common municipal functions
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such as per capita police expenditures. They conclude that “Functional responsibility explains
more of the variance in overall taxing and spending levels than any socioeconomic variable” (Dye
& Garcia, 1978, p. 119).
Using as his dependent variable city general expenditures less outside aid, William Lyons
(1978) analyzes 285 cities in the United States with a population of at least 50,000 by creating
regression equations for expenditures in the years 1960, and 1970 and also for the change in
expenditures that occur from 1960 – 1970.

Anticipating that reformed cities exhibit a greater

response rate to environmental demands for decreased spending and that unreformed cities
respond more to demands for increased spending, he uses multiple regressions on both sets of
cities to test his hypotheses. To indicate the conditions likely to increase the demand for service
levels Lyons controls for population size, percent nonwhite, median age, percent population
increase, percent homeowner occupied, and per capital income (Lyons, 1978). He also controls
for whether or not the city is responsible for providing the education function. Lyons’ analysis
appears to confirm his hypotheses. He concludes that policy variations are likely significantly
related to whether a city is structured as reformed or unreformed. “Reformed cities respond more
pronouncedly to those pressures that tend to reduce spending; unreformed cities respond more to
those pressures that increase spending” (Lyons, 1978, p. 130).
In 1980 David Morgan and John Pelissero (1980) examine the impact that structural
reform in cities has on taxation and spending levels. They perform an interrupted time series
analysis on eleven cities in the United States with populations of more than 25,000 that have
significantly changed their political structure in the years between 1948 and 1973. They then
compare these findings to eleven matched control cities that have made no structural changes in
the same time period. They conclude from this analysis that government structural changes have
almost no impact on changes to either taxing levels or spending levels (Morgan & Pelissero,
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1980). To them the evidence suggests that structural reform changes have little effect, long-term,
on fiscal decisions.
In the same year of 1980, Kenneth Meier (1980) presents research that seeks to examine
the prevalent belief that the structural reorganization of executive agencies results in the reduction
of employment and expenditures within those agencies that are reorganized. Using a
longitudinal design, Meier analyzes data from 16 states that have undergone major
reorganizations between 1965 and 1975 and compares those states employment and expenditures
levels with 16 states that have not undergone such reorganizations. According to Meier, the
effects of reorganization on either employment levels or expenditure levels prove not statistically
significant (Meier, 1980). He concludes that history is a much more likely explanation for
reductions in these two variables in states during this time period than reorganization efforts.
In a 1986 study, Naomi Wish (1986) is interested in assessing the relationship between
city structure and expenditures and the effects that expenditures have on quality of life
measurements. She uses data obtained from the 65 largest MSAs in the United States to examine
this relationship. Expenditure levels found do appear to confirm the previous findings of
Lineberry and Fowler, mayor-council governments do indeed outspend council-manager
governments in the examined population (Wish, 1986). She also discovers that the MSAs with
council-manager governments are also more likely to have a better quality of life score. When
the relationship between structure and region is examined, however, she finds that cities in the
northwest are characterized by mayor-council structures and these cities represent almost half of
the data sample within the analysis. In the end she concludes that regional and geographical
variations contribute more to the variations observed in the city data than form of government
(Wish, 1986).
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In 1986 Paul Farnham (1986) returns to the examination of variation in the number and
effect of functions on local government expenditures using a more varied data set than is used in
previous research. Farnham looks at data from the 2,500 communities in the United States listed
in the 1975 Census Bureau’s estimates as having a population of 10,000 residents or more. He
assesses the relationship that exists between a city’s population, geographical region, and the 12
common municipal functions (Farnham, 1986). He finds that, in general, the larger the city’s
population the more functions that city performs; most of the cities in the study did not provide
the education, welfare, hospital, housing, or urban renewal functions. He concludes that his
analysis reaffirms the position that controlling for functional variation among local governments
is needed when analyzing expenditures of those communities (Farnham, 1986). He also
concludes that the impact of functional variation differs among the central, suburban, and
independent cities examined in his dataset (Farnham, 1986).
Kevin Deno and Stephen Mehay (1987) utilize the median voter behavior framework to
reexamine the same 73 cities that Booms originally reports on in 1966. When reexamining
Booms’ original data using this new framework, they find that Booms’ original conclusion, that
council-manager governments have lower expenditure levels than mayor-council cities, cannot
be substantiated (Deno & Mehay, 1987). In addition to analyzing Booms’ original data, Deon
and Mehay also analyze a national sample of 148 municipalities in order to examine the effects
that government structure have on wage and compensation levels (Deno & Mehay, 1987). They
find that wages and compensation levels do differ significantly between the two forms of
government, with mayor-council cities maintaining these costs lower than their council-manager
counterparts. They do discover, however, that when fringe benefits are included in the equation,
there is no statistical difference between the two types of cities (Deno & Mehay, 1987). They
conclude, “...it does not appear that simply appointing a professional manager either mutes the
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forces of electoral politics or provides incentives for efficiency...If matters were so simple, the
urban fiscal crisis could have been solved long ago” (Deno & Mehay, 1987, p.639).
Using 1987 expenditure data from all United States cities with populations at or above
25,000, David Morgan and Sheilah Watson (1995) examine how per capita direct municipal
spending (less intergovernmental revenue) is affected by mayoral power. The uses the sum of 12
items included in a 1987 ICMA survey of municipal chief executives to measure formal and
informal powers possessed by a municipality’s mayor (Morgan & Watson, 1995). Performing the
analysis using linear regression, the authors control for population, percent of residents over age
65, percentage of homeowners, percent of residents with a high school education, population
change, functional scope, and mayoral power. Regression analysis shows that mayoral power
does not significantly influence per capita expenditures in either mayor-council or councilmanager communities (Morgan & Watson, 1995). They determine that intergovernmental
revenue, level of education, homeownership, and percentage of elderly population, do however,
have an influence on per capita expenditures.
In the results of a study published in an article in 1998 by Theodore Stumm and Matthew
Corrigan (1998), a sample of 149 cities with populations over 10,000 is analyzed to determine if
two measures of efficiency, property tax rates and the general fund expenditures of a community,
are significantly different in cities with or without professional managers. The results of their
analysis indicate that cities with professional managers, on average, do have lower property tax
rates than those cities without professional managers (Stumm & Corrigan, 1998). In addition,
results also indicate that the presence of a professional manager in a community is apparently
helps ensure that general fund expenditures are substantially lower than they are in cities without
a professional manager (Stumm & Corrigan, 1998).
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Rebecca J. Campbell and Geoffrey K. Trunbull (2003), in a 2003 article, suggest that
other studies have, “ignored the broader view of local government structure beyond the question
of management expertise” (Campbell & Trunbull, 2003, p.23). These authors suggest that the
unified government found in the council-manager plan verses the separation of powers structure
found in the mayor-council plan might lead to differences in spending levels. There intent is to
examine how separation of legislative and executive powers affects government spending. They
collect data from all cities with a population of 10,000 or greater in MSA’s located in the MidAtlantic, Midwest, South, and West regions of the United States for the years 1982 and 1992.
They also gather data from all of the counties located in the same areas during the same time
period. Their final data set contains information from 347 municipalities and 356 counties
(Campbell & Trunbull, 2003). Results of the analysis find an inconsistency between findings for
the city and the county governments. The data indicate no difference in spending between city
governments regardless of government form or whether a professional manager or elected chief
administrative officer is present. However, while the city data indicate no difference between the
spending levels of a separation of executive-legislative powers form and a unified executivelegislative structure, data does show that those county governments that adopt a structure that
separate executive and legislative powers tend to spend more than those that operate under a
unified executive-legislative structure (Campbell & Trunbull, 2003).
In a 2004 study of municipalities in the United States with populations between 2,500
and 25,000, French (2004) uses data gathered from 559 municipalities and analyzes it to help
determine whether council-manager cities exhibit different spending levels than non-councilmanager cities. Per capita expenditures are defined as municipal budgeted expenditures less
expenditures for education. French controls for many of the socio-economic variables previously
associated with municipal expenditure levels such as region, urban-rural status, population
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change, median household income, and number of services provided by the municipality (French,
2004). Using an Independent Samples T Test and multiple regression analysis, French shows that
a significant difference is detected in the per capita expenditures between the municipalities with
the council-manager form of government and those with non-council-manager government
structures (French, 2004). He does go on to caution, however, that, “per capita expenditures may
not provide an appropriate measure of efficiency and / or effectiveness in local government”
(French, 2004, p.206).
In a 2006 research article, Changhoon Jung (2006) examines data from 504 United States
cities with populations over 50,000 for the period 1980 -2000 using a pooled cross-sectional timeseries research design. Jung examines the expenditure levels for six common municipal
functions; police, fire, interest on municipal debt, along with non-capital expenditures on
highways, sanitation, and public health (Jung, 2006). Jung concludes from his analysis that the
per capita spending levels in reformed and unreformed municipal cities does not significantly
differ. He does, however, find that in some specific functions (police for example) per capita
spending in council-manager cities is significantly less than in those municipalities that do not
utilize the council-manager form of government (Jung, 2006). Jung suggests that further detailed
studies be performed considering other variables, including variables capturing the newer hybrid
city structures (Jung, 2006).
In 2008 Lynn MacDonald (2008) collects data on over 3000 cities in the United States
between the years 1980 and 2002 from a variety of sources. He wants to analyze how three
components of municipal government namely form of government, size of the city council, and
the election method of councilors, affects municipal expenditure levels (MacDonald, 2008).
MacDonald defines city expenditures as the direct general city expenditures less any education
and intergovernmental grants. He uses a sophisticated time-series model to look at the cross-
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sectional estimates for cities between the years 1980 and 2002, controlling for a number of
explanatory variables. MacDonald’s analysis finds no significant difference in expenditures for
any of the three components he examines (MacDonald, 2008).

Stephen Coate and Brian Knight (2009) examine the relationship of local government
form and public spending in a Working Paper prepared for the National Bureau of Economic
Research in 2009. Using econometric models, Coate and Knight analyze data based upon a large
sample of cities covering the years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002. They use both a panel
analysis and a cross sectional analysis to examine this data (Coate & Knight, 2009). Based upon
the acceptance of various assumptions put forward (Coate & Knight, 2009), they interpret the
data as demonstrating that spending in mayor-council form cities is lower relative to spending in
council-manager governments.
Up to this point, all of the studies examined utilize a dichotomous classification of
municipal governments (reformed verses unreformed; mayor-council verses council-manager;
council-manager verses non-council-manager). A 2010 research article by Jered B. Carr and
Shanthi Karuppusamy (2010) is the first found that looks at expenditures in cities using a more
elaborate classification method. Carr and Karuppusamy look at the per capita expenditures of the
general fund for 263 cities in the state of Michigan for the year 1999 using several different
classification systems. In addition to the classical mayor-council or council-manager
classification system, these authors utilize categories proposed by DeSantis and Renner (2002),
the three types of cities put forward by Frederickson et al. (Frederickson and Johnson, 2001;
Frederickson et. al., 2004a), and a hybrid of the adapted cities framework developed by Carr and
Karuppusamy (2008). Using OLS regression, these authors estimate the effects of the various
structures on per capita expenditures. Their analysis provides no evidence that, in any of the
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systems of classification examined, structures of local government are significantly related to per
capita expenditures (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2010).
Reformers thought that through encouraging adoption of the corporate model in local
government they could bring efficiency to city services (Adrian, 1988). Many researchers have
attempted to use expenditure levels in cities as a proxy to measure this efficiency gain. The link
between the form of government that a municipality operates under and the expenditure level
within that municipality is not clearly shown from the available literature. Some have tended to
confirm the idea that reformed (council-manager) municipalities spend less than their nonreformed (mayor-council) counterparts (Booms, 1966; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Lyons, 1978;
Stumm & Corrigan, 1998; Jung, 2006). Other scholars find the exact opposite; that councilmanager form cities spend more (Sherbenou, 1961; Nunn, 1966; French, 2004; Coate & Knight,
2009). For most of the research, however, little evidence is found to link form of government and
expenditures; rather, other socio-economic variables such as functional responsibility, region,
population size, metropolitan status, etc. are more closely linked to municipal spending (Cole,
1971; Liebert, 1974; Dye & Garcia, 1978; Morgan & Pelissero, 1980; Meier, 1980; Wish, 1986;
Farnham, 1986; Deno & Mehay, 1987; Morgan & Watson, 1995; Campbell & Trunbull, 2003;
Jung, 2006; MacDonald, 2008; Carr & Karuppusamy, 2010).
Almost all of the studies in the existing literature utilize some variant of the dichotomous
(mayor-council and council-manager) measure of government structure in their analysis of

municipal expenditures (Booms, 1966; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Lyons, 1978; Stumm &
Corrigan, 1998; Jung, 2006; Sherbenou, 1961; Nunn, 1966; French, 2004; Coate & Knight, 2009;
Cole, 1971; Liebert, 1974; Dye & Garcia, 1978; Morgan & Pelissero, 1980; Meier, 1980; Wish,
1986; Farnham, 1986; Deno & Mehay, 1987; Morgan & Watson, 1995; Campbell & Trunbull,
2003; Jung, 2006; MacDonald, 2008). Carr and Karuppusamy (2010) use multiple structural
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classification systems for local governments but limit their study to only municipalities in the
state of Michigan.
The author of this study anticipates that as the form of a municipality’s institutional
structure changes, the per capita expenditure levels in that municipality will also change.
Hypothesis one is developed to test the idea that the institutional administrative structures in a
municipality make a difference in the level of municipal spending. Multiple classification
systems for each municipality are utilized and compared to net general fund per capita
expenditure levels. Net general fund per capita expenditures is calculated using each
municipality’s adopted general fund budget, deducting any funding designated for educational
purposes, and then dividing that amount by the municipality’s population.

Hypothesis 1 – The per capita expenditures of a municipality will be
different depending on how the municipality’s institutional form is
classified.
Form of Government and CAO Time Allocation
Research that examines how city administrators allocate their work time is also an
area of interest for many scholars over the past fifty years. Much of the interest in time
allocation stems from the complexity of roles scholars discover in the position of the city
manager in local governments.
In a 1958 article published under the title “The Manager Is a Politician”, written
for a special symposium issue of Public Administration Review, Karl Bosworth (1958)
writes how managers with different “styles” still take political roles. Almost all
managers, even those that adopt ‘The Administrator Manager’ (Bosworth, 1958, p.217)
style that emphasizes internal administration functions to the exclusion of any policy
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initiatives, have to make up and present a budget to the council. It is in this role of
budgeter, if not in any other, that he is political. “Even if a manager has had budgetary
guidance from the council, he cannot ordinarily escape some public responsibility for his
proposed budget” (p. 217). By proposing a firm budget the manager implies some
‘needs’ and ‘wants’, “the essence of politics” (Bosworth, 1958, p. 217). Such a finding
implies a role for city administrators beyond that of a simple internal administrator and
invites an inquiry into how those administrators allocate their time between different
roles.
Deil S. Wright (1969) posits that the behavior of city managers is characterized by
the use of three analytically distinct role categories; namely, the roles that city managers
take in the realms of managerial, policy, and political activities. Wright uses data in his
analysis that he collects from a survey of forty-five of the fifty-five cities in the United
States with populations greater than 100,000 at the time. Wright asks each city manager
to rank the roles of managerial, policy, and political in terms of the amount of time spent
on each. In addition, each city manager is also asked to rank his personal preference
among the roles and the extent to which he feels each contributes to successful
performance (Wright, 1969). Wright finds that a majority of city managers say that they
spent the majority of their time acting in a managerial role (60% rated this as first among
the three activities in time allocation). However, only 46% of managers rank this role
first in their personal preference choice and only 37% rank the managerial role first in
contributing to successful performance. One-third say that the political role ranks first in
contributing to successful performance and 22% say that the policy role ranks first in this
category. Wright concludes that these results show that the city manager is “more than a
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politician” (Wright, 1969, p. 241). A city manager’s total role is actually an
amalgamation of the three distinct roles of administration, policy, and political activities.
In a 1977 article, Frank Aleshire and Fran Aleshire (1977) write about how city
managers now have to play a new ‘game’ that has different rules than the ‘old game’ in
the 1950s. The changing environment of local government finds an interaction of federal,
state, and local governments. This interaction changes how city managers spend their
time (Aleshire & Aleshire, 1977). It is their estimate that managers of the day spend
about 30 percent of their time either with the city council or on council related activities,
another 30 percent on internal management issues, 10 percent on public relations, and
(representing the biggest shift in the manager’s role under the new rules) a full 30 percent
on intergovernmental relations. It is their contention that, to succeed, managers must
recognize the new roles required to meet their changing environment (Aleshire &
Aleshire, 1977).
Other authors also write about how the city manager of the day allocates his or
her time. Donald A. Blubaugh (1987) (a city manager in Hayward, California at the
time) writes about the changes that have taken place in the time allocation of city
managers. Historically, Blubaugh writes, 70 percent of a managers time is devoted to the
internal affairs of a city and 30 percent to working directly with the council and other
governmental agencies (Blubaugh, 1987). Now, he concludes, 70 percent of the time of
an urban city manager is spent, “developing local policy, encouraging cooperation among
policymakers, and coordinating efforts with other governmental jurisdictions” (Blubaugh,
1987, p. 9). Similarly, in a 1989 article, Martha L. Hale (1989) uses data from a study
based on structured observations of five city managers in Los Angeles County to examine
how city managers use their time. Hale places the primary roles of the city manager in the
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categories of Brokers, Information Agents, and Administrative. The role of Brokers take
the largest segment of the managers’ time, that of information agent second, and,
surprisingly, administrative the least (Hale, 1989).
In 1985 Charldean Newell and David Ammons (1987) perform a survey of 418
municipalities in the United States with a 1980 population greater than 50,000. The 527
responses that they receive from the chief executive officers and their principle assistants
from these cities provides data that allows them to analyze how these executives spent
their working time, along with how they would prefer to spend it. Newell and Ammons
classify all of the respondents as city managers, mayors, assistant city managers, or
mayoral assistants. They question these individuals regarding the actual amount of time
that they devote to the policy, administrative, and political roles of their position (Newell
& Ammons, 1987). Mayors and their assistants in non-council-manager cities appear to
spend more hours per week at work than do city managers and their assistants. Analysis
of how these executives actually allocate their time shows that while all four groups spent
a large portion of their time in the management role of their jobs, there are some
significant differences between them. City managers spent more than half of their time
(51%) on management activities while mayors spent slightly less on the management role
(44%). In addition, while mayors spent about 26% of their time on policy role activities,
city managers spent almost 32% of their time on policy activities (Newell & Ammons,
1987). Not surprisingly, there is a significant difference in the amount of time spent on
political activities between city managers and mayors. Mayors spent 30% of their time
on these political activities compared to only 17% for city managers. For all four groups,
it appears that these executives are in general satisfied with how they allocate their work
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time, with only modest differences overall between actual and preferred time allocations
(Newell & Ammons, 1987).
When Newell and Ammons examine the data closely looking for variables that
could help explain the variations seen between the three roles of policy, administrative,
and political, they make several discoveries. Officials in smaller cities, those executives
that are older in age and city managers in general are likely to devote a greater percentage
of their time to the management role (Newell & Ammons, 1987). Those executives with
a graduate degree in Public Administration are likely to spend a smaller amount of their
time in the management role than those without such a degree. They discover three
variables that are significant in helping to explain the time devoted to the policy role.
Those that are city managers, are younger in age and those who serve in larger population
communities are more likely to devote a greater percentage of their time to the policy role
(Newell & Ammons, 1987). Two variables, being a mayor and holding an MPA degree,
explain those who are likely to devote more time to the political role in the community in
which they serve. Newell and Ammons conclude that, “The classical theorists of
council-manager government were correct in their assumption that form does make a
difference” (Newell & Ammons, 1987, p.250). They go on to say, “...form of
government does influence the activities and role emphases of key officials” (p.250).
In a 1995 article by Charldean Newell, James J. Glass, and David N. Ammons
(1995), the authors take data from the same 1985 survey just mentioned above (Newell &
Ammons, 1987) but use only data obtained from council-manager cities and city
managers (153 city managers). They supplement this information with a second survey,
which includes structural characteristics question, sent to the same cities in 1988. They
receive 140 usable responses from these cities. When they examine the structural
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characteristics of reporting cities they find that the presence of many unreformed
characteristics, such as the direct election of the mayor, is the rule rather than the
exception (Newell, Glass, & Ammons, 1995). Many mayors (42%) in those respondent
council-manager cities over 100, 000 populations have an independent staff and 81% of
mayors and 76% of council in all of these 50,000 plus population cities receive a salary.
When looking at variations concerning the management, policy, and political roles in city
managers working in these cities, the researchers find some interesting facts. For
example, if a mayor and council members receive compensation for the services that they
perform, city managers are more likely to list the management role as the most important
of the three (Newell et al., 1995). Similarly, if staff assistance is provided to the mayor
or council, then the city manager is likely to perceive the policy role as the most
important. Interestingly, if the council is made up of a higher percentage of women or
minorities, the city manager devotes a higher percentage of his or her time to the policy
and political roles on the job. The authors conclude that the changing environment of
cities has changed the role emphasis for city managers. The ‘professionalization’ of
elected officials, perhaps allowing the mayor and council to take a more active role in
policy issues, permits the manager to concentrate more on the management role. The
diversification of city councils by the inclusion of more women and minorities causes a
more politicized council today than in the past (Newell et.al., 1995). This change results
in city managers spending more time on the policy role, less time on the political role,
and about the same on the management role.
P. Edward French and David H. Folz (2004) use data from 502 respondent cities
,collected from a random survey of 1,000 municipalities with a population from 2,500 to
24,500, to examine how the chief executive officers of these cities divide their working
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time between the policy and management roles (French & Foltz, 2004). Results from this
data are then compared to the 1985 data analyzed in the Newell and Ammons study
discussed earlier. They find that the small city executives that they examine are very
similar to those respondents of the earlier study from larger cities. Both groups spent the
bulk of their time on management role related activities (French & Folz, 2004). They
did, however, discover that small town city managers spent a substantially larger
percentage of their time (56%) on management activities compared to the larger city
managers surveyed in 1985 (51%). The size of a city did not appear to affect the
proportion of time that city chief executive officers spent on policy role activities; both
large and small city managers spent about the same percentage of time (31% -32%) on
these policy role activities. These authors conclude that many of the difference between
the mayor and manager’s time allocations noted in larger cities, is confirmed to also exist
in smaller communities (French & Folz, 2004).
In 2009, Jerri Killian and Enamul Choudhury (2010) conduct an email survey of
1,960 appointed city managers and chief administrative officers in cities with a
population of at least 10,000 for which they could locate email addresses. Their survey
solicits 427 responses from the 1,960 requests, with all but a handful coming from those
cities with a population under 250,000 (Killian & Choudhury, 2010). Among the data
that they solicit from these administrators is information concerning the use of their
working time. The find that the mean working week for these administrators is 57.4
hours, very close to the 56.5 hours that Ammons and Newell find in their 1985 study
(Newell & Ammons, 1987). When these administrators report on how they actually used
their working time and on how they would prefer to use their working time, Killian and
Choudhury find some similarities and some differences compared to the results in the
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Newell and Ammons earlier study. Regarding time spent by administrators in the
management role, data indicate that administrators in 2009 actually allocate most of their
time to the management role. More than half (66%) of the respondents said that they
spent 50% to 100% of their time on management role activities (Killian & Choudhury,
2010), however, only 59% indicted that they would spend this same amount of time of
these activities if given a choice. When looking at policy role activities, 63% of those
responding indicate that they actually spent between 25% and 50% of working time on
this role; 59% say that they would spend an equal amount of time on the policy role if
given a preference. Finally, the political role receives the lowest time allocation from
those responding to the survey. About three-quarters of respondents indicate that they
spent between 0% and 25% of their time on the political role; however, if given the
choice, the percentage drops to 58%. This indicates that these administrators prefer to
spend more time on political role activities than they are currently (Killian & Choudhury,
2010). These researchers point out that this desire to spend more time on political role
activities is a “significant departure” (p.17) from the earlier study’s findings that
administrators are, in general, satisfied with their actual time allocation. They conclude
that ,”...contemporary city managers seem to have a strong desire to spend more time in
the community relations arena and to assume a more active political role” (Killian &
Choudhury, 2010, p. 18).
The existing literature on form of government and its relation to the allocation of
working time by the CAO of a municipality shows that CAOs do allocate the time that
they spend on the job between various roles and activities associated with these different
roles. The three roles originally put forward by Wright (1969), namely the roles of
management, policy, and political, still seem to explain the primary activities that
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contemporary chief administrative officers perform; although CAO roles have been
looked at using different perspectives (Aleshire & Aleshire, 1977; Blubaugh, 1987; and
Hale, 1989). Most of these studies find that most administrators spend a great deal more
of their time on those activities that are related to the management role (Newell &
Ammons, 1987; Newell, Glass, & Ammons, 1995; French & Folz, 2004; and Killian &
Choudhury, 2010), less on policy role activities, and the smallest proportion on political
role activities.
In this study the author intends to enhance the existing literature concerning the
time allocations by chief administrative officers in the different forms of government and
how they allocate their time between the administrative, policy, and political role
activities. Previous studies have primarily focused on the differences between the mayorcouncil and council-manager forms of government. For this study, the intent is to expand
the current literature discussion on time allocation by CAOs, by examining time
allocations using additional typologies for classifying municipalities. It is proposed that
as the institutional structural features of municipalities are altered between more
reformed and less reformed characteristics, the allocation of working time for CAOs
between the administrative, policy, and political roles will change as well.
Hypothesis 2 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes the
percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer
to management activities will change.
Hypothesis 3 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes the
percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer
to policy activities will change.
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Hypothesis 4 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes the
percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer
to political activities will change.
Form of Government and Provision of Public Services
Research by Public Administrative scholars has also looked at the provision of
public services in local government and the relationship service provision has with form
of government. If there is a difference in how responsive the mayor-council form
municipality is in comparison to more reformed cities then that should be reflected in the
provision and quality of public services provided.
In 1978, Thomas R. Dye and John A. Garcia (1978) conducted a study of 243
central cities and 340 suburban cities with populations above 10,000. In their study they
examine twelve municipal functions (education, welfare, housing, libraries, health,
police, fire, streets, sewerage, sanitation, and parks). They sought to describe the
variations in functional responsibilities between cities as well as observe some of the
regional, structural, and demographic correlates of those variations (Dye & Garcia,
1978). What they discover is that much of the difference in functional responsibility of
cities can be assigned to the regional, structural, and demographic variations between the
cities they examine. Dye and Garcia (1978) find that central cities have a greater
tendency to be providers of a more comprehensive list of services than their suburban
counterparts, which tend to be more specialized in the services they provide. For
example, few suburban municipalities provide education, welfare, or hospital services but
almost one-third of central cities in the United States provide these services. Of the
twelve services they examine, central cities average providing 9.77 while suburb cities
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only average providing 7.89. Region is also found to play a pronounced role in the
number and type of services cities provide. Dye and Garcia (1978) discover that in some
service areas this difference is very pronounced, especially when comparing the
Northeast and West regions of the country. Almost three-quarters of Northeastern cities
(73.6%) have responsibility for providing education services while only 12.1% of
western region cities are responsible for this service. The same is true for welfare
services (64.2% compared to 14.6% in the west) and for hospitals (43.4% in the northeast
compared to 17.1% of cities in the west). The level of services that the other two regions
of the country provide (south and Midwest) fall somewhere between these two extremes
(Dye & Garcia, 1978).
Differences in service provision levels are also found when these authors look at
reformed verses unreformed governmental structures (Dye & Garcia, 1978). They note
that reformed cities with managers are usually more specialized in the service areas they
provide. Reformed cities with managers are usually more capable of handling the
problems found in common areas such as streets, sewage, parks, etc. Unreformed
municipalities, on the other hand, can better handle service problems in the areas where
they find increased responsibility; such as education, welfare, and health services (Dye &
Garcia, 1978).
In a 1979 article authored by Heywood T. Sanders (1979), the relationship
between the form of government in a municipality and the quality performance of the
services it provides are explored. Sanders (1979) looks at data from 838 cities in the
United States with a population of greater than 25,000 and examines the bond ratings and
fire insurance ratings of these cities in order to assess governmental performance. Based
upon his analysis, Sanders (1979) concludes that the form of government that a
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municipality operates under plays only a very limited role in the performance quality
within these two areas. The bond rating of a municipality exhibits only a very limited
relationship with the form of government that a community operates under. He
determines that a city’s size, age, and the region it is located in are more important factors
than form of government in determining service performance quality (Sanders, 1979).
Sanders also finds that the most important factors in determining the fire ratings given to
municipalities are population size and region, not form of government. In reviewing
1978 ICMA survey data for the police and fire services, Sanders (1979) does note the fact
that employment numbers for these two service departments are slightly higher for
unreformed cities verses reformed cities, however, he attributes much of this difference to
metropolitan status, region, population, and ethnicity. Sanders’ conclusion is that it is the
population, character, and location of a city rather than its form of government, that most
affects the provision of public services (Sanders, 1979).
Speaking about differences found between reformed and unreformed
municipalities, Glen Abney and Thomas Lauth (1986) talk about different methods of
control they perceive to be used within the two types of cities. In order to accomplish
their objectives, appointed officials in reformed cities appear to exhibit a style of control
based upon rational criteria. The elected officials of unreformed cities appear to rely on
control through the manipulation of department heads (Abney & Lauth, 1986).
Department heads found in reformed (council-manager) cities have a different perception
of city managers in their city than department head do in unreformed cities. City
managers are perceived to place more emphasis on equity, efficiency, and effectiveness
concerning service provision than administrators in unreformed cities (Abney & Lauth,
1986). Department heads perceive elected officials as emphasizing maintenance and
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expansion of services more than city managers as well. Council members, they note, that
serve in reformed cities, are less likely than their unreformed counterparts to intervene
with government functions on behalf of citizens and they also make fewer requests to
administrators on behalf of their constituents (Abney & Lauth, 1986).
In a 1988 article, Irene S. Rubin (1988) examines some of the political and
budgetary implications the use of enterprise funds have in Illinois municipalities.
Enterprise funds are distinguished from other funds in cities by the fact that they derive
all or some of their financial support from fees or other revenue directly gained from the
service that they provide (Rubin, 1988). In her study Rubin analyzes data from survey
responses of 133 cities in Illinois with populations between 5,000 and 130,000. Some
twelve different enterprise funds are reported as being utilized by these cities; most
reporting cities, however, only utilize one or two enterprise funds (85 out of the 133).
The most common uses of enterprise funds are for water services (88%), parking services
(34.6%), and wastewater (24.8%) (Rubin, 1988). On average, these cities receive 21% of
their total revenue from these enterprise funds. Rubin (1988) examines several
hypotheses relating to the relative use of enterprise funds in these cities including
whether a municipality operates under a reform or unreformed government form. Two
hypotheses may be drawn when reformism is used to explain the use of enterprise funds
in cities, according to Rubin (1988). First, theoretically, enterprise funds may be in use
to protect the municipal services performed within them from political tradeoffs and,
therefore, reformed cities are more likely to use these types of service delivery systems.
Secondly, on the other hand, enterprise funds may be intended as a way of protecting
patronage in certain areas by reducing accountability and removing services from
budgetary implications (Rubin, 1988). Analysis of the data shows that cities that
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contained more reformed government are more likely to use enterprise funds to provide
certain services than are cities with unreformed governments (Rubin, 1988). The
question of why this occurs is left unanswered by the author. The author suggests that
the technical expertise required to establish such enterprise funds is more likely to be
found in more-reformed cities with professional management. Similarly, cities with an
atmosphere of scandal and mistrust are more likely to adopt a more-reformed institutional
structure and budgets in these cities may become structured to minimize the financial
discretion of mayors or managers through the use of enterprise funds (Rubin, 1988).
In 1990, Kathy Hayes and Semoon Chang (1990) examine data from 191 cities
with a population greater than 10,000 in order to determine whether those under the
council-manager form are any more efficient than those under the mayor-council plan.
To test this idea they calculate efficiency measures for three municipal services, refuse
collection, police protection, and fire protection (Hayes & Chang, 1990). Using
economic modeling techniques, these authors find that no difference in efficiency
measures is found between the council-manager form of government and the mayorcouncil form. They did find that larger mayor-council cities are more efficient than
smaller mayor-council cities but no such difference exists between larger and smaller
council-manager municipalities (Hayes & Chang, 1990). In the end they conclude that
what form a city adopts does not provide a significant indicator of how efficient that city
operates in the three areas examined (Hayes & Chang, 1990).
More recently, Alejandro Rodriguez (2007) also tests the proposition that
reformed government is more cost-efficient in service delivery than unreformed
government. Rodriguez analyzes 67 counties in Florida using a mixed method of
analysis including surveys, secondary archives, and personal interviews. The study looks
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at two measures of service output, namely, county road pavement conditions, and per
capita county expenditures on road maintenance and improvement, to see if reformed
government positively relates to cost-efficient service delivery (Rodriguez, 2007).
Rodriguez’s analysis finds that those counties with more reformed government did
indeed show lower expenditures in road maintenance and improvement but also have
better road pavement conditions (Rodriguez, 2007). He concludes that, “These findings
are congruent with the reformed tradition theory that reformed governments are more
cost-efficient than unreformed governments – in this case, better roads at a lower cost”
(Rodriguez, 2007, p. 987).
This review of the literature shows that studies examining the relationship
between form of government and provision of public services have produced conflicting
results. On the one hand, some studies show the existence of a relationship between
government form and service performance or outputs (Dye & Garcia, 1978; Sanders,
1979; Abney & Lauth, 1986; Rodriguez, 2007). On the other hand, other research notes
that differences between the two forms of government are more related to geographical
location, population size, or other characteristics of the municipality (Dye & Garcia,
1978; Sanders, 1979; Hayes & Chang, 1990). All of these studies, however, utilize the
dichotomous variable of reformed (council-manager) verses unreformed (mayor-council)
form when conducting their analysis.
In this study the author intends to enhance the existing literature concerning the
quality of services in municipalities between the different forms of government. Previous
studies primarily focus on the differences between the mayor-council and councilmanager forms of government. For this study, the intent is to expand the current
literature and examine how that a municipality’s quality of service is perceived by the
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person most directly in charge of delivering that service, the CAO. This is accomplished
by examining this variable using additional typologies for classifying municipal
government form. It is proposed that as the institutional structural features of
municipalities are altered between more reformed and less reformed characteristics, the
perception of the quality of service, as observed by the CAO of that municipality, will
change as well.
Hypothesis 5 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes the
perception of the chief administrative officer about the quality of services
offered within their municipality will change.
Division of Responsibilities and form of Government
The idea of the politics-administration dichotomy in public administration is one
of the enduring theoretical constructs (Svara, 1998). In local government this theoretical
model holds that; 1) “the city council does not get involved in administration”; and 2)
“the city manager has no involvement in shaping policies” (Svara, 1998, p. 51). Several
authors look at the history of the traditional dichotomy model and question its presence at
the beginning of the field of Public Administration. Rosenbloom (2008) states that it is
quite clear that originally the dichotomy is put in place to separate partisan politics from
the daily administration of programs. It is his assertion that the meaning of the dichotomy
is expanded during the period between 1926 through 1937 to include the more general
orthodox meaning of politics that includes public policies. Rosenbloom concludes that
this is deliberately done primarily because researchers of the day did not want to offend
funders and supporters who are looking to emphasize the non-political nature of their
work and are afraid of looking like they are manipulators (Rosenbloom, 2008). Lynn
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(2001) takes the viewpoint that the traditional bureaucratic paradigm existing before the
1940’s is the victim of revisionist history. His review of the literature finds no hard line
stand by earlier writers that lead to the complete separation of politics and policy from
administration. James Svara (1999a) joins in with Lynn’s analysis and in fact goes on to
say that Wallace Sayre (1958), in an attempt to basically set up a straw man, deliberately
hardens the ideas of early writers concerning the dichotomy. Empirical evidence has
time and time again shown this strict interpretation of the dichotomy in local government
to be untrue. Researchers over the years, concentrate repeatedly on the supposed
distinction between policy and administration found in the orthodox dichotomy model.
In a 1958 article by Karl Bosworth (1958), he states openly in his title, “The
Manager is a Politician”. The manager, if in no other area of operation (Bosworth
writes), makes up the budget and therefore is in the political arena. The manager also
functions in the role of policy researcher (Bosworth, 1958) and as such uses his or her
knowledge of municipal affairs and other information to advise the council on the
ramifications of their proposals. The manager likewise operates as a community leader
(Bosworth, 1958). Managers help to settle public problems and study informal power
structures of their communities so that can use these channels to achieve their goals.
Bosworth concludes by writing how one should think about city managers, “...let us think
of them as officers of general administrative direction and political leadership, for that is
what they are” (Bosworth, 1958, p. 222).
Robert Loveridge (1968) analyzes data from 59 managers and 338 members of
city councils located in the San Francisco Bay region in order to examine the policy role
conceptions that each possesses. Loveridge wants to examine how city managers defined
their policy role, what expectations council members have for the manager’s policy role,
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and examine any conflict between the two (Loveridge, 1968). He discovers that a full
75% of city managers reject the classic dichotomy model that places managers only in
administrative responsibilities. How the city manager personally perceives his own role
in policy activities, coupled with the expectations the council members possess
concerning the appropriate level of manager activity in these areas, comprise the two
important factors in defining the manager’s role in policy activities (Loveridge, 1968).
Eighty-eight percent of city managers view themselves as policy innovators and 81% see
themselves as policy advocates. A substantial percentage of these managers (40%) say
that they should even encourage potential candidates to run for city office (Loveridge,
1968). The view of the council members is, however, distinctively different from those
of the managers in the survey. Loveridge (1968) finds that, in general, council members
seem to view the manager more as a staff administrator rather than as a political
executive. Council members also have a strong consensus on the idea of the traditional
dichotomy relationship. In general, council members view the manager as the
administrator and themselves as the policy makers (Loveridge, 1968). They see the
manager in a role defined as administrative. The manager is seen as a council advisor not
a policy innovator; a source of information and not a policy or political leader. Such
opposite views of the role of the city manager can lead to conflict between the manager
and council and in a large majority of city managers the study did identify this as one of
their major sources of problems (Loveridge, 1968). Loveridge (1968) concludes that
managers resolve this dilemma one of two ways. Firstly, the manager either camouflages
his activities in these controversial areas (or confines his activities to behind the scenes
work); or secondly, the manager only gets involved in the relatively safe policy areas and
stays out of controversial areas (Loveridge, 1968).
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David N. Ammons and Charldean Newell (1988) write , “The fact is, the politics
vs. administration dichotomy presumed to be established through the council-manager
plan has proven to be far less absolute than at least some of the reformers had originally
thought” (p. 14). Data from 226 chief executives of cities in the United States with a
population over 50,000, indicate that there is, in reality, a mixing of roles between the
mayors and managers of these communities. Mayors that act as CEO’s in their cities do
manage and city managers do indeed act in policy and political roles (Ammons &
Newell, 1988). When asked to choose between the management, policy, and political
roles and designate the most important, city managers chose the management role 38.5%
of the time, the policy role 55.8% of the time, and the political role only 5.8% of the time.
These authors conclude that a city’s selection of a form of government (mayor-council or
council-manager) should not keep the CEO from performing the roles needed to keep the
organization functioning (Ammons & Newell, 1988).
Robert T. Golembiewski and Gerald T. Gabris (1994) list continuation of the
usage, by those in public administration, of the distinction between politics and
administration, as one of the six themes that are turning what has been in the past a
successful idea (council-manager government) into a failure. The distinction in the past
proved useful, but clinging to this idea is becoming harmful (Golembiewski & Gabris,
1994). Robert S. Montjoy and Douglas J. Watson (1995) also find the traditional view of
the dichotomy in local government as untenable. The traditional interpretation of the
policy / administration dichotomy is, “neither practical nor desirable in council-manager
government” (Montjoy & Watson, 1995, p. 231). Managers often play a very important
role that is both needed and advantageous to the elected officials.
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Delmer D. Dunn and Jerome S. Legge Jr. (2002) use factor analysis to analyze
three models scholars use to characterize the relationship between elected and appointed
officials: the orthodox politics-administration dichotomy model, the modified dichotomy
model and the partnership model. The orthodox dichotomy model describes a relationship
where a “rather strict separation of politics and administration” exists with particular
functions, as previously discussed, assigned to each of the two actors (Dunn & Legge,
2002, p. 402). The modified dichotomy model holds that there is a distinction between
politics and policy, and the dichotomy also holds for politics and administration; but not
policy and administration; it allows for a more active leadership role for administrators
(Dunn & Legge, 2002). The partnership model holds that not only can administrators
venture into policy making but, likewise, elected officials may venture into the executing
of laws and policies. They examine 488 responses from top managers in local
governments across the country using factor analysis seeking to discover which of the
three models local managers identify with and what factors help to explain the
correlations (Dunn & Legge, 2002). In their findings, they locate an important group of
managers that identify with each of the three models. A number of managers still
identify policy implementation as primarily the administrators’ job, and most managers
still can, “relate to a model that insulates and buffers management and policy
implementation from elected officials” (Dunn & Legge, 2002, p. 417). Somewhat
contrary to much of the literature, the orthodox politics-administration dichotomy has not
vanished from the profession with a sizable number of managers still identifying with it;
however, the other two models contribute more to explaining variance. Lastly, they find
that many managers at the local level identify with the partnership with elected officials
model (Dunn & Legge, 2002), suggesting the empirical reality of recent literature putting
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forward such a model. They conclude that the partnership model that so many managers
identify with may, “be exactly what is needed to enhance democratic governance” (Dunn
& Legge, 2002, p. 419).
In a 2009 article, Yahong Zhang and Richard C. Feiock (2009) investigate the
mechanisms that lead elected officials to defer their power in policy making to the local
manager. They use data in this analysis they gather from the mayors and managers of
123 cities in Florida (Zhang & Feiock, 2009). They find that the lack of formal authority
given to a mayor is not a major reason for policy making power to be assigned to the city
manager. This goes against some other research indicating the exact opposite (Morgan &
Watson, 1992) and supports suggestions that institutional structures are less a factor in
explaining local officials’ power. They also find that higher levels of professionalism
from city managers did indeed help them to gain additional policy making power (Zhang
& Feiock, 2009). Likewise, if an elected body and manager have dissimilar ideologies,
the elected bodies are prone to hesitate in giving greater policy power to the manager
than if the two agree. Zhang and Feiock (2009) conclude that these findings reconfirm
the fact that the sharing of power in policy making by councils is determined more by
non-institutional factors than by institutional ones. A manager that has greater
administrative power (defined as the number of leadership and department head positions
under the direct appointment and removal of the manager) is also less likely to possess
greater policy making power (Zhang & Feiock, 2009). Other findings include: women
managers are less likely to have greater authority in policy making processes; the larger
the city, the less likely it is that a manager dominates the policy making process; and, the
more wealthy a city, the less policy making authority the council is likely to delegate to
the manager. In conclusion, Zhang & Feiock note that their findings do not support the
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modified dichotomy model (that assumes the dominant role of city managers in the
policy role), but rather they find that managers try to reconcile the tensions between
complying with the political control of the governing body with the responsibility that
they have to the local government. Managers consciously trade off their administrative
power for policy making power (Zhang & Feiock, 2009). It is the non-institutional
factors that are all significant in their model in determining if the elected body will defer
policy making authority to the manager.
In an effort to ‘reconceptualize’ the relationship that exists between the policy and
administration functions in council-manager cities, James H. Svara (1985) presents a
model he labels the “Dichotomy and Duality” model. Svara contends that the various
models depicting the relationship between elected officials and administrators in policy
and administration put forward over the years suffer from both empirical and normative
problems (Svara, 1985). He goes on to describe how, in addition to these problems, “that
we are burdened with such imprecise definitions of the central concepts that distinctions
between office and function are difficult to make” (Svara, 1985, p. 224). To combat
these problems, Svara proposes a new model that divides the old politics-administration
dichotomy into four separate dimensions of the governmental process. The mission,
policy, administration, and management functions of the government process are the four
functions of the governmental process that ‘blend’ into each other in a continuum are yet
are conceptually distinctive from each other and operationalized for analysis (Svara,
1985). The ‘mission’ and the ‘management’ functions, at the extremes of the continuum,
are largely dichotomized, with elected officials primarily responsible for the mission
functions and administrators for management functions. The internal functions on the
continuum, the policy and administration functions, consists of shared responsibilities
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(duality) between elected and appointed officials. Svara graphically displays this
distribution of responsibility for these four distinct functions, using a line to show the
division of responsibility (See Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1

Svara’s Dichotomy/Duality Model

Svara (1985) defines and operationalizes these four functions for council-manager
governments. Svara defines mission as, “the organization’s philosophy, its thrust, the
broad goals it sets for itself, and the things it chooses not to do” (Svara, 1985, p. 224).
For example, mission activities include determining the purpose or scope of services and
the tax levels that a community wants to adopt. Determining direction in these broad
areas concerning what should and should not be done in a city is usually the function of
the elected officials, although administrators often give advice on what can and cannot be
accomplished. Policy function activities are define by Svara as, “middle-range policy
decisions, e.g., how to spend government revenues, whether to initiate new
programs...and how to distribute services at what levels within the existing range of
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services provided” (Svara, 1985, p. 225). These functional responsibilities are shared by
both elected and appointed officials. For example, elected officials approve new
programs and projects and pass a budget but administrators make recommendations on
these decisions and determine service distribution formulas. Another shared functional
responsibility between administrators and elected officials is the administration functions.
Svara defines these functions as, “the specific decisions, regulations, and practices
employed to achieve policy objectives” (p. 226). This functional responsibility is usually
the purview of the appointed administrators in a council-manager city; however, elected
officials often do get involved in administration through the use of legislative oversight,
intervening in service delivery (handling citizen complaints for example), and specifying
very specific techniques to be used in implementation of adopted policies. The last
function in the model, management, Svara defines as, “the actions taken to support the
policy and administrative functions. It includes controlling and utilizing the human,
material, and informational resources of the organization to best advantage” (Svara, 1985,
p. 227). The management function is usually the functional responsibility of the
manager, but the council does get involved occasionally in areas such as ratifying or
initiating internal management changes. Examples of where council might get involved
in management functions might include such actions as prompting changes in merit pay,
grievance procedures, or minority hiring. Svara (1985) uses interviews with officials in
five large cities in North Carolina (over 100,000 populations) as empirical validation of
his model. While all cities examined fall into a general pattern as is depicted in Figure
3.1, there are some differences between them. Svara lists four deviations from the
general pattern. These four deviations are listed as ‘strong manager’, ‘council dominant’,
council incursion’, and ‘council-manager standoff’ to describe the change in functional
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responsibility mixed he finds in each (Svara, 1985). In conclusion, Svara finds that the
new model, “is an advance over the dichotomy model which prescribed behavior for a
pure but powerless manager, on the one hand, or the mixture in policy or coequal models
which gave the manager license to be powerful but at the cost of political purity and
democratic control” (Svara, 1985, p. 230). Svara’s model allows for neither a complete
separation of policy and administration nor a complete intermingling. It protects the
conditions for democratic governance but also allows for the best use of the talents of
both administrators and elected officials (Svara, 1985).
In a 1985 article authored by William P. Browne (1985), research is conducted to
test just one of the four dimensions in the dichotomy/duality model put forward by Svara
(1985). Browne uses a questionnaire from 114 Michigan city and village managers to
study policy initiation in these cities. He discovers in these cities and villages, 74
percent of managers say that policy leadership is a ‘very necessary’ requirement of their
position (Browne, 1985). In addition, one-third report that either themselves personally
or their staffs take the lead in almost every single policy issue, and 60% say that most
policy questions arise not from the council but from the manager’s office. Managers also
indicate that in 99% of the cases their relationship with their council is either excellent or
good, and large majorities say that their councils are very supportive of them on
’individual initiatives’ (Browne, 1985). A very strong relationship is also found to exist
between those managers that anticipate a high level of council acceptance of their policy
leadership and the predisposition of managers to exercise that leadership. No linkage is
found between managers personal characteristics such as years of experience, etc. and
those managers’ predispositions to take a leadership role in policy initiation. Browne
concludes that, “municipal environment, rather than the aforementioned personal
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characteristics of the office holder, determines the policy role of the municipal
manager...” (Browne, 1985, p. 621). Browne also concludes that his findings show the
utility of using Svara’s model on the one dimension of policy (Browne, 1985).
Looking at Svara’s model from the perspective of leadership, Greg J. Protasel
(1995) uses the model to help visualize policy leadership in council-manager cities.
Protasel shows that when the separate and shared responsibilities of the council and
manager in the dichotomy/duality model are oriented to the same axes several facts
become clear. Firstly, the manager has a larger overall separate area of responsibility than
does the council. Secondly, the manager and council share most of the responsibility area
in the policy dimension but the overall area of coverage in the policy area does not match
that area covered in the other three dimensions (Protasel, 1995). This implies that a
leadership gap within the policy dimension area exists that is covered neither by the
manager nor the council. To fill this gap Protasel describes four patterns of leadership in
council-manager cities that emerge. A traditional leadership pattern is one that allows the
council to retain the policy-making power and the city manager retains the administrative
power. In a dominate manager leadership pattern the manager still maintains the control
over administrative functions but also serves as the dominate actor in the policy function
(Protasel, 1995). Finding the mayor and manager sharing policy leadership describes
Protasel’s third pattern. Lastly, the strong mayor pattern describes the mayor acquiring
much of the manager’s power within the policy function and thus it requires that the
mayor become a strong political leader within the community (Protasel, 1995). In this
fourth pattern the mayor acts more like he is located in a strong-mayor community rather
than in a council-manager one. Protasel emphasizes that the direct election of mayors in
council-manager cities can actually enhance the council-manager plan by helping to close
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the policy leadership gap; however, introducing aspects of a separation of powers model
(as found in mayor-council cities) may take this idea too far and create more leadership
problems than it solves (Protasel, 1995).
In subsequent research, Svara is able to empirically support the dichotomy-duality
model in a number of studies including: a survey of city and county managers in North
Carolina (Svara, 1988a), in a study involving six pairs of moderately large councilmanager and matched mayor-council cities (120,000 to 650,000) in several states (Svara,
1988b), in a survey of 131 North Carolina and Ohio city managers (Svara, 1995), and, in
an examination of 31 cities in the United States with population over 200,000 (Svara,
1999b). In recent writings, Svara finds, “a political-administrative relationship in local
government characterized by high level of interaction and varying but reciprocal
influence” (Svara, 2006b, p. 1081).

Svara describes this relationship as a model of

‘Complementarity’, “...that presumes distinction, deference, and restraint, as well as
intermixture, reciprocal influence, and interdependence” (Svara, 2008, p. 49). He goes
on to say that, “Complementarity is primarily grounded in a model of overlapping roles
in the relationship between politicians and administrators, but to some extent it draws on
models of separate roles, administrative autonomy, and political responsiveness as well”
(Svara, 2008, p. 49). Recently, Tansu Demir (2009) uses survey responses from 346 city
managers in the country to empirically test the complementarity model view of the
politics-policy continuum using activities rated on a five point Likert scale. Rated
activities are related to the variables identified along a continuum with political
particularism at the political end of the spectrum and personnel management at the
management end of the spectrum (Demir, 2009). Demir’s analysis of the data he collects
seems to illustrate that the complmentarity model provides a reasonably good model of
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the political-administrative relationship in local governments in the United States (Demir,
2009). Demir writes, “...politics and management seem to have a dichotomous-like
relationship, while policy and administration seem to be blended, with reciprocal
influence and overlapping roles” (Demir, 2009, p. 885).
The existing literature seems to indicate that the generally held belief that the idea
that a strict politics-administration dichotomy has existed since the modern beginning of
the field of public administration is at best a simplistic generalization (Rosenbloom,
2008; Lynn, 2001; Svara, 1999a). Many scholars in past decades have found major
issues both empirically and normatively with the strict interpretation of the dichotomy in
local governments (Bosworth, 1958; Loveridge, 1968; Ammons & Newell, 1988;
Golembiewski & Gabris, 1994; Montjoy & Watson, 1995; Dunn & Legge, 2002; Zhang
& Feiock, 2009; and Svara, 1985). James Svara (1985) proposes a model (dichotomyduality) that suggests a blending of politics and administration through a continuum of
four dimensions. This blending occurs from the most political of the dimensions, mission
activities, into the policy making activities dimension, through the administration
activities dimension, and into the most administrative dimension, that of management
activities (Svara, 1985). Numerous studies reaffirm the utility of the dichotomy-duality
model (Browne, 1985; Protasel, 1995; Svara 1988a; Svara, 1988b; Svara, 1995; Svara,
1999b; Demir, 2009) in giving a better picture of the relationship between elected
officials in local government and appointed managers.
This study intends to enhance the existing literature concerning the relationship
between the elected and appointed officials in local governments in the United States
across the four dimensions discussed in Svara’s dichotomy-duality model using the
different forms of local government as described by the Adapted Cities Framework.
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Chief Administrative Officers in cities in the United States are surveyed to ascertain their
perceptions of the levels of involvement for themselves, the mayor, and the city council
members within their respective communities. Past studies using the dichotomy-duality
model have primarily focused on the differences between the mayor-council and councilmanager forms of government. For this study, the author intends to expand the current
literature concerning the roles played by the various local officials by examining these
variables using additional typologies for classifying municipalities. It is proposed that as
the institutional structural features of municipalities are altered between more reformed
and less reformed characteristics, the percentage of total involvement between the chief
administrative officer verses the council in the four dimensions put forward in the
dichotomy-duality model, as observed by the CAO of that municipality, will change as
well.
Hypothesis 6 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in
Mission activities will change.
Hypothesis 7 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in Policy
activities will change.
Hypothesis 8 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in
Administrative activities will change.
Hypothesis 9 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in
Management activities will change.
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The following hypotheses are tested to determine whether or not there is a
statistical difference in the dependent variables citied in the analysis and the different
forms of government used as the independent variables.
Hypothesis 1 – The per capita expenditures of a municipality will be
different depending on how the municipality’s institutional form is
classified.
Hypothesis 2 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer
to management activities will change.
Hypothesis 3 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer
to policy activities will change.
Hypothesis 4 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer
to political activities will change.
Hypothesis 5 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
perception of the chief administrative officer about the quality of services
offered within their municipality will change.
Hypothesis 6 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in
Mission activities will change.
Hypothesis 7 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in Policy
activities will change.
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Hypothesis 8 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in
Administrative activities will change.
Hypothesis 9 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in
Management activities will change.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The survey used in this study is designed to examine cities within the United
States with a population between 10,000 and 250,000. Many of the questions asked
within the survey are designed to collect information that allows the researcher to
develop the independent variables as outlined in Chapter 2, Developing the Independent
Variables. Other questions are designed to solicit information that provides evidence that
will allow the researcher to test the hypotheses that are proposed concerning the
relationship between the independent variables developed and the dependent variables
examined. Many of the questions ask the subject to give his or her perception concerning
the relative importance, allocation of time, or active involvement level of important
actors within the municipality. This information provides the researcher with important
and worthwhile insights into the structural makeup of individual municipalities as well as
the perceptions and daily activity of individuals directly involved with public
administration at the local level of government in the United States.
Data Sources
This study design is to compare and contrast cities and towns in the United States
with a population between 10,000 and 250,000 using a variety of different institutional
classification typologies. A number of different classification systems exist to describe
the form that local governments utilize in regard to their institutional structure. Chapter 2
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of this study discusses several existing classification systems and develops an additional
one. The classification systems this study uses include a dichotomous nominal variable,
a multinomial variable, and an interval level variable.
The traditional dichotomous classification of municipalities as either mayorcouncil (unreformed) or council-manager (reformed) provides the author with a nominal
level measurement on which to classify municipalities for comparison. For the purpose of
this study, all forms that utilize a mayor-council, mayor-board, mayor-alderman, or other
variation of an elected official serving as the chief executive officer of the city are all
classified as mayor-council (this is the same classification the ICMA survey uses).
The ‘Adapted Cities Framework’, put forward by Frederickson, Johnson, and
Wood (2004) and discussed in detail in chapter 2, provides this study with a five category
multinomial level measurement for contrast and comparison.
Finally, the zero to fifty point scoring system discussed and developed in chapter
2, utilizing a number of institutional structural features drawn from several different
classification systems, provides the interval level measurement for this study.
The initial survey in this study is mailed to the chief administrative officers of 800
municipalities representing a random sample of all 50 states within the United States.
The simple random sampling procedure described by David Nachmias and Chava
Nachmias in Research Methods in the Social Sciences, 2nd Edition (1981) is utilized in
order to obtain a random sample of all municipalities within the United States classified
as either council-manager or mayor-council with a population between 10,000 and
250,000.
First, a list of all municipalities with a population between 10,000 and 250,000 is
developed from the International City Management Association (2010) Municipal Year
86

Book 2010 for all municipalities classified within this listing as either mayor-council or
council-manager. Each of the 2,975 (there were 1,850, or 62%, council-manager and
1,125, or 28% mayor-council) cities listed are then assigned a number (1000 to 3975). A
random number generator is then used to develop a final list of 800 cities nationwide to
participate in the survey. This random sample of 800 cities (502 (63%) council-manager
and 298 (37%) mayor-council) represents 49 states. These 800 municipalities are then
mailed the printed survey instrument along with a letter explaining the purpose, content,
use of, confidentiality of the survey, and a self addressed stamped envelope for returning
the printed survey. In the explanation letter each participant is also given the web address
of an online survey instrument that they can use to complete the survey if they desire to
do so. A search of municipal websites provides email addresses for 643 chief
administrative officers out of the 800 participant municipalities in the survey. A followup email is then sent to these captured email addresses a few days after the printed
surveys are mailed. The link to the online survey instrument as well as an attached
Microsoft WORD file containing a copy of the printed survey is included with this email.
A second wave follow-up letter, including a copy of the same printed survey, is
mailed to all participants that have not responded within approximately six weeks after
the initial survey is mailed. Again, a follow-up email containing the same information
included in the initial email is sent a few days after the second wave follow-up letter is
mailed. A third wave follow-up email is finally sent several weeks later to all those who
have not yet responded. This email contains the same information as the previous two.
The CAOs (city managers, administrators, and mayors) of participant
municipalities are ask to respond to a number of questions regarding their individual
background, education, political ties, and other demographic information. Information is
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also gathered on general municipal information including annual budgets, property tax
rates, and unemployment rates. Additionally, in order to classify each municipality into
the proper city type, information concerning the institutional structure surrounding the
mayor, city council, city staff, and the municipality in general is also solicited.
Participants are also asked to rate the involvement levels of themselves (as the mayor or
appointed CAO of the city), their mayor or CAO counterpart (if present), and their city
councils, for thirteen activities identified by Svara (2006) that are then used to measure
the mission, policy, administrative, and management dimensions of the CAO/council
relationship. Data is also collected to establish the individual respondent’s time allocation
for the policy, administrative, and political roles performed each day within the
municipality. Finally, participants are asked to rate their own perceptions of the quality
of services that the municipality provides for 12 specific municipal services. To
supplement the survey data, budget information concerning each participating
municipality’s general fund expenditures is obtained from each municipality’s website
for the most current fiscal year. Supplemental demographic data on each municipality iss
also obtained from the United States Census Bureau’s website.
Unit of Analysis
Data for this research study is solicited from eight hundred randomly chosen cities
and towns in the United States with populations between 10,000 and 250,000 (this
sample equals 27% of the total population under study) (see tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3).
Participants returned two hundred and seventy surveys (a return rate of 34%). Four
surveys are deemed unusable; three because of insufficient data completion in the survey
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and one municipality’s population is deemed outside of the study parameters. A net total
of two hundred and sixty-six surveys are included in the data set.
Table 4.1
Region

Northeast
South
Midwest
West
TOTAL

Table 4.2
Region

Northeast
South
Midwest
West
TOTAL

Summary of Population
Council-Manager
Form
Percent
Count
of
Region
328
47%
(18%)

559

72%

446

49%

517

87%

1850
(100%)

62%

(30%)
(24%)
(28%)

Mayor-Council
Form
Percent
Count
of
Region
367
53%
(33%)

Regional
Totals
100%

213

28%

100%

465

51%

100%

80

13%

100%

1125
(100%)

38%

100%

(19%)
(41%)
(7%)

695

(23%)

772

(26%)

911

(31%)

597

(20%)

2975
(100%)

Summary of Survey Sample
Council-Manager
Form
Percent
Count
of
Region
91
51%
(18%)

151

69%

110

48%

150

88%

502
(100%)

63%

(30%)
(22%)
(30%)

Mayor-Council
Form
Percent
Count
of
Region
89
49%
(29%)

Regional
Totals
100%

67

31%

100%

121

52%

100%

21

12%

100%

298
(100%)

37%

100%

(22%)
(41%)
(7%)

89

180

(23%)

218

(27%)

231

(29%)

171

(21%)

800
(100%)

Table 4.3
Region

Northeast
South
Midwest
West
TOTAL

Summary of Survey Responses
Council-Manager
Form
Percent
Count
of
Region
29
69%
(16%)

57

66%

41

50%

45

82%

172

65%

(35%)
(24%)
(25%)

(100%)

Mayor-Council
Form
Percent
Count
of
Region
13
31%
(14%)

Regional
Totals
100%

30

34%

100%

41

50%

100%

10

18%

100%

94

35%

100%

(31%)
(44%)
(17%)

(100%)

42

(16%)

87

(33%)

82

(31%)

55

(21%)

266

(100%)

A total of one hundred and eighty-five variables are derived from the survey
responses, city budget documents, and the census data information. The author uses
these variables to present information on institutional form (or type) of government
structure, city demographics, the allocation of the chief administrative officers time,
perceptions of the levels of professionalism of staff, and the perceived involvement levels
of both the CAO and city council regarding a number of activity dimensions. A total of
twelve independent variables in combination (including the three independent primary
research typology variables) are used by the author to evaluate the usefulness of the nine
hypotheses proposed.
Operational Definitions
In this study several of the terms need to be defined to provide any clarification
that might be required for use in the research design. The following terms are used in the
study and their definitions are as follows:
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Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) – the individual within a government that is
responsible for the administrative functions of the municipality (this may be the elected
mayor or an appointed professional administrator).
Council-manager form of government – this is a self reported form of government
that generally places the responsibility for administrative functions of the municipality
with an appointed manager and the responsibility for political and policy functions in a
council (or its equivalent) to whom the appointed manager is accountable and
responsible.
Mayor-council form of government – this is a self reported form of government
that has an elected official serving as the chief executive officer and may or may not have
an appointed chief administrative officer who is generally responsible for the
administrative functions of the municipality. This includes variations in government
forms such as the mayor-board, mayor-alderman, or any other variation with an elected
official serving as the CEO.
Partisan – the association of individuals with a political party.
Non-partisan – no association of individuals with a political party.
Dependent Variables
Dependent variables utilized within this research include: 1) per capita general
fund expenditures; 2) percentage of total working time devoted by the CAO to
management related activities; 3) percentage of total working time devoted by the CAO
to policy related activities; 4) percentage of total working time devoted by the CAO to
politically related activities; 5) the CAOs perceived overall quality of services offered by
the municipality; 6) the percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council in
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mission activities; 7) the percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council
in policy activities; 8) the percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council
in administrative activities; and, 9) the percentage of total involvement for the CAO
verses the council in management activities.
Per capita general fund expenditures are calculated by taking the total general
fund expenditures for the municipality and dividing this figure by that municipality’s
population. Because it is important that general fund expenditures should focus on
common functions, any educational expenses related to public education are excluded
from this expenditure amount. In most municipalities education falls under a separate
jurisdiction other than the municipal government.
Percentage of total working time devoted to management related activities is
captured from the actual percentage of total work time that the respondent estimates that
he / she devotes to the management related activities in the municipality (includes
staffing, budgeting, coordination of departments evaluating, directing, etc.).
Percentage of total working time devoted to policy related activities is captured
from the actual percentage of total work time the respondent estimates that he / she
devotes to the policy related activities (includes all meetings with council members,
agenda setting, and policy development, policy proposal, and policy advise).
Percentage of total working time devoted to political related activities is captured
from the actual percentage of total work time the respondent estimates that he / she
devotes to the politically related activities (includes ceremonies, public relations,
meetings with other governmental officials at other levels of government, speeches, etc.).
The perceived quality of services offered by the municipality is defined as the
average rating that a respondent gives for all city services. Survey participants are asked
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to rate the quality of services offered by their municipality on the following 3 point scale:
1) Service available but less than desirable; 2) Service available and meets the needs of
citizens; and 3) Service exceeds citizen’s expectations. An interval level variable is
created that takes the sum of all of the individual service ratings given by that respondent
and then divides that sum by the number of services that the respondent indicates are
provided by that municipality; thus giving the average rating of all services within that
municipality.
The percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council in mission
activities is defined as the percentage of the total involvement effort (total effort is
defined as 100% including both the CAO and the council) that the CAO contributes.
Survey participants are ask to rate the perceived involvement level of themselves (as
either mayor or CAO), their counterpart (either the mayor or CAO), and their city council
for three specific mission related activities. These three mission related activities
include: A) determining the purpose and services of municipal government, B)
developing strategies of future development of the municipality, and C) setting long-term
fiscal priorities for the municipality. Respondents are ask to rate these activities for all
three of these participants using a six point Likert scale coded as follows: 0) none, 1) very
low, 2) low, 3) average, 4) high, 5) very high. Separate variables are created that sum the
ratings scores for all three mission activities for of the three officials, thus providing a
total mission involvement score for each mayor, CAO, and council for each municipality
(if appropriate). The percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council is
then calculated by: 1) taking the total mission score for the CAO and then dividing that
sum by the number of questions included under that dimension (3) to calculate an average
CAO mission score; 2) then taking the total mission score for the council and then
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dividing that sum by the number of questions included under that dimension (3) to come
to an average council mission score; 3) and finally, dividing the average mission score of
the CAO into the sum of both 1) and 2) (Average CAO plus average council mission
score). For example, if the average mission score for the CAO was 4 (12/3) and the
average mission score for the council was 4.333 (13/3) the process described above will
produce a percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council of .48
(calculated as: 4 / (4 + 4.333) = .48). This same procedure is also used to calculate the
percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council variable for hypothesis 7
(policy activities), hypothesis 8 (administrative activities), and hypothesis 9 (management
activities) as well.
The percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council in policy
activities is defined as the percentage of the total involvement effort (total effort is
defined as 100% including both the CAO and the council) that the CAO contributes.
Survey participants are ask to rate the perceived involvement level of themselves (as
either mayor or CAO), their counterpart (either the mayor or CAO), and their city council
for four specific policy related activities. These four policy related activities include: A)
developing annual goals and objectives for municipal programs, B) the budget process,
C) identifying current issues that require attention by the municipal government, and D)
developing solutions to current issues. Survey respondents are ask to rate these activities
for all three participants using a six point Likert scale coded as follows: 0) none, 1) very
low, 2) low, 3) average, 4) high, 5) very high. A variable is created that sums the ratings
scores for all four related policy activities for each participant thus providing a total
policy involvement score for each mayor, CAO, and council in each municipality (if
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appropriate). The percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council is then
calculated using the same process discussed above.
The percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council in
administrative activities is defined as the percentage of the total involvement effort (total
effort is defined as 100% including both the CAO and the council) that the CAO
contributes. Survey participants are ask to rate the perceived involvement level of
themselves (as either mayor or CAO), their counterpart (either the mayor or CAO), and
their city council for three specific administrative related activities. These three activities
include: A) evaluating the accomplishment of specific programs, B) resolving citizens
complaints about services, and C) implementing programs and delivering services.
Survey respondents are ask to rate these activities for all three participants using a six
point Likert scale coded as follows: 0) none, 1) very low, 2) low, 3) average, 4) high, 5)
very high. A variable is created that sums the ratings scores for all three related
administrative activities for each participant thus providing a total administrative
involvement score for each mayor, CAO, and council in each municipality (if
appropriate). The percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council is then
calculated using the process described above.
The percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council in
management activities is defined as the percentage of the total involvement effort (total
effort is defined as 100% including both the CAO and the council) that the CAO
contributes. Survey participants are ask to rate the perceived involvement level of
themselves (as either mayor or CAO), their counterpart (either the mayor or CAO), and
their city council for three specific management related activities. These three activities
include: A) changing management practices or reorganizing city government, B) hiring
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decisions about department heads, and C) hiring decisions: employees below department
head level. Survey respondents are ask to rate the three participants involvement levels
using a six point Likert scale coded as follows: 0) none, 1) very low, 2) low, 3) average,
4) high, 5) very high. A variable is created that sums the ratings scores for all three
related management activities thus providing a total management involvement score for
each mayor, CAO, and council in each municipality (if appropriate). The percentage of
total involvement for the CAO verses the council is then calculated using the process
described above.
Independent Variables
The nine hypotheses previously stated are designed to test the value of the
research independent variables (which describe the institutional form or type of
government) when they are used to predict per capita general fund expenditures;
percentage of total work time the CAO devotes to the management, policy, and political
role activities; the overall quality of services offered by the municipality as perceived by
the CAO; and the percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council in the
mission, policy, administrative, and management dimensional related activities. In
addition to the research independent variables (also discussed below), the following
independent control variables are also used in the multiple regression equations for these
nine dependent variables.
Form or type of government is captured by three separate research independent
variables that are analyzed within this study. Government Form (coded as govform) is a
dichotomous nominal variable that captures the actual form of government reported by
each respondent municipality. This nominal variable is coded 0 for mayor-council (or
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equivalent) form municipalities and 1 for council-manager form cities. City Type (coded
ctytype) is a multinomial level variable that is defined as the city classification type based
upon the ‘Adapted Cities Framework’ put forward by Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood
(2004) and discussed in chapter 2. This five category classification system is coded in a
series of dummy variables for the analysis as follows: Political Cities (used as the control
or omitted group) is coded in the variable ctytypeP as non-political = 0, political = 1;
Adapted Political Cities is coded in the variable ctytypeAP as non-adapted political = 0,
adapted political = 1; Conciliated Cities is coded in the variable ctytypeC as nonconciliated = 0, conciliated = 1; Adapted Administrative Cities is coded in the variable
ctytypeAP as non-adapted administrative = 0, adapted administrative = 1; Administrative
Cities is coded in the variable ctytypeA as non-administrative = 0, administrative = 1.
Finally, ‘Score’ is an interval level measurement (developed in chapter 2) that allots a
point value to each municipality utilizing a number of institutional and structural features.
This variable ranges from a possible numerical low score of 0 (the most political) to a
possible high score of 50 (the most administrative).
Population (coded as pop) is the population for each responding municipality in
the survey and is the actual population reported. This is a numerical value in thousands
and no recoding is necessary.
Median Household Income (coded as mhsinc) is the actual median household
income for each responding municipality. This is a numerical value directly from census
information and no coding is necessary.
Percent of families below the poverty level (coded as pov) is the actual percentage
of families living in each respondent municipality at or below the defined poverty level.
This is an actual percentage value directly from census data and no coding is necessary.
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Urban-Suburban-Rural defines the metropolitan status of the respondent
municipality as it is reported by the respondent. This three category variable is coded as
a series of dummy variables as follows: Urban (the control or omitted group) is coded in
the variable durban as non-urban = 0, urban = 1; Suburban is coded in the variable
dsuburb as non-suburban = 0, suburban = 1; and Rural is coded in the variable drural as
non-rural = 0, rural = 1.
Number of Services offered (coded totsvc) is the total number of municipal
services offered by each respondent municipality, as reported. This is coded as an integer
value from 0 to 12.
Region is the geographical region of the country (as defined by the U.S. Census
Bureau) in which the respondent municipality is located. This four category variable is
coded as a series of dummy variables as follows: Northeast (the control or omitted group)
is coded in the variable regionne as non-northeast = 0, northeast = 1; South is coded in
the variable regions as non-south = 0, south = 1; Midwest is coded in the variable
regionmw as non-midwest = 0, midwest = 1; and West is coded in the variable regionw as
non-west = 0, west = 1.
Percent of Minority Population (coded as prcminor) is the actual percentage of the
population in each respondent municipality that is not classified as ‘white’ under the
census race classification. This is an actual percentage value and no recoding is
necessary.
A dummy variable (mccao) is also included to distinguish those survey
respondents that are appointed COAs working in a mayor-council municipality. This
dummy variable is coded as a 1 if a respondent is a CAO in a mayor-council municipality
and 0 if they are not.
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A dummy variable (caoreporting) is also used in the analysis of hypothesis 6, 7,
8, & 9 to distinguish whether the survey instrument was completed by the elected mayor
or by the appointed CAO in the municipality. There are twenty-four municipalities that
authorize an appointed CAO in which the mayor completed the survey. This variable
allows us to detect if having the mayor complete the survey makes a statistical difference.
This dummy variable is coded as a 1 if the mayor is completing the survey and 0 is the
appointed CAO is completing the survey.
Statistical Testing
This study uses several different methods of classifying municipalities in order to
compare and contrast the differences between the individual typologies within each
individual system. The study evaluates a representative sample of all cities in the United
States classified by the ICMA as either mayor-council or council-manager cities and
having a population between 10,000 and 250,000. The author uses the data analysis and
statistical package Stata to evaluate the relationship between the three classification
systems chosen and the nine dependent variables.
A hypothesis is a statement that predicts that a relationship exists between an
independent variable and dependent variable (Welch & Comer, 2001). If the hypothesis is
stated in terms that hypothesize that the independent variable has no effect on the
dependent variable it is called the null hypothesis. In contrast, the research (or
alternative) hypothesis assumes that a relationship does exist between the independent
and dependent variable. Both deductive and inductive reasoning are required to “prove”
that a hypothesis is true (O’Sullivan & Rassel, 1999). Disconfirming evidence from
statistical tests (based on deductive reasoning) is relied upon to demonstrate the truth of
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the hypothesis indirectly by showing that the null hypothesis is false. Evidence that
establishes causality, is replicable, and can eliminate alternative hypotheses (based on
inductive reasoning) will help to confirm that the hypothesis is correct.
Statistical tests of significance and hypothesis testing rely on disconfirming
evidence in order to demonstrate the truth of a hypothesis (O’Sullivan & Rassel, 1999).
To test a hypothesis, “the researcher selects a statistical test to determine the probability
that the hypothesized relationship in the population is random” (p. 366). If the
relationship is shown not to be simply random by the statistical test used then the null
hypothesis can be rejected as false and the alternative research hypothesis is supported
showing a relationship exists between the two variables from the survey data.
This study primarily uses regression analysis to analyze the relationship between
the three selected independent variables and the nine dependent variables; however, a
variety of other descriptive and statistical tools are also employed when appropriate.
As discussed above, each hypothesis is examined using three separate variables
that are utilized to classify municipalities via different typologies. These three variables
include a dichotomous nominal level classification (government form), a multinomial
level classification (city type), and an interval level classification (score).
For each of these three primary research variables the author uses multiple
statistical tools to test the relationship between the independent and dependent variables.
The ‘difference of the mean test’ is a statistical tool that is used to compare the
mean values of two groups (Welch & Comer, 2001). This test utilizes the t distribution
and what is commonly called the t-test to examine the relationship between a nominal
level variable and an interval level variable (O’Sullivan & Rassel, 1999). The two-group
mean comparison test is utilized in this study to compare the mean of the two groups in
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the nominal classification in which municipalities are classified into either mayor-council
or council-manager category. This analysis allows the author to draw conclusions about
whether or not the dichotomous classifications of mayor-council and council-manager
differ significantly for each of the dependent variables examined. This analysis is
performed on each hypothesis.
‘Analysis of Variance’ (ANOVA) is a statistical tool used primarily for analyzing
the differences between multiple group means (O’Sullivan & Rassel, 1999). In ANOVA
the independent variable is generally a nominal classification; the dependent variable
must however be interval (Welch & Comer, 2001). ANOVA analysis must fulfill two
assumptions: first, that each of the groups constitutes a random sample; and second, that
the variances for the populations in all groups are equal (O’Sullivan & Rassel, 1999).
ANOVA analysis is utilized within this study to compare the means for groups of cities
classified using the multinomial level variable used to classify municipalities into the five
city types put forward in the ‘Adapted Cities Framework’ (Frederickson et. al., 2004).
The ANOVA analysis in this study compares the mean of the five groups in the
multinomial classification that types cities into either political, adapted political,
conciliated, adapted administrative, or the administrative category. This analysis allows
the author to draw conclusions about whether or not these five categories of cities differ
significantly from each other in regards to the dependent variables examined. This
analysis is also performed for each hypothesis.
Each of the three primary independent variables utilized in this study are also
examined using multiple linear regression analysis performed for each of the proposed
hypothesis. In linear regression the researcher looks to describe the relationship between
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the independent and the dependent variable by a straight line (Welch & Comer, 2001).
The general format of the regression equation used in this analysis is:
Y = a + bX

(4.1)

where:
a = the constant or Y intercept
b = the regression coefficient or slope
Y = the predicted value of the dependent variable
X = the independent variable
Technically, regression requires that the variables used are measured on the
interval level; however, nominal level independent variables can be incorporated by
utilizing a dummy variable technique (Welch & Comer, 2001). Regression analysis is
used within this study to compare the relationship between each of the three identified
primary research independent variables (government form, city type, and score) and the
dependent variables. This regression analysis allows the author to draw conclusions
about whether or not these three independent variables are significantly related to the
dependent variables examined. This analysis also indicates the proportion of the variance
in the dependent variables that can be explained by or associated with the independent
variable, as indicated by the R2 value. This analysis is performed for each hypothesis for
each of the three classification research variables.
In each of the regression equations discussed above control variables are also
utilized to assist in understanding concerning how that change observed in the dependent
variable are produced by the independent research variable (Welch & Comer, 2001).
Linear regression using the Ordinary Least Squares model is utilized for each of the three
independent variables discussed above for the nine hypotheses.
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The three independent variables are examined in order to determine if they are
related to the general fund per capita expenditures of cities included in this study
(hypotheses 1). Previous studies in our review of the literature show that these variables
are related. However, the relationship is not always consistent in direction or intensity.
The author expects that the population size in municipalities is related to the dependent
variable. Larger municipalities are usually more heterogeneous leading to higher
demands from citizens. Larger cities also generally have a proportionally larger tax base
that is based upon a more diverse economic make-up.

Because general fund per capita

expenditures are calculated from general fund budget expenditures, per capital
expenditures are highly dependent on municipal general fund revenues. General fund
revenues are highly dependent on the amount of taxes that residents pay into municipal
coffers. Median household income for the city may also be indicative of the amount of
taxes municipal residents pay into general fund revenues in the form of property and sales
taxes. The percentage of families living below the poverty line in a city is also related to
per capita general fund expenditures. The author expects that an increase in the family
poverty level places a higher demand on general services offered by the community and
thereby an increase in general fund expenditures. Another variable the author expects to
be positively related to per capita general fund expenditures is the total number of
services offered by the municipality. An additional service offered in one community
that is not offered in another similar community, one could expect, causes the first
community to have higher general fund expenditures. The author also expects the
percentage of minority population within the municipality to relate to general fund
expenditure levels. In general, the author expects a larger minority population to
translate into a higher demand for many services offered in a city because minorities are
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generally associated with higher levels of poverty and therefore a higher cost per capita.
Finally, the author anticipates that two geographical differences between municipalities
are related to per capital general fund expenditure levels. Both the region of the country
in which the city resides along with the proximity of the municipality to larger urban
areas, the author expects is related to expenditure levels. Municipalities located in the
Northeast and the Midwest regions are anticipated to have higher levels of expenditures
than those in the South and West. These two regions are traditionally responsible in more
instances for financially demanding services such as public housing, public education,
public transportation, and public health issues. Location of a municipality in an urban,
suburban, or rural location is also anticipated to affect expenditure levels. Rural areas are
generally less densely populated than urban areas and should have a lower level of
expenditure demand than either urban or suburban areas. Suburban areas are usually
younger communities than urban areas and therefore face fewer aging infrastructure
demands and thus a lower expenditure level for these services; however, suburban
communities may have higher demands for quality of life services than are found in
urban areas and thus higher expenditures within these areas.
The regression equations for hypothesis 2, 3, and 4 examine how the CAOs total
percentage of work time is actually allocated among the 2) management, 3) policy, and 4)
political roles performed each day. The author anticipates that the independent variables
have an impact on how CAOs allocate their time. The author anticipates that in those
cities with more independent city managers, CAOs spend more time devoted to
management activities and less time to political activities. Studies in the literature
usually show that appointed executives devote more of their time to management
activities. Population size is also anticipated to be related to each of the three dependent
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variables. Larger municipalities are usually more heterogeneous leading to higher
demands from citizens. The larger a municipality’s population the more services will
likely be offered and therefore be require management. Location of a municipality in an
urban, suburban, or rural location is also anticipated to affect time allocations. The
political demands of a larger urban community are much larger than those found in a
small rural city. The lack of staff in rural municipalities also places the CAO into the role
of policy expert for the community in many instances. The region of the county that a
municipality is located also places differences on the roles that the CAO plays. The south
is known to be uniquely conservative on some issues while the Northeast and West are
uniquely liberal on the same issues (Erikson & Tendin, 2007). On almost all social issues
the south is very conservative and these various public opinion views affect the roles that
CAOs perceive as proper and thus affect how CAOs actually allocate their time.
Hypothesis 5 uses the overall quality of services that a municipality offers, as
perceived by the CAO, as the dependent variable and examines this variable in relation to
the three independent research variables using regression analysis. The author anticipates
that as a city reforms its structure from more political to more administrative the quality
of the services as perceived by the CAO changes. The author expects that the population
size in a municipality also relates to the dependent variable. Larger municipalities are
usually more heterogeneous which leads to higher demands from citizens. Such higher
demand has a negative effect on the perceived quality of services the municipality offers.
Median household income provides the author with an indicator of the community’s
ability to pay for quality services. Higher income levels should translate into higher levels
of service quality. The percentage of families living below the poverty line in a
community also indicates resident’s ability to pay for municipal services. A higher
105

percentage of families in a community living below the poverty line translate into
residents having a reduced capacity to pay for services but a higher level of need for
those same services. The region of the country and whether the city is located in a rural,
suburban, or urban location are also examined to determine if these factors also relate to
the quality of services offered.
Hypothesis 6, 7, 8, and 9 analyze the percentage of total involvement (total
involvement includes the sum of all involvement for both the council and the CAO in a
municipality) for the CAO in a number of specific measured responsibilities. The four
dimensions of responsibility measured in this study correspond to the four dimensions put
forward by Svara (1985) in his “Dichotomy and Duality” model of council and manager
relationships. Svara’s model is used to compare the appointed administrator’s level of
role responsibility in relation to the elected council’s level of role responsibility for each
of the four dimensions described within the model. Because Svara’s model only
examines the relationship of appointed managers and not elected ones (mayors) , we
exclude from the analysis of hypotheses 6, 7, 8, and 9 those municipalities that do not
authorize the use of an appointed CAO. The author uses the involvement level of the
appointed CAO is in determining the purpose and services of the city, in developing
future development strategies, and in setting long-term fiscal priorities as a proxy for
measuring a CAOs Mission involvement (Svara, 2006). A CAO involvement level in
developing annual goals, participating in the budget adoption process, identifying current
issues requiring municipal attention, and in developing solutions to those current issues
are used to measure the Policy dimension activities (Svara, 2006). The Administration
dimension is measured by the CAOs involvement in evaluating specific program
accomplishments, resolving citizen complaints, and implementing programs and service
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delivery (Svara, 2006). Finally, a CAOs involvement level in changing management
practices, in reorganization issues, and with making hiring decisions concerning
employees at or below the department head level measure the Management dimension
activities (Svara, 2006). A variable measuring population is controlled for in each
regression model in order to examine its relationship with these four dependent
dimension variables. Whether a municipality is located in an urban, suburban, or rural
area is also anticipated to have an effect on the CAOs involvement levels. The lack of
staff in smaller rural municipalities often places the CAO in those municipalities into the
role of expert for the community in a number of different areas including activities
relating to the mission and policy dimensions. The region of the county that a
municipality is located in also potentially plays a difference in the roles that the CAO
plays. For example, on almost all social issues the south is very conservative (Erikson &
Tendin, 2007). These variations in public opinion views between the different regions,
affects the roles that CAOs perceives as proper to assume. This perception of what are
the proper roles to assume, affects how deeply the CAO involves himself in the activities
associated with the four measured dimensions. A dummy variable that distinguishes
whether the survey instrument is completed by the elected mayor or by the appointed
CAO in the municipality is also included in each of the regression equations analyzing
these four dimension variables. There are twenty-four municipalities in the data that
authorize an appointed CAO in which the mayor completes the survey instrument. This
dummy variable allows us to detect whether having the mayor complete the survey
makes any statistical difference in the results.
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Advantages and Limitations of the Study
This study enhances the existing literature concerning local government in cities
in the United States with a population between 10,000 and 250,000. The analysis the
author performs within this study provides valuable information concerning the perceived
quality of services and other administrative and structural attributes of local governments
in this population range. This research compares and contrasts local governments
utilizing a number of institutional classification structures.
One limitation to this study is the fact that several of the variables analyzed within
this study are based on subjective rather than objective data. The actual time allocations
of CAOs, the overall quality of services a municipality provides, and the percentage of
total involvement for the CAO verses the council are all based on questions that are
designed to solicit the respondent’s perceptions. It would be more beneficial if more
valid and reliable indicators were available, however, comparisons with other existing
studies help to lend validity to the conclusions that the author draws.
A second possible limitation to this study is the overall response rate of 34%. A
higher response rate might enhance the validity of the results. The study does, however,
obtain results from 270 cities and municipalities in the United States. It is also shown
that these cities are representative of the entire population of cities between 10,000 and
250,000 (See tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3) whether the data is examined by state, region, or
government form (mayor-council or council-manager). Two hundred and seventy cities
provide us with a thorough analysis of municipalities in the population range under study.
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CHAPTER V
DATA ANALYSIS
Response Rates
In this study, eight hundred surveys are mailed to a random sample of the 2,975
municipalities within the United States with a population between 10,000 and 250,000.
The sample includes 502 (63%) municipalities listed as utilizing the council-manager
form of government and 298 (37%) municipalities listed as using the mayor-council
form. This sample is in line with the total population under study (62% council-manager
and 38% mayor-council). The surveys are mailed to respondents in three waves. Wave
one generated 213 returns, wave two generated 48 returns, and wave three generated 9
returns for a total of 270 returned surveys. Four of the returned surveys are discarded as
unusable leaving a usable data set of 266 returned surveys. Of these 266 usable returned
surveys 171 (64.3%) are received from council-manager form cities and 95 (35.7%) are
received from mayor-council form municipalities; again in line with the population under
study. The overall response rate of thirty-four percent is considered adequate to support
the findings within the survey analysis.
Demographics of Chief Administrative Officers
The demographic aspects of Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs) in the
respondent municipalities are examined using both the dichotomous classification
method of mayor-council and council-manager form of government as well as the five
category Adapted Cities framework (Frederickson et al., 2004).
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When analyzed using the dichotomous mayor-council and council-manager
classification system (See Table 5.1), the author finds that 84% of CAOs in mayorcouncil municipalities and 88% of CAOs in council-manager cities that responded to this
survey are male. Although this difference is not statistically significant (Pearson Chi
Square probability = 0.348), it is interesting that the highest percentage of female CAOs
occurs in mayor-council municipalities. The vast majority of CAOs in both mayorcouncil and council-manager municipalities are Caucasian although there are 6% more
minority CAOs in council-manager cities than in mayor-council municipalities. Both
forms report 2% African-American CAOs but only the council-manager municipalities’
report Hispanic (5%) and other (1%) minority CAOs.

Although the majority of CAOs

in both forms of government report having a 4 year college degree or higher (73% in
mayor-council and 97% in council-manager), more CAOs in council-manager cities have
attained a Masters degree or higher (50% in mayor-council verses 78% in councilmanager). The majority of CAOs in council-manager municipalities (63%) are educated
in the field of Public Administration. A majority of appointed CAOs in mayor-council
communities also are educated in the Public Administration field (59%) while mayor
CAOs are almost evenly split between educations in Business (38%), and other (43%).
The vast majority of CAOs in both forms of government are married (93% in mayorcouncil and 89% in council-manager).
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Table 5.1

Demographic aspects of CAOs by form
Mayor-Council Municipalities

Council- Manager
Municipalities

Mayors

CAOs

Total

52

42

94

172

90%
10%

75%
25%

84%
16%

88%
13%

96%

100%

98%

92%

Race

Caucasian
AfricanAmerican
Hispanic
Other

4%

0%

2%

2%

0%
0%

0%
0%

0%
0%

5%
1%

Education

H.S./GED
Some College
4 year degree
Masters
PhD
Professional
degree

6%
33%
21%
31%
2%

0%
12%
26%
53%
2%

3%
23%
23%
41%
2%

0%
2%
19%
71%
2%

8%

7%

7%

5%

12%

59%

35%

63%

38%
2%
5%
43%

17%
5%
5%
15%

28%
4%
5%
29%

12%
7%
3%
15%

# of Respondents
Male
Gender
Female

Education
Field

Public
Administration
Business
Engineering
Finance
Other

Marital
Status

Single
Married
Divorced
Widowed

0%
94%
2%
4%

2%
93%
5%
0%

2%
93%
3%
2%

5%
89%
5%
1%

Political
Party

Republican
Democrat
Independent
None
Other

29%
42%
21%
8%
0%

38%
14%
19%
30%
0%

33%
29%
20%
18%
0%

26%
18%
32%
24%
1%

Very Liberal
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Very
Conservative
weekly working
hours

0%
12%
39%
45%

0%
16%
41%
38%

0%
14%
40%
42%

1%
11%
62%
24%

4%

5%

5%

2%

47.38

54.44

48.59

54.49

Ideology
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Table 5.2

Demographic aspects of CAOs by city type

# of Respondents
Male
Gender
Female
Caucasian
Race

Education

Education
Field

AfricanAmerican
Hispanic
Other
H.S./GED
Some College
4 year degree
Masters
PhD
Professional
degree
Public
Administration
Business
Engineering
Finance
Other
Single

Marital
Status

Married
Divorced
Widowed
Republican

Political
Party

Democrat
Independent
None
Other
Very Liberal

Ideology

Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Very
Conservative
weekly working
hours

Political

Adapted Political

mayors

mayors

Appt
CAO

Total

Appointed CAOs

25
87%
13%

30
93%
7%

30
70%
30%

60
81%
19%

12
91%
9%

128
88%
12%

41
85%
15%

100%

93%

100%

97%

100%

91%

95%

0%

7%

0%

3%

0%

2%

0%

0%
0%

0%
0%

0%
0%

0%
0%

0%
0%

6%
1%

5%
0%

4%
40%
8%
28%
4%

7%
28%
31%
34%
0%

0%
10%
32%
45%
3%

3%
18%
32%
40%
2%

0%
8%
17%
67%
0%

0%
2%
17%
73%
2%

0%
2%
24%
68%
2%

16%

0%

10%

5%

8%

5%

2%

11%

12%

57%

36%

64%

65%

61%

33%
6%
6%
44%

44%
0%
4%
40%

17%
7%
7%
13%

29%
4%
5%
25%

7%
7%
0%
21%

11%
7%
3%
13%

17%
2%
2%
17%

0%
91%
4%
4%

0%
96%
0%
4%

3%
90%
7%
0%

2%
93%
3%
2%

0%
100%
0%
0%

5%
91%
4%
0%

8%
82%
7%
3%

32%
50%
14%
5%
0%

32%
32%
25%
11%
0%

31%
19%
19%
31%
0%

31%
26%
22%
20%
0%

40%
10%
10%
40%
0%

25%
17%
31%
26%
1%

29%
20%
37%
14%
0%

0%
13%
30%
48%

0%
11%
43%
43%

0%
23%
38%
35%

0%
17%
41%
39%

0%
0%
64%
36%

1%
9%
60%
27%

0%
19%
68%
14%

9%

4%

4%

4%

0%

3%

0%

53.52

42.52

51.39

47.1

57.08

54.34

55.05
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Conciliated

Adpt.
Admin.

Admin

Most CAOs in mayor-council cities indicate a preference for one of the two major
political parties (33% republican and 29% democrat) while most CAOs in councilmanager cities indicate a preference for neither (32% independent and 24% none). CAOs
in respondent mayor-council municipalities appear to take a more conservative tilt than
those in council-manager cities. When survey respondents are ask to describe their
ideology 62% of CAOs in council-manager municipalities describe themselves as
moderates while almost half of respondents in mayor-council communities describe
themselves as either conservative (45%) or as very conservative (4%).
When CAO demographics are analyzed using city type from the Adapted Cities
Framework (See Table 5.2), we also observe some interesting characteristics. As
expected, the vast majority of CAOs across the five categories (Political, Adapted
Political, Conciliated, Adapted Administrative, and Administrative) are Caucasian males.
When education level is examined, the author observes that across all five categories the
majority of CAOs have at least a 4 year college degree. Somewhat paradoxically, the
Political city category contains double the percentage of CAOs without a 4 year college
degree (44%) of any other category but it also contains the highest percentage of PhD’s
(4%) and Professional degrees (16%) of any of the five categories. When educational
field of a CAO is reviewed, the author observes that as a city becomes more
administrative it is more likely that the CAO of that municipality is educated in the
Public Administration field. Again, as expected, the large majority of CAOs in every
category type are married. When ask to state their political preference 82% of those
CAOs in the political city category indicate one of the two major political parties (32%
republican and 50% democrat) and 57% of CAOs in the Adapted Political category also
identify one of the two major political parties; although this is primarily due to the high
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rate in which elected mayor CAOs in Adapted Political cities identify with one of the
major political parties. The majority of CAOs in the remaining three categories identify
themselves as either independent or none (50% in Conciliated, 57% in Adapted
Administrative, and 51% in Administrative). When describing their political ideology,
CAOs tend to move from more conservative to more moderate as the categories move
from Political Cities toward administrative cities. Political City CAOs identify
themselves the least of the time as moderates (30%) and the most as conservative or very
conservative (57%). Administrative City CAOs identify themselves the most as
moderates (68%) and the least as conservative or very conservative (14%).
Overview of Analysis
For each of the nine hypotheses tested within this study, the form, or type, of
government for each municipality is captured and analyzed using three separate
independent variables. These three independent variables represent a nominal
dichotomous variable (mayor-council or council-manager), a five category multinomial
variable based upon the ‘Adapted Cities Framework’ (Frederickson et al., 2004), and an
interval level variable that develops a point total score for each municipality using a
number of institutional and structural features, as developed fully in chapter two.
The author analyzes the nominal dichotomous variable for each municipality
using both a two group mean comparison T-Test and an ordinary least squares (OLS)
multiple regression analysis for each dependent variable. These tests allow the author to
determine first, if there is any statistically significant difference in the mean of the
categories of mayor-council and council-manager, and second, to determine the direction
and significance of the relationship between the independent and dependent variable as
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well as explain the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that can be
associated with the independent variables.
The author analyzes the five category multinomial level variable using a OneWay ANOVA test for each dependent variable as well as an OLS multiple regression
analysis. This analysis allows us to draw conclusions about whether the dependent
variables of municipalities within these five city classification types differ significantly
from each other.
Finally, the author analyzes the interval level variable using OLS multiple
regression analysis for each of the dependent variables. This analysis allows the author to
draw conclusions about the significance of the statistical relationship between this
interval level independent variable and the nine dependent variables.
For each of the regression models in this study a Cooks D test statistic is run to
help determine the possibility of outliers in the data set1. If a case indicates a Cooks D
value that is greater than or equal to twice the equation of (4/N-P-1), the case is deemed
to be an influential outlier. To determine the actual effect of the potential influential
outlier on the model, a regression is run for each model including and excluding the
identified outlier cases. Each regression model is also tested for multicollinearity using a
variance inflation factor (VIF) test. Using this test, no finding of multicollinearity is
made in any of the models. Finally, a White’s test for heteroskedasticity is run for each
OLS regression equation as well. If heteroskedasticity is detected then a robust
regression method is employed. To allow for comparison between the regression models,
corrections are made to ensure that all three models within each individual hypothesis
To assure consistency, identified outliers for each hypothesis were removed when
calculating the T-test and ANOVA statistics. This does not significantly affect the
results.
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utilize the same outlier cases. This correction does not significantly change the results of
the study.
Hypothesis One
Hypothesis one proposes that the per capita expenditures of a municipality is
different depending on how that municipality’s institutional form is classified. The
author anticipates that changes to institutional and structural characteristics of
municipalities made to make the city more ‘reformed’ or less ‘reformed’ in character will
affect the efficiencies within these cities and result in significantly different per capita
expenditure levels. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 provide a breakdown by form of government and
type of city regarding the general fund per capita expenditure level for municipalities.
Discussion of hypothesis one will follow these tables.
Table 5.3

Per capita expenditures – by government form

N
Mean Per Capita
Expenditures
Minimum Per Capita
Expenditures
Maximum Per Capita
Expenditures

Mayor-Council

Council-Manager

88

168

$721.49

$762.23

$159.60

$227.60

$1500.00

$1795.70
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Table 5.4

Per capita expenditures – by city type

N

Political

Adapted
Political

Conciliated

Adapted
Admin.

Admin.

22

58

11

125

40

$709.33

$717.10

$745.67

$797.60

$159.60

$392.30

$227.60

$276.60

$1427.30

$1183.70

$1591.20

$1795.70

Mean Per
$791.07
Capita
Expenditures
Minimum
$381.90
Per Capita
Expenditures
Maximum
$1500.00
Per Capita
Expenditures

T-Tests and ANOVA analysis
Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table
5.5) show that although the mean per capita expenditures of the 168 council-manager
cities are higher than those of 88 mayor-council cities, it is not a statistically significant
difference. The per capita expenditure level of the 168 council-manager municipalities
responding to the survey is $762.23 and the per capita expenditure level of the 88 mayorcouncil respondent cities is $721.49. Analysis results in a t-statistic of -1.0496 at 254
degrees of freedom. The resulting significance is .2949 which is higher than .05;
therefore it is not a statistically significant relationship.
Table 5.5

Two group means comparison t-test – general fund per capita expenditures

Government Form

N

MEAN

Mayor-Council

88

721.49

Council-Manager

168

762.23
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T

Degrees of
freedom

Significance
(2-tailed)

-1.0496

254

.2949

Table 5.6

ANOVA analysis – adapted city type by - general fund per capita
expenditures

Between groups

237103.68

Degrees
Mean
of
Squares
Freedom
4
59275.9201

Within groups

21967707.9

251

87520.7484

Total

22204811.5

255

87077.6923

Model

Sum of
Squares

F
0.68

Significance
0.6083

The five level multinomial independent variable for city classification based on
the ‘Adapted Cities Framework’ (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted
Administrative, and Administrative) is analyzed to find if a relationship exists between
city type and the dependent variable general fund per capita expenditures.
Analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA analysis indicates an F score of
0.68 with a significance level of 0.6083. This is also over the .05 threshold for statistical
significance (See Table 5.6), thus there is no statistical difference between the five city
type categories.
OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple linear regression is used to evaluate the
relationship between general fund per capita expenditure and the three research
independent variables of government form, city type, and calculated score along with the
control independent variables of population, median household income,
urban/suburban/rural status, total number of services, quality of service, percent minority
population, and region of the country. The F statistic is used to test the null hypotheses
that the slope is 0 (B1....B10=0), or the statistical significance of our model in predicting
the dependent variable (Y). Adjusted R square is also calculated and is used to tell us the
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substantive significance of our model, or how much of the change in the dependent
variable is explained by the independent variables. To obtain a percentage figure,
multiply the R square number by 100 (example: R square of .01 would equal 1% of the
model’s dependent variable explained by the model).
The three models are compared side by side in table 5.7 to allow the reader to
examine the relationship that these independent variables have the dependent variable.
Each of these models is run with the identified outliers removed2. The F score of
models one and three are statistically significant at the .05 level of significance while
model two is significant only at the .10 level of significance. The resulting Adjusted-Rsquare values for each of the three models are .0455 for the nominal variable, .0378 for
the multinomial level variable, and .0457 for the interval level score variable. This tells
the reader that the models only explain 4.55%, 3.78%, and 4.57%, respectively, of the
variation in general fund per capita expenditures. This level of explanation indicates that
only a very low level of substantive significance is found using our three models. A
review of the individual independent variables in the three models indicate that in none
of the three models do we find that the research variable used to measure government
institutional form to be statistically significant. The most significant of the independent
variables in the model is the variable indicating whether the municipality is located in a
suburban metropolitan area. In all three models this variable is significant at the .05
threshold level. In model one, for instance, the coefficient of this variable is -98.953 and
is significant at the .05 level of significance.
The five outliers identified each had a general fund per capita expenditure level
significantly above the remaining municipalities. There was no statistical difference
detected in models one and three when the regression models were run with the outliers
included, however, in model two the significance was.0409 which is below the threshold
of .05.
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This tells us that a municipality located in a suburban location has $98.953 less in
general fund per capita expenditures than a municipality located in an urban location (the
comparison variable). The author finds this relationship significant in both models two
($100.315 less) and three ($100.069 less) as well. Although not at the threshold
significance level of .05, analysis also shows that in all three models the median
household income variable is significant at the .10 level. In model one, for every $1,000
change in median household income, one expects a $1.78 increase in general fund per
capita expenditures; in model two one expects a $1.87 increase; and, in model, expect a
$1.75 increase.
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Table 5.7

Multiple regression – Ind. Var.-city type; Dep. Var. - general fund per capita
expenditures

Independent Variable

Regression #1
(government form)

Regression #2
(city type)

Regression #3
(score)

N

254

254

254

Constant

612.412 ***
(3.22)
31.063
(0.77)

622.429 ***
(3.19)

601.569 ***
(3.12)

government form
score

-25.516
(-0.34)
-70.155
(-0.64)

Adapted Political
Conciliated
Adapted
Administrative
Administrative

0.995
(0.81)

-14.410
(-0.21)
37.588
(0.46)
-0.810
(-1.35)

-0.852
(-1.43)

1.869 *
(1.82)

1.749 *
(1.73)

-98.953 **
(-2.01)
-81.412
(-1.30)
14.272
(1.58)

-100.315 **
(-2.00)
-79.544
(-1.26)

-100.069 **
(-2.03)
-82.572
(-1.32)

14.774
(1.61)

14.403
(1.59)

dummy west

-7.374
(-0.13)
2.17
(1.65)
3.550
(0.06)
-96.379
(-1.64)
-111.103
(-1.64)

-4.321
(-0.07)
2.163
(1.64)
7.117
(0.11)
-93.063
(-1.56)
-111.643
(-1.64)

-6.863
(-0.12)
2.203 *
(1.68)
.542
(0.01)
-98.525 *
(-1.68)
-114.245 *
(-1.68)

F score

2.10 **

1.71 *

2.10 **

Adjusted R2

.0455

.0378

.0457

population
median household
income
dummy suburb
dummy rural
total number of
services
quality service score
percent minority
dummy South
dummy mid-west

-0.855
(-1.84)
1.776 *
(1.76)

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 level
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Findings for Hypothesis One
In the analysis that uses the three independent variables described above to
classify municipalities, against the dependent variable general fund per capita
expenditures, the author finds none of the research variables have a statistically
significant relationship which would allow us to reject the null hypothesis. The Two
Group Mean T-Test indicates no statistically significant difference between mayorcouncil and council-manager municipalities in general fund per capita expenditure levels.
Likewise, the ANOVA analysis between the five categories of cities found in the
‘Adapted Cities Framework’ also finds no statistically significant differences between the
five types of cities. Multiple regression analysis of the three research independent
variables finds that while two of the three models put forward are each significant as a
whole, they each explain very little of the change in the dependent variable of general
fund per capita expenditures. In addition, none of the three individual research variables
are found to be statistically significant in the model. The author therefore cannot reject
the null hypothesis. The data do not demonstrate that per capita expenditures of a
municipality are different depending on how the municipality’s institutional form is
classified.
Hypothesis Two
Hypotheses two, three, and four examine the percentage of total work time that
the chief administrative officer of a municipality allocates to the management, policy, and
political roles in their communities. Tables 5.8 and 5.9 provide a breakdown by form of
government and type of city regarding these time allocations. Discussion of hypothesis
two follows these tables.
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Table 5.8

Summary of chief administrative officer’s time allocation by government
form

Form of
Government
Mayor-Council

Management

Policy

Political

50.4%

31.5%

14.6%

Council-Manager

55.3%

32.2%

12.4%

*may not add to 100% due to rounding and the use of different cases
Table 5.9

Summary of chief administrative officer’s time allocation by city type

Category of
City

Management

Policy

Political

N=260

N=261

N=260

51.1%

26.9%

18.3%

48.8%

33.0%

14.3%

38.9%

36.8%

19.8%

58.0%

29.4%

9.4%

Conciliated
Adapted
Administrative

63.0%

29.2%

7.7%

54.4%

32.3%

12.9%

Administrative

56.7%

33.1%

10.7%

TOTAL

53.6%

33.0%

14.3%

Political
Adapted
Political

mayors
appointed
CAOs

*may not add to 100% due to rounding and the use of different cases
Hypothesis two proposes that as the institutional form of a municipality changes,
the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to
management activities will change. The author anticipates that as changes to institutional
and structural characteristics of municipalities are enacted to make the city more
‘reformed’ or less ‘reformed’ in character, then the chief administrative officer’s
concerns with management efficiencies will alter and this will result in significantly
different amounts of time devoted to these types of activities.
123

T-Tests and ANOVA analysis
Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table
5.10) show that the mean amount of time devoted to management activities of CAOs in
the 170 council-manager cities is statistically higher than those of CAOs in the 90 mayorcouncil cities responding to the survey. The mean time a CAO devotes to management
activities in the 170 council-manager municipalities responding in the survey is 55.3% of
the total working time; the mean time a CAO devotes to management activities in the 90
mayor-council responding cities is 50.4% of the total working time. Analysis results in a
t-statistic equal to -2.1471 at 258 degrees of freedom. The resulting significance is .0327
which is below the threshold of .05; therefore there is a statistically significant difference.
Table 5.10

T-test – percent of CAOs time allocated to management activities

Government Form

N

MEAN

Mayor-Council

90

.504

Council-Manager

170

.553

Table 5.11

T

Degrees of
freedom

Significance
(2-tailed)

-2.1471

258

.0327

ANOVA – city type by percent of CAOs time allocated to management
activities

Between groups

.294487851

Degrees
of
Freedom
4

Within groups

7.69959473

255

Total

7.99408258

259

Model

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F

Significance

.073621963

2.44

0.0476

.030194489

The five level multinomial independent variable for city classification based on
the ‘Adapted Cities Framework’ (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted
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Administrative, and Administrative) is also analyzed to determine if a relationship exists
between city type and the dependent variable, mean amount of time a COA devotes to
management activities.
Analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA analysis3 indicates an F score of
2.44 with a significance level of .0476. This is under the .05 threshold for statistical
significance (See Table 5.11), therefore, a significant difference is found to exist between
the five Adapted Cities types.
OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis
The author also uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple linear regression to
evaluate the relationship between mean amount of total working time devoted by CAOs
to management related activities and the three research independent variables of
government form, city type, and calculated score, along with the control independent
variables of whether the survey was completed by a mayor CAO or an appointed CAO in
a mayor-council form municipality, population, median household income,
urban/suburban/rural status, and region. The three models are compared side by side in
table 5.12 to allow the reader to examine the relationship of these independent variables
with the dependent variable.
Each of these models is run with the identified outliers removed4. The F score of
model one (mayor-council and council-manager) is statistically significant at the .01 level
of significance, as is model two and model three. For model one, using the nominal
If the six identified outliers are included in the ANOVA analysis the F statistic is
found to be 1.25 with a statistical significance of 0.2913 which is above the .05 threshold.
4
The six identified outliers each indicated a percentage of time spent on
management activities as either much higher or much lower than other similar
municipalities. Regression models run including the outliers did not change the statistical
significance of any of the three models shown.
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variable government form, the F score is 2.97 (significant at the .01 level). The F score
for the multinomial model two is 3.49 (also significant at the .01 level). The interval
level variable score in regression model three has an F score of 2.58 (also significant at
the .01 level). The calculated adjusted-R-square values for each of the three models
inform the reader that the independent variables, taken together, indicate a substantive
significance of, or that they explain, 6.39%, 10.33%, and 5.19% respectively of the
variation of the percentage of total working time devoted to management related
activities for CAOs in these municipalities.
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Table 5.12

Mult. Reg. – percent of CAOs total working time devoted to management
related activities

Independent Variable

Regression #1
(government form)

Regression #2
(city type)

Regression #3
(score)

N

260

260

260

Constant

.386 ***
(7.73)
.104 ***
(3.85)

.441 ***
(8.24)

.376 ***
(7.22)

government form
score

-.130 ***
(-2.73)
.107 *
(1.72)
.044
(1.14)
.070
(1.52)

Adapted Political
Conciliated
Adapted Administrative
Administrative
CAO in mayor-council
municipality
population

.003 ***
(3.39)

.111 ***
(2.86)

.187 ***
(4.26)

.090 **
(2.40)

dummy west

-.001
(-1.47)
.001 *
(1.73)
.010
(0.33)
.056
(1.54)
.027
(0.78)
.035
(1.05)
-.018
(-0.48)

-.0004
(-1.29)
.001
(1.30)
.016
(0.58)
.056
(1.59)
.024
(0.71)
.048
(1.43)
-.011
(-0.28)

-.0005
(-1.36)
.001 *
(1.65)
.008
(0.26)
.051
(1.41)
.022
(0.61)
.030
(0.89)
-.023
(-0.60)

F score

2.97 ***

3.49 ***

2.58 ***

Adjusted R2

.0639

.1033

.0519

median household income
dummy suburb
dummy rural
dummy South
dummy mid-west

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 level

An examination of the individual independent variables within the three models
indicate that in both model one (mayor-council and council-manager) and model three
(the calculated administrative score) the research variables are statistically significant at
the .01 level and two of the four variables representing the adapted cities framework in
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model two are significant at the .10 level of significance. The government form variable
in model one demonstrates a T-score of 3.85 indicating a significance level of .01 and the
score variable of model three indicate a T-score of 3.39, also indicating a significance
level of .01. Only the Adapted Political research variable in model two reaches a
statistically significant level of .05, however, the conciliated city variable is also
statistically significant at the .10 level. In all three models the author finds that the
dummy variable indicating those mayor-council municipalities where an appointed CAO
completed the survey is highly significant. In model one this variable has a coefficient of
.111; this tells us that, keeping constant the other variables, appointed CAOs in mayorcouncil cities spend on average 11.1% more of their total time on management related
activities than do elected CAOs. Similar results are found in models two and three. In
model two the difference is 18.7% and in model three it is 9.0%. This finding is
confirmed reviewing the two group mean comparison t-test between the 29 mayorcouncil municipalities in which the mayor completes the survey instrument and the 31 in
which the appointed CAO completes the instrument (mccao). The t-test using the mccao
dummy variable results in a t score of -3.5584 and a significance of 0.0008. None of the
other individual independent variables in any of the three models are statistically
significant at the threshold level of significance of .05.
Findings for Hypothesis Two
The author finds in the above analysis using the three independent variables to
classify municipalities against the dependent variable percentage of total work time
devoted to management activities by the CAO, the dichotomous research variable
discerning between mayor-council and council-manager forms of government (model 1)
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and the interval level variable that scores each municipality according to various
institutional and structural features (model 3), have a statistically significant relationship
which would allow us to reject the null hypothesis. The R square, or substantive
significance, of these two models, however, both explain less than 6.5% of the variation
of the dependent variable. The Two Group Mean T-Test confirms that there is indeed a
statistically significant difference between mayor-council and council-manager
municipalities in the mean percentage allocation of total work time a CAO in these
communities devotes to management activities. The ANOVA analysis between the five
categories of cities from the ‘Adapted Cities Framework’ also confirms what is
discovered in model two, that there are some statistically significant differences between
the five types of cities. Multiple regression analysis of the three research independent
variables finds that all three regression models are significant as a whole. In addition,
even though both the research variables in model one and model three (government form
and score) are statistically significant, both models explain less than 6.5% of the change
in the dependent variable. Model two explains 10.33% of the change in the dependent
variable. Only one of the research variables used for classifying cities into the Adapted
Cites framework in model two is found to be significant at the threshold .05 levels in
explaining the variation in the dependent variable, however, the conciliated cities variable
is significant at the .10 level of significance. In all three models, however, the variable
that captures the fact that an appointed CAO in a mayor-council form municipality
completes the survey is significant in explaining the variation in how much total work
time a CAO allocated to management related activities. Based upon these findings the
author can reject the null hypothesis. The data do demonstrate that as the institutional
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form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief
administrative officer to management activities will change
Hypothesis Three
Hypothesis three proposes that as the institutional form of a municipality changes
the percentage of total working time the chief administrative officer devotes to policy
activities will change. The author anticipates that as changes to institutional and
structural characteristics of municipalities are made to make the city more ‘reformed’ or
less ‘reformed’ in character, the chief administrative officer of that municipality will alter
his or her reliance level on the council members for policy direction and this will result in
significantly different amounts of time devoted to policy type activities.
T-Tests and ANOVA analysis
Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table
5.13) show that the percentage of time the CAO devotes to policy activities in the 170
council-manager cities responding to the survey is not statistically different than the mean
percentage of time of CAOs in the 91 mayor-council cities responding to the survey. The
mean percentage of time that a CAO in the 170 council-manager municipalities devotes
to policy activities is 32.2% and the mean time devoted to management related activities
by CAOs in the 91 mayor-council respondent cities is 31.46%. Analysis results in a tstatistic equal to -.3918 at 259 degrees of freedom5. The resulting significance is .6955
which is well above the threshold of .05; therefore there is no statistically significant
difference.

Calculating both the T-test and the ANOVA for this dependent variable including
all five identified outliers did not change the significance of either tests result.
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Table 5.13

Two group means comparison t-test – percent of CAOs time allocated to
policy activities

Government Form

N

MEAN

Mayor-Council

91

.3146

Council-Manager

170

.322

Table 5.14

T

Degrees of
freedom

Significance
(2-tailed)

-.3918

259

.6955

ANOVA – adapted city type by percent of CAOs time allocated to policy
activities

Between groups

.082506336

Degrees
of
Freedom
4

Within groups

5.37490756

256

Total

5.4574139

260

Model

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F

Significance

.020626584

0.98

0.4176

.020995733

The five level multinomial independent variables for city classification based on
the ‘Adapted Cities Framework’ (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted
Administrative, and Administrative) is also analyzed to find if a relationship exists
between it and the dependent variable percentage of total time that CAOs devote to
policy related activities. Analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA analysis indicate
an F score of 0.98 with a significance level of 0.4176; over the .05 threshold for statistical
significance (See Table 5.14). No significant difference is found between the CAOs in
the five Adapted Cities types concerning the percentage of total time spent on policy
related activities.
OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis
The author uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple linear regression to
evaluate the relationship between the percentage of the total amount of time CAOs
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devote to policy related activities and the three research independent variables of
government form, city type, and calculated score along with the control independent
variables of whether the survey is completed by a mayor CAO or an appointed CAO in a
mayor-council form municipality, population, median household income,
urban/suburban/rural status, and region. The three models are compared side by side in
table 5.15 to allow the reader to examine the relationship these three independent
variables have with the dependent variable.
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Table 5.15

Mult. Reg. – percent of CAOs total working time devoted to policy related
activities

Independent Variable

Regression #1
(government form)

Regression #2
(city type)

Regression #3
(score)

N

261

261

261

Constant

.391***
(8.93)
-.014
(-0.61)

.336 ***
(7.07)

.381 ***
(8.44)

government form
score
Adapted Political
Conciliated
Adapted Administrative
Administrative
CAO in mayor-council
municipality
population

-.028
(-0.87)

.108 ***
(2.65)
.026
(0.48)
.051
(1.51)
.054
(1.35)

.0001
(0.11)

-.072 *
(-1.91)

-.017
(-0.54)

dummy west

.0002
(0.61)
-.0002
(-0.49)
-.013
(-0.55)
-.024
(-0.79)
-.048
(-1.56)
-.064 **
(-2.19)
-.020
(-0.60)

.0001
(0.51)
-0002
(-0.43)
-.024
(-0.97)
-.027
(-0.90)
-.045
(-1.50)
-.068 **
(-2.32)
-.027
(-0.80)

.0002
(0.54)
-.0003
(-0.56)
-.014
(-0.58)
-.023
(-0.74)
-.048
(-1.57)
-.063 **
(-2.15)
-.022
(-0.65)

F score

0.99

1.35

0.94

Adjusted R2

-.0005

.0159

-.0020

median household income
dummy suburb
dummy rural
dummy South
dummy mid-west

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 level
In each of these regression models the identified outliers are removed6. None of
the three models are statistically significant at the .05 level of significance. For model one
6

Each of the five identified outliers had CAO percentage of time allocations to the
policy activities at a much higher level than similar municipalities. Including the outliers
in the regression equations did not change the significance level in any of the three
models.
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that uses the nominal variable government form, the F score is 0.99 (not significant). The
F score for the multinomial model two is 1.35 (not significant). Analysis indicates that
the interval level variable score in model three has an F score of 0.94 (also not
significant). These three F scores indicate that none of the three models are significant in
explaining the variation in the dependent variable. The resulting adjusted-R-square
values for each of the three models are -.0005 for the nominal variable, .0159 for the
multinomial nominal level variable, and -.0020 for the interval level score variable.
When the author reviews the individual independent variables within the three models he
finds that only in model two, where Adapted Political cities are found to be significantly
different from Political cities, are any of the research variables found to be statistically
significant. None of the independent control variables in any of the three models are
statistically significant at the threshold .05 levels except the variable representing the
mid-west region. The mid-west region is found to be significantly different than the
northeast region in all three regression models. Performing a One Way ANOVA analysis
on region and percentage of working time spent on policy activities finds that CAOs in
the Midwest region spent significantly less percentage of their daily work time in policy
activities than those in the Northeast, but not the West or the South.
Findings for Hypothesis Three
In the analysis above, using the three independent variables to classify
municipalities in comparison with the dependent variable percentage of total working
time a CAO devotes to policy related activities, the author finds none of the research
variables to have a statistically significant relationship which would allow us to reject the
null hypothesis. The adjusted-R-square, or substantive significance, of these regression
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models indicates that the three independent variables explain a very small percentage of
the variation in the dependent variable. The Two Group Mean T-Test confirms that there
is no statistically significant difference between mayor-council and council-manager
municipalities regarding the amount of time CAOs devote to policy activities. The
ANOVA analysis between the five categories of cities from the ‘Adapted Cities
Framework’ also confirms the findings in model two; no statistically significant
difference between the five types of cities is detected, with the exception of adapted
political cities in model two. Multiple regression analysis performed using the three
research independent variables reveals that none of the three regression models are
significant as a whole and none of the models explains much of the change in the
dependent variable. Based upon these findings the author cannot reject the null
hypothesis. The data do not demonstrate that as the institutional form of a municipality
changes, the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer
to policy activities will change.
Hypothesis Four
Hypothesis four proposes that as the institutional form of a municipality changes
the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to
political activities will change. The author anticipates that as changes to institutional and
structural characteristics of municipalities are made to make the city more ‘reformed’ or
less ‘reformed’ in character, the chief administrative officer of that municipality
concentrates at different levels on these political activities and this results in significantly
different amounts of their total working time the CAO devotes to political type activities.
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T-Tests and ANOVA analysis
Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table
5.16) show that the mean amount of time that the CAOs within the 170 council-manager
cities devote to political activities is not statistically different, at the .05 threshold level of
significance, than those CAOs in the 90 mayor-council cities responding to the survey7.
The difference is, however, significant at the .10 level. The mean percentage of working
time that CAOs devote to political activities in the 170 council-manager municipalities
responding to the survey is 12.38%; the mean percentage of working time that CSOs
devote to management activities in the 90 mayor-council municipalities is 14.58%.
Analysis results in a t-statistic equal to 1.8684 at 258 degrees of freedom. The resulting
significance is .0628; above the threshold of .05 but significant at the .10 level.
Therefore, there is not a statistically significant difference between the two.
Table 5.16

T-test – percent of CAOs time allocated to political activities

Government Form

N

MEAN

Mayor-Council

90

.1458

Council-Manager

170

.1238

7

T

Degrees of
freedom

Significance
(2-tailed)

1.8684

258

0.0628

When the T-test is calculated with the six identified outliers included, the
difference is significant at the .05 threshold level of significance. The ANOVA test is
significant in both cases.
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Table 5.17

ANOVA – adapted city type by percent of CAOs time allocated to political
activities

Between groups

.131762625

Degrees
of
Freedom
4

Within groups

1.99845003

255

Total

2.13021266

259

Model

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F

Significance

.032940656

4.20

0.0026

.007837059

Using the five-level multinomial independent variable for city classification based
on the ‘Adapted Cities Framework’ (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted
Administrative, and Administrative), analysis is performed to find if a difference exists
between these five city types using the dependent variable, percentage of total time the
CAO devotes to political activities.
Analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA analysis finds an F score of 4.20
with a significance level of .0026; well below the .05 threshold for statistical significance
(See Table 5.17). This finding indicates that there is a statistically significant difference
between the groups. The Bartlett’s test for equal variance for this ANOVA is, however,
statistically significant. The assumption of equal variance in each group is one of the
primary assumptions required for ANOVA analysis. The statistically significant Bartlett’s
test result indicates that this equal variance assumption is violated. To compensate for
this violation of equal variance a post hoc test on the data is run in SPSS using a GamesHowell multiple comparison statistic. The Games-Howell multiple comparison shows
that out of the ten possible combinations of the five different city types (political, adapted
political, conciliated, adapted administrative, and administrative) four combinations are
significantly different at the threshold .05 level of significance. Political cities are
significantly higher than Conciliated cities (.001 significance); Political cities are also
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higher than Administrative cities (.011 significance). Adapted Political cities are
significantly higher than Conciliated cities (.014 significance). Finally, Adapted
Administrative cities are significantly higher than Conciliated cities (.016 significance).
None of the other six combinations meet the significance threshold of .05.
OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple linear regression is used by the author to
evaluate the relationship between the percentage of total working time devoted to
political activities by CAOs and the three research independent variables of government
form, city type, and calculated score, also including the control independent variables of
whether the survey is completed by a mayor CAO in a mayor-council form municipality,
population, median household income, urban/suburban/rural status, and region. Again,
the three models are compared side by side in table 5.18 to allow the reader to examine
the relationship that these three independent variables have with the dependent variable.
Each of these models is run with the identified outliers removed8. Findings
indicate that all three of these models are statistically significant at the .01 level of
significance. For model one, using the nominal variable government form, the F score is
3.93. The F score for the multinomial variable in model two is 4.54. The interval level
variable score, found in model three, has an F score of 4.17. These three F scores
indicate that all three of the regression models are statistically significant in explaining
the variation in the dependent variable. The resulting adjusted-R-square values for each
of the three models are .0924 for the nominal variable (model 1), .01408 for the

In each of the six identified outlier cities the CAO spent significantly more time in
political activities than in similar cities. Running the regressions with the outliers
included did not change the significance of any of the regression models.
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multinomial nominal level variable (model 2), and .08608 for the interval level score
variable (model 3).
A review of the individual independent variables in the three models indicates that
in models one and three the research variables are found to have a negative and
statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable, controlling for all the
other variables. The Adapted Political cities variable in model two is the only research
independent variable found to be not statistically significant. The Conciliated, Adapted
Administrative, and Administrative variables in model two are all negative and
significantly different from Political cities at the .01 level.
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Table 5.18

Mult. Reg. – percent of CAOs total working time devoted to political related
activities

Independent Variable

Regression #1
(government form)

Regression #2
(city type)

Regression #3
(score)

N

260

260

260

Constant

.137 ***
(5.41)
-.050 ***
(-3.72)

.139 ***
(5.17)

.149 ***
(5.69)

government form
score

.008
(0.34)
-.109 ***
(-3.51)
-.062 ***
(-3.18)
-.084 ***
(-3.62)

Adapted Political
Conciliated
Adapted Administrative
Administrative
Appointed CAO in mayorcouncil municipality
population

-.002 ***
(-3.98)

-.080 ***
(-4.08)

-.104 ***
(-4.66)

-.076 ***
(-4.03)

dummy west

.0002
(1.08)
-.0002
(-0.71)
.004
(0.30)
-.00005
(-0.00)
.041 **
(2.34)
.046 ***
(2.69)
.054 ***
(2.75)

.0002
(1.00)
.00002
(0.06)
.008
(0.55)
.003
(0.15)
.044 **
(2.57)
.042 **
(2.50)
.055 ***
(2.87)

.0002
(1.02)
-.0002
(-0.55)
.006
(0.41)
002
(0.09)
.045 **
(2.56)
.048 ***
(2.85)
.058 ***
(2.96)

F score

3.93 ***

4.54 ***

4.17 ***

Adjusted R2

.0924

.1408

.08608

median household income
dummy suburb
dummy rural
dummy South
dummy mid-west

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 level
The government form research variable in model one and the score variable in
model three both indicate a negative relationship with the dependent variable that is
significant at the .01 level. Model one indicates that changing the form of government
from mayor-council to council-manager, when controlling for all the other variables,
results in a -5.0% change in the percentage of time a chief administrative officer devotes
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to political activities. Model two predicts that, controlling for the other variables,
changing the type of city from Political to Conciliated will result in a 10.9% decrease in
time spent on political activities. Changing from a Political to an Adapted Administrative
city type results in a 6.2% decrease in percentage of time spent on political activities and
changing from Political to Administrative results in a decrease of 8.4%. In model three, a
one point increase in the calculated score of a municipality results in a 0.2% decrease in
the percentage of time a chief administrative officer devotes to political activities,
controlling for the other independent variables. In all three models the author also finds
that having an appointed CAO in a mayor-council municipality complete the survey is
highly significant. In model one this variable has a coefficient of -.080; this tells us that,
keeping constant the other variables, appointed CAOs in mayor-council cities responding
to the survey spend on average 8.0% less of their total time on political related activities
than elected CAOs in mayor-council cities. The reader finds similar results in models
two and three. In model two the difference is 10.4% less time spent on political activities
for appointed CAOs and in model three it is 7.6% less time. Elected CAOs are more
concerned with political activities as giving speeches, public relations and attending
ceremonies. This could be attributed to the fact that, unlike appointed CAOs, these
elected CAOs must regularly stand for election to office and these activities are more
important to accomplishing this goal. The coefficients for each of the three region
variables are positive and statistically significant as well. This tells the author that in all
three regions outside of the Northeast, CAOs spent a significantly higher percentage of
their total time in political related activities than CAOs in the Northeast region did,
controlling for the other variables.
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Findings for Hypothesis Four
When the author examines the analysis above, that uses the three independent
research variables for classify municipalities against the dependent variable amount of
time devoted to political activities, the findings indicate that all three of the research
variables have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. The R
square, or substantive significance, of these three regression models indicates that the
independent variables explain 9.24%, 14.08%, and 8.608% respectively of the variation
in the dependent variable. The Two Group Mean T-Test confirms that there is a
statistically significant difference between how CAOs in mayor-council and councilmanager municipalities allocate their time to political activities. The ANOVA analysis
between the five categories of cities from the ‘Adapted Cities Framework’ also confirms
what is discovered in model two, there is a statistically significant difference between the
amount of time CAOs in the five types of cities allocate for political activities, and five of
the ten combinations of city type display a significant difference. Multiple regression
analysis of the three research independent variables finds that in, all three of the
regression models, the research variables are statistically significant. Only one city type
category, Adapted Political cities in model two, is not significant. In addition, the
regression models are found to all be significant as a whole. Based upon these findings
the author can reject the null hypothesis. The data do demonstrate that as the institutional
form of a municipality changes the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief
administrative officer to political activities will change.
Hypothesis Five
Hypothesis five proposes that as the institutional form of a municipality changes
the perception of the chief administrative officer concerning the quality of the services a
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municipality offers will change.

The author anticipates that as changes to institutional

and structural characteristics of municipalities are made to make the city more ‘reformed’
or less ‘reformed’ in character, then the chief administrative officer of that municipality
attempts to meet the ‘needs’ of the community rather than its ‘wants’ at a different levels.
This results in CAOs in different types of municipalities perceiving the services in those
municipalities meeting the needs of the citizens within those communities at differing
levels. Tables 5.19 and 5.20 provide a breakdown by form of government and type of city
regarding the number of services and the quality scores given by chief administrative
officers for those services. Discussion of hypothesis five will follow these tables.
Table 5.19

Quality/number of services – by government form
Mayor-Council

CouncilManager

mayor
CAOs

appointed
CAOs

Total

N

52

42

94

170

Mean Rating

2.30

2.25

2.28

2.23

1.7

1.6

1.6

1.4

3

3

3

3

10.63

9.24

10.01

9.74

4

2

2

4

12

12

12

12

Minimum
Rating
Maximum
Rating
Mean Number
of Services
Minimum # of
Services
Maximum # of
Services
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Table 5.20

Quality/number of services – by city type

N
Mean
Rating
Minimum
Rating
Maximum
Rating
Mean
Number of
Services
Minimum #
of Services
Maximum #
of Services

Political

Adapted
Political

Conciliated

Adapted
Admin.

Admin.

25

60

12

126

41

2.17

2.31

2.29

2.23

2.21

1.7

1.6

1.9

1.4

1.7

2.9

3

2.7

3

3

10.76

9.78

10.08

9.79

9.39

7

2

7

4

5

12

12

12

12

12

T-Tests and ANOVA analysis
Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table
5.21) shows the mean quality of services rating given by chief administrative officers in
the 170 council-manager cities is not statistically different than is that given by chief
administrative officers in the 94 mayor-council cities that responding to the survey9. The
mean quality of services rating is the calculated average rating of the twelve common
municipal services as rated by the chief administrative officers on a scale of 1 (available
but less than desirable) to 3 (exceeds citizen’s needs). The mean quality of services
rating in the 170 council-manager municipalities responding in the survey is 2.226 and
the mean quality of services rating by CAOs in the 94 mayor-council respondent cities is
slightly higher at 2.278. Analysis results in a t-statistic equal to 1.1802 at 262 degrees of

Calculating the T-test and the ANOVA analysis including the two identified outliers did not change
the significance of either test.
9
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freedom. The resulting significance is .2390, well above the threshold of .05; therefore,
there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups.
Table 5.21

Two group means comparison t-test – quality of services rating for all
municipal services

Government Form

N

MEAN

Mayor-Council

94

2.278

Council-Manager

170

2.226

Table 5.22

T

Degrees of
freedom

Significance
(2-tailed)

1.1802

262

.2390

ANOVA – adapted city type by quality of services score

Between groups

.525521755

Degrees
of
Freedom
4

Within groups

29.4670545

259

Total

29.9925763

263

Model

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F

Significance

.131380439

1.15

0.3313

.113772411

The five level multinomial independent variable for city classification based on
the ‘Adapted Cities Framework’ (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted
Administrative, and Administrative) is analyzed for a relationship with the dependent
variable of quality of services rating given by chief administrative officers.
Analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA analysis indicate an F score of 1.15
with a significance level of .3213; over the .05 threshold for statistical significance (See
Table 5.22). No significant difference is found between the five Adapted Cities types.
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OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis
The author uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple linear regression to
evaluate the relationship between the quality of services rating given by chief
administrative officers and the three research independent variables of government form,
city type, and calculated score, along with the control independent variables of whether
the survey is completed by a mayor or an appointed CAO in a mayor-council form
municipality, population, median household income, percentage of families living below
the poverty line, urban/suburban/rural status, total number of services offered, and region.
The three models are compared side by side in table 5.23 to allow the reader to examine
the relationship of these independent variables with the dependent variable.
Each of these models is run with the identified outliers removed10. All three of
the models are statistically significant at the .01 level of significance. For model one,
using the nominal variable government form the F score is 4.34. The F score for the
multinomial model two is 3.87. Model three, using the interval level variable score
variable, has an F score of 4.30. These three F scores indicate that all three of the models
are significant in explaining the variation in the dependent variable. The resulting R
square values for each of the three models are .1229 for the nominal variable, .1330 for
the multinomial level variable, and .1217 for the interval level score variable. A review
of the individual independent variables in the three models indicate that in two of the
three models (model one and model three) the primary research variable is found to be
statistically significant at the .05 threshold level. In model two only the Adapted Political

Two outliers were identified, one gave a much higher and the other a much lower quality rating
score than similar cities. Running the models with these outliers included did not change the significance
levels of any.
10
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cities variable reaches the .05 significance level; the other three research variables
(Conciliated, Adapted Administrative, and Administrative) are not significant.
Table 5.23

Multiple regression – dependent variable – quality of services score

Independent Variable

Regression #1
(government form)

Regression #2
(city type)

Regression #3
(score)

N

263

263

263

Constant

2.622 ***
(16.70)
-.137 ***
(-2.77)

2.519 ***
(15.29)

2.650 ***
(16.52)

government form
score

.206 **
(2.33)
.038
(0.33)
-.023
(-0.31)
-.060
(-0.69)

Adapted Political
Conciliated
Adapted Administrative
Administrative
Appointed CAO in
mayor-council
municipality
population

-.004 ***
(-2.71)

-.176 **
(-2.45)

-.273 ***
(-3.30)

-.157 **
(-2.27)

dummy west

.001 *
(1.99)
.001
(0.75)
-.005
(-1.03)
-.005
(-0.10)
-.049
(-0.73)
-.046 ***
(-4.83)
.175 ***
(2.68)
.187 ***
(2.96)
.082
(1.14)

.001 *
(1.89)
.001
(0.91)
-.004
(-0.85)
-.017
(-0.31)
-.056
(-0.84)
-.046 ***
(-4.88)
.176 ***
(2.71)
.173 ***
(2.74)
.073
(1.03)

.001 *
(1.94)
.001
(0.80)
-.005
(-1.08)
-.002
(-0.04)
-.043
(-0.64)
-.046 ***
(-4.84)
.185 ***
(2.83)
.194 ***
(3.08)
.091
(1.26)

F score

4.34 ***

3.87 ***

4.30 ***

Adjusted R2

.1229

.1330

.1217

median household income
poverty %
dummy suburb
dummy rural
total number of services
dummy South
dummy mid-west

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 level
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Model one results find that, controlling for all the other variables in the equation,
CAOs in council-manager municipalities rate the total quality of their services .137
points lower than CAOs in mayor-council municipalities. In regression model three,
again controlling for the other variables, for every additional point added to a
municipality’s score, the CAO in that municipality rates total quality of services .004
points lower. In all three models the dummy variable indicating mayor-council
municipalities in which an appointed CAO completes the survey is highly significant. In
model one this variable has a coefficient of -.176; this tells the reader that, keeping
constant the other variables, appointed CAOs in mayor-council cities rate the total quality
of services on average .176 points less than all other CAOs. Similar results are
uncovered in models two and three. In model two the difference is .273 points less and in
model three it is .157 points less. The variable capturing total number of services reported
to be offered in the municipality is also significant in all three models. In all three
models the coefficient of this control variable is -.046. This informs us that in each
model, for every additional service offered by the municipality the quality score given by
the CAO for that municipality decreases by .046 points. It appears that increasing the
number of services that a municipality offers has a negative and significant affect on the
quality of those services offered. The control variables for the south and mid-west region
are also positive and statistically significant at the .01 levels in all three regression
models. CEO’s in the south and mid-west region will rate the quality of their services
higher than those CEO’s in the northeast region, controlling for the other variables in the
regression.
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Findings for Hypothesis Five
In the analysis of the three independent variables classifying municipalities, set
against the dependent variable quality of services score, the research variables in model
one and model three are found to have a statistically significant relationship allowing the
author to reject the null hypothesis. Only the Adapted Political cities variable in model
two is found to be significant. The adjusted-R-square or substantive significance of these
three models indicates that the independent variables explain 12.29%, 13.30%, and
12.17% respectively of the variation in the dependent variable, total quality of service
rating. The Two Group Mean T-Test indicates that there is no statistically significant
difference between mayor-council and council-manager municipalities in the mean
quality of service ratings given by their respective chief administrative officers. The
ANOVA analysis between the five categories of cities from the ‘Adapted Cities
Framework’ also confirms what is found in regression model two; no statistically
significant differences between the five types of cities is detected. The author finds,
however, that all three regression models analyzed are significant as a whole. In addition,
multiple regression analysis using the three research independent variables find that in
two of the three regression models the research variable is statistically significant; in
model two only the Adapted Political cities variable is significant.

Based upon the

findings in our regression analysis the author can reject the null hypothesis. The data do
demonstrate that as the institutional form of a municipality changes the perception of the
chief administrative officer concerning the quality of the services offered within their
municipalities also changes.
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Hypothesis Six
Hypotheses six, seven, eight, and nine examine the involvement level of the
appointed chief administrative officer of a municipality in the Mission, Policy,
Administrative, and Management related dimensions within their municipalities as
described by Svara in his ‘Dichotomy-Duality Model’ (1985, 1995). Svara uses this
model to graphically show the division of responsibility for each of these four dimensions
of government activity between the elected council in a municipality and its appointed
administrative official. Svara points out that, “the logic of the model suggests that the
involvement of both council members and administrators be measured separately. Part of
the confusion in interpreting existing research is uncertainty over whether decision
making is a zero-sum activity. Demonstrating that the manager’s contributions are
extensive does not necessarily mean that the council’s role is diminished” (Svara, 1995,
p. 38). To get a truer picture, both the CAOs and the council’s involvement ratings must
be used. “This approach does not assume a zero-sum situation. It permits any
combination of involvement level for the two sets of officials” (Svara, 2006, p. 1069). In
tables 5.24 and 5.25 a breakdown by form of government and type of city regarding the
involvement level of CAOs in relation to the rating scale used in the survey is displayed.
Although they are not included in the analysis, those municipalities without an appointed
CAO and led by a mayor, are also listed for comparative purposes (all of these are
mayor-council form municipalities and all but six of these municipalities fall into the
Political city type classification).
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Table 5.24

CAOs involvement level by governmental form

Form of
Government
MayorCouncil
CouncilManager
Mayor Led
Cities
Table 5.25

Mission
Activities

Policy
Activities

Admin.
Activities

Mgmt.
Activities

4.202

4.418

4.357

4.070

4.347

4.599

4.508

4.405

4.376

4.419

4.301

4.237

CAOs involvement level by city type

Category of
City
Political
Adapted
Political

Mission
Activities
NA

Policy
Activities
NA

Admin.
Activities
NA

Mgmt.
Activities
NA

4.191

4.397

4.319

4.000

Conciliated

4.394

4.614

4.576

4.515

Adapted
Administrative

4.357

4.604

4.521

4.388

Administrative

4.283

4.567

4.463

4.439

Mayor Led
Cities

4.376

4.419

4.301

4.237

In tables 5.26 and 5.27 a breakdown by form of government and type of city
displaying the CAOs perception of the involvement level of councils in relation to the
rating scale is also displayed.
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Table 5.26

CAOs perception of council’s involvement level by government form

Form of
Government
MayorCouncil
CouncilManager
Table 5.27

Mission
Activities

Policy
Activities

Admin.
Activities

Mgmt.
Activities

3.958

3.777

3.327

2.526

3.725

3.409

2.663

1.398

CAOs perception of council’s involvement level by city type

Category of
City
Political
Adapted
Political

Mission
Activities
NA

Policy
Activities
NA

Admin.
Activities
NA

Mgmt.
Activities
NA

3.957

3.788

3.375

2.528

Conciliated

4.091

3.727

2.909

2.455

Adapted
Administrative

3.717

3.373

2.624

1.354

Administrative

3.700

3.506

2.789

1.496

Combining these two ratings gives us a picture of the relative involvement of both
the appointed CAO and the council for each of the four dimensions. An example of such
a comparison as a graphically display is shown in Figure 5.1. A graphic representation of
each type of city institutional form discussed in the above charts is also included in
Appendix C.
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Figure 5.1

Relative involvement level of CAOs and council in mayor-council cities

Relative involvement levels of both the appointed CAOs and the councils are also
calculated by finding the percentage of total involvement (both the CAO and the council
together equal 100%) for each of the two groups. In tables 5.28 and 5.29 a breakdown
regarding the level of total involvement as divided between the council and the appointed
CAO, as perceived by the CAO, is displayed by government form and by the type of
government. These percentages are calculated by taking the CAOs total average rating
and dividing it into the sum of the CAOs plus council’s average ratings. This tells us
what percentage of total involvement is contributed by the appointed CAO. For example,
from Table 5.28 it the reader finds that appointed CAOs in mayor-council municipalities
are relatively more involved in mission activities than are council members in mayorcouncil municipalities (CAO:.5187 verses council: 1-.5187=.4813).
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Table 5.28

CAOs percentage of total involvement – by government form

Form of
Government
MayorCouncil
CouncilManager
Mayor Led
Cities
Table 5.29

Mission
Activities

Policy
Activities

Admin.
Activities

Mgmt.
Activities

.5187

.5413

.5702

.6313

.5417

.5789

.6359

.7800

.5637

.5704

.5948

.6677

CAOs percentage of total involvement – by city type

Category of City
Political

Mission
Activities
NA

Policy
Activities
NA

Admin.
Activities
NA

Mgmt.
Activities
NA

Adapted Political

.5179

.5393

.5645

.6272

Conciliated

.5222

.5575

.6197

.6668

Adapted
Administrative

.5431

.5820

.6400

.7849

Administrative

.5384

.5689

.6214

.7671

Mayor Led Cities

.5637

.5704

.5948

.6677

These percentage allocations can also be graphically displayed (See Figure 5.2 for
an example) to illustrate the relative involvement of the CAO and the council. A graphic
representation of the division of total effort split between CAOs and councils for each of
the different types of city institutional forms displayed in the above charts is included in
Appendix D.
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Figure 5.2

Percentage of Total Effort for CAOs and council in mayor-council cities

The author uses the CAOs percentage of total involvement, as displayed in Table
5.28 and 5.29, as the dependent variable to test hypotheses 6, 7, 8, and 9.
Hypothesis six proposes that as the institutional form of a municipality changes,
the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer verses
the council in Mission activities will change. The author anticipates that as changes to
institutional and structural characteristics of municipalities are made to make the city
more ‘reformed’ or less ‘reformed’ in character, the chief administrative officer of that
municipality will rely at different levels on the elected officials of the community for
mission type activities and will therefore also personally focus different amounts of his
efforts on those mission type activities.
T-Tests and ANOVA analysis
Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table
5.30) show that the mean percentage of total involvement between the appointed chief
administrative officers verses the council in mission related activities in the 167 council155

manager cities is statistically different from the 56 CAOs in the mayor-council cities
responding to the survey at the .05 level. The mean percentage of total involvement for
the appointed chief administrative officer in mission related activities in the 167 councilmanager municipalities is .5417. The mean percentage of total involvement between for
appointed chief administrative officer in mission related activities in the 56 mayorcouncil respondent cities is lower at .5187. Analysis results in a t-statistic equal to 2.4180 at 221 degrees of freedom. The resulting significance is .0164; less than the
threshold level of .05. Therefore, there is a statistically significant difference between the
two groups11.
Table 5.30

T-test – CAOs percentage of total involvement v. Council in mission

Government Form

N

MEAN

Mayor-Council

56

.5187

Council-Manager

167

.5417

Table 5.31

T

Degrees of
freedom

Significance
(2-tailed)

-2.4180

221

.0164

ANOVA – adapted city type by CAOs percentage of total involvement v.
Council in mission

Between groups

.024087665

Degrees
of
Freedom
3

Within groups

.833261799

219

Total

.857349464

222

Model

11

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F

Significance

.008029222

2.11

0.0998

.003804848

Analysis that included the seven outliers identified produced a T-test that was
significant only at the .10 level of significance and an ANOVA test that was significant at
the .05 level of significance.
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The five level multinomial independent variable for city classification based on
the ‘Adapted Cities Framework’ (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted
Administrative, and Administrative) is also analyzed for a relationship with the
dependent variable of mean percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief
administrative in mission related activities.
Analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA analysis indicate an F score of 2.11
with a significance level of 0.0998; over the .05 threshold for statistical significance but
significant at the .10 level (See Table 5.31). Based upon these results, no significant
difference is found in the dependent variable between the five Adapted Cities types.
OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis
The author uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple linear regression to
evaluate the relationship between the percentage of total involvement between the
appointed chief administrative officer in mission related activities and the three research
independent variables of government form, city type, and calculated score, along with the
control independent variables of population, urban/suburban/rural status, and region. In
addition, a dummy variable indicating that the elected mayor rather than the appointed
CAO completes the survey is added to control for this variable. The three models are
compared side by side in table 5.32 to allow the reader to examine the relationship of
these independent variables with the dependent variable.
Each of these models is run with the identified outliers removed. In models one,
two, and three the F score is statistically significant at the .01 level of significance. For
model one, using the nominal variable government form, the F score is 3.13; the F score
for the multinomial model two is 2.60; and for model three, using the interval level
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variable score, findings indicate an F score of 3.08. These three F scores indicate that all
three of the models are significant in explaining the variation in the dependent variable.
The resulting adjusted adjusted-R-square values for each of the three models are .0714
for the nominal variable, .0673 for the multinomial nominal level variable, and .0696 for
the interval level score variable. Reviewing the individual independent variables in the
three models indicates that the dummy variable controlling for a when mayor completes
the survey is not significant in any of the three models. The author therefore concludes
that it makes no statistical difference whether the mayor or appointed CAO completes the
survey.
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Table 5.32

Multiple regression – dep. Var. – CAOs percentage of total involvement v.
Council in mission

Independent Variable

Regression #1
(government form)

Regression #2 (city
Regression #3 (score)
type)

N

223

223

223

Constant

.479 ***
(27.58)
.021 *
(1.89)

.479 ***
(26.14)

.471 ***
(22.91)

government form
score

.001 *
(1.78)

dummy west

-.023
(-1.30)
-.0001
(-0.92)
.029 ***
(2.77)
.006
(0.43)
.031 **
(2.41)
.032 **
(2.51)
.038 ***
(2.60)

-.003
(-0.13)
.023 *
(1.79)
.013
(0.86)
-.023
(-1.26)
-.0001
(-0.97)
.030 ***
(2.83)
.006
(0.38)
.031 **
(2.40)
.031 **
(2.40)
.039 ***
(2.63)

F score

3.13 ***

2.60 ***

3.08 ***

Adjusted R2

.0714

.0673

.0696

Conciliated
Adapted Administrative
Administrative
mayor completing survey
population
dummy suburb
dummy rural
dummy South
dummy mid-west

-.022
(-1.27)
-.0001
(-0.84)
.028 ***
(2.71)
.006
(0.40)
.029 **
(2.26)
.031 **
(2.42)
.036 **
(2.46)

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 level
In all three models, classifying a municipality as suburban is highly significant, as
is the region of the country where the municipality is located. These findings tell us that,
controlling for the other variables, an appointed CAO in a suburban municipality will
contribute 2.9%, 3.0%, and 2.8% more, respectfully, for models one, two, and three of
the total effort of involvement in mission activities than appointed CAOs in urban
municipalities. Likewise, an appointed CAO in the South, Mid-west, or West will
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contribute a higher percentage to the total effort put forth in the mission activities defined
in the survey instrument than one that is located in the Northeast region. Neither the
government form variable in model one (T-score of 1.89) nor the score variable of model
three (T-score of 1.78) indicates a significance level reaching the .05 level required,
although both do reach a significance level of .10. This may indicate that a real
difference does exist but that difference does not reach the threshold level used within
this study. Neither the rural nor the population variables in any of the three models are
statistically significant.
Findings for Hypothesis Six
In the analysis of the three independent variables used to classify municipalities
against the dependent variable percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief
administrative officer in mission related activities, none of the research variables
describing the institutional structure of the municipalities included in the study are found
to have a statistically significant relationship. This does not allow the author to reject the
null hypothesis12. The govform variable in model one, the score variable in model three,
and the Adapted Administrative city variable in model two are all significant at the .10
level but all fail to meet the .05 significance level threshold. The adjusted-R-square
indicates that each of the three models explain about 7% of the variation of the dependent
variable. The Two Group Mean T-Test confirms that there is a statistically significant
difference between mayor-council and council-manager municipalities in the mean
percentage of total involvement of the appointed chief administrative officers in mission
related activities. The ANOVA analysis between the five categories of cities frome the
Running these three regression models including the seven identified outliers produced similar
results of significance. All outliers have mission involvement percentages significantly higher or lower
than the mean level of similar municipalities.
12
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‘Adapted Cities Framework’ confirms the results from regression model two, that any
statistically significant differences in the dependent variable between the five types of
cities does not reach the threshold level of .05 significance. Multiple regression analysis
performed using the three research independent variables finds that, although all three of
the models regressed are significant as a whole, the research variables in each of the
models are not significant at the threshold level set within this study. Based upon all of
these findings, the author cannot reject the null hypothesis. The data do not demonstrate
that as the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total
involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in Mission activities changes.
Hypothesis Seven
Hypothesis seven proposes that as the institutional form of a municipality
changes, the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative
officers in Policy activities will also change. The author anticipates that as changes to
institutional and structural characteristics of municipalities are made to make the city
more ‘reformed’ or less ‘reformed’ in character, the appointed chief administrative
officer of that municipality relies on the elected officials of the community for policy
type activities at different levels and will, therefore, personally focus different amounts of
effort on these policy type activities.
T-Tests and ANOVA analysis
Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table
5.33) show that the mean percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief
administrative officers in policy related activities in the 171 council-manager cities is
statistically higher than those of the appointed CAOs in the 55 mayor-council cities
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responding to the survey13. The percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief
administrative officers in policy related activities in the 171 council-manager
municipalities that responded in the survey was .5789. The mean percentage of total
involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers in policy related activities in
the 55 mayor-council respondent cities is significantly lower at .5413. Analysis results in
a t-statistic equal to -4.2632 at 224 degrees of freedom. The resulting significance is
.0000, well below the threshold of .05. Analysis therefore shows that there is a
statistically significant difference in the dependent variable between the two groups.
Table 5.33

T-test – CAOs percentage of total involvement v. Council in policy

Government Form

N

MEAN

Mayor-Council

55

.5413

Council-Manager

171

.5789

Table 5.34

T

Degrees of
freedom

Significance
(2-tailed)

-4.2632

224

.0000

ANOVA – adapted city type by CAOs percentage of total involvement v.
Council in policy

Between groups

.063675662

Degrees
of
Freedom
3

Within groups

.719617063

222

Total

.783292725

225

Model

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F

Significance

.021225221

6.55

0.0003

.003241518

The five-level multinomial independent variable for city classification, based on
the ‘Adapted Cities Framework’ (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted
When both the T-test and the ANOVA are calculated including the four identified outliers, the
results were statistically the same.
13
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Administrative, and Administrative), is also utilized to analyze whether a relationship
exists with the dependent variable of percentage of total involvement for the appointed
chief administrative officer in policy related activities.
Analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA analysis indicate an F score of 6.55
with a significance level of .0003, well below the .05 threshold for statistical significance
(See Table 5.34). This indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between
the groups. The Bartlett’s test for equal variance for this ANOVA is, however,
statistically significant. The assumption of equality of variance for each group is one of
the primary assumptions for ANOVA analysis. The statistically significant Bartlett’s test
result indicates that this equal variance assumption is violated. To compensate for this
violation of equal variance a post hoc test on the data is run in SPSS using a GamesHowell multiple comparison statistic. The Games-Howell multiple comparison shows
that out of the six possible combinations of the four different city types (political is
excluded leaving, adapted political, conciliated, adapted administrative, and
administrative) two combinations are found to be significantly different at the threshold
.05 level of significance. Adapted Political cities, with a mean of .5392, are significantly
different from Adapted Administrative cities, with a mean of .5820 (.000 significance).
Adapted Political cities are also significantly different from Administrative cities, with a
mean of .5697 (.025 significance). None of the other four combinations of city types
meet the significance threshold of .05.
OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple linear regression is used to evaluate the
relationship that percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative
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officers in policy related activities has with the three research independent variables of
government form, city type, and calculated score, along with the control independent
variables of population, urban/suburban/rural status, and region14. An addition dummy
variable indicating whether the elected mayor rather than the appointed CAO completes
the survey is added to control for this variable. Again, the three models are compared
side by side in table 5.35 to allow the reader to examine the relationship these
independent variables have with the dependent variable.
Each of these models is run with the identified outliers removed. The author finds
that all three of the models are statistically significant at the .01 level of significance. For
model one, using the nominal variable government form, the F score is 5.07. The F score
for the multinomial model two is 4.28. The model using the interval level variable score,
model three, has an F score of 4.40. These three F scores indicate that all three of the
regression models are statistically significant when explaining the variation in the
dependent variable. The resulting adjusted-R-square values for each of the three models
are .1265 for the nominal variable (model 1), .1273 for the multinomial level variable
(model 2), and .1079 for the interval level score variable (model 3).

14

The percentage of CAO involvement in all four of the identified outlier cities is
significantly higher than the mean for similar cities.
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Table 5.35

Multiple regression – dep. Var. – CAOs percentage of total involvement v.
Council in policy

Independent Variable

Regression #1
(government form)

Regression #2 (city
Regression #3 (score)
type)

N

226

226

226

Constant

.503 ***
(31.20)
.038 ***
(3.66)

.501 ***
(29.29)

.497 ***
(25.74)

government form
score

.001 ***
(2.93)

dummy west

-.019
(-1.21)
-.0001
(-1.12)
.023 **
(2.42)
-.003
(-0.24)
.032 ***
(2.74)
.039 ***
(3.22)
.036 **
(2.69)

.015
(0.78)
.044 ***
(3.70)
.028 **
(1.98)
-.017
(-0.98)
-.0001
(-1.19)
.024 **
(2.52)
-.004
(-0.33)
.032 ***
(2.71)
.038 ***
(3.12)
.037 ***
(2.77)

F score

5.07 ***

4.28 ***

4.40 ***

Adjusted R2

.1265

.1273

.1079

Conciliated
Adapted Administrative
Administrative
mayor completing survey
population
dummy suburb
dummy rural
dummy South
dummy mid-west

-.023
(-1.40)
-.0001
(-0.99)
.021 **
(2.22)
-.005
(-0.35)
.030 **
(2.46)
.036 ***
(2.97)
.033 **
(2.47)

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 level
Reviewing the individual independent variables from the three models indicates
that in all three models most of the research variables are found to have a statistically
significant relationship with the dependent variable. The Conciliated cities variable in
model two is the only research independent variable in any of the models not to be
statistically significant. The Adapted Administrative and Administrative cities variables
in model two are both positive and significantly different from Adapted Political cities
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(the control dummy variable) at the .05 level. The government form research variable in
model one and the score variable in model three both indicate a positive relationship that
is significant at the .01 level. Model one indicates that changing the form of government
from mayor-council to council manager results in a .038 increase in the percentage of
total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers in policy related
activities, controlling for the other independent variables. In model three, a one point
change in the calculated score of a municipality results in a .001 increase in the
percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in policy
related activities, controlling for the other independent variables. A review of the
individual control variables found within the three models indicates that the dummy
variable controlling for a mayor completing the survey is not significant in any of the
three models. In all three models, the fact that a municipality is suburban is found to be
highly significant as is the region of the country where the municipality is located. This
suggests that appointed CAOs in suburban municipalities are involved at significantly
higher levels in policy related activities within their municipalities than the appointed
CAOs in urban municipalities. Similar to findings in hypothesis six, an appointed CAO in
the South, Mid-west, or West contributes a higher percentage to the total effort put forth
in the policy activities, as defined in the survey instrument, than a similar CAO that is
located in the Northeast region. Neither the rural nor the population variables in any of
the three models are statistically significant nor does it matter whether the survey is
completed by the mayor or appointed CAO.
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Findings for Hypothesis Seven
In reviewing the analysis, using the three independent variables to classify
municipalities against the dependent variable percentage of total involvement for the
appointed chief administrative officer in policy related activities, all of the research
variables, save one in model two (conciliated cities), are found to have a statistically
significant relationship with the dependent variable. The direction of the relationship is
positive. The adjusted-R-square, or substantive significance, of these models indicates
that the independent variables explain between 10.79% and 12.73% of the variation in the
dependent variable. The Two Group Mean T-Test confirms that there is a statistically
significant difference in the dependent variable between mayor-council and councilmanager municipalities in the percentage of involvement for the appointed chief
administrative officer in policy related activities. Appointed CAOs in council-manager
cities are significantly more involved in policy related activities than are appointed CAOs
in mayor-council municipalities. The ANOVA analysis using the five categories of cities
found in the ‘Adapted Cities Framework’ also confirms findings in regression model two,
that there is a statistically significant difference between the five types of cities when
examining the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative
officers in policy related activities. Multiple regression analysis of the three research
independent variables finds that in all three regression models the research variables
(again with the exception of Conciliated cities in model two) are statistically significant
and all three of the regression models are found to be significant as a whole. Based upon
these findings, the author can reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference. The
data do demonstrate that as the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
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percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers in Policy
activities changes.
Hypothesis Eight
Hypothesis eight proposes that as the as the institutional form of a municipality
changes, the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative
officer in administrative activities will change. The author anticipates that as changes to
institutional and structural characteristics of municipalities are made to make the city
more ‘reformed’ or less ‘reformed’ in character, the appointed chief administrative
officer of that municipality will rely more or less on the elected officials of the
community for the performance of administrative related activities and will therefore
personally focus more or less of his/her energy on these administrative type activities..
T-Tests and ANOVA analysis
Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table
5.36) show that the mean percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief
administrative officers in administrative related activities in the 170 council-manager
cities is statistically higher than that of appointed CAOs in the 56 mayor-council cities
responding to the survey15. The mean percentage of total involvement for the appointed
chief administrative officers’ in administrative related activities in the 170 councilmanager municipalities is .6359. This compares to .5702 for appointed CAOs in the 56
mayor-council respondent cities. Analysis results in a t-statistic equal to -5.7384 at 224

15

Including the four identified outliers in the data for the T-test or ANOVA analysis
did not change the statistical significance of either statistic.
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degrees of freedom. The resulting significance is less than .0001, below the threshold of
.05; therefore there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups.
Table 5.36

T-test – CAOs percentage of total involvement in administrative activities

Government Form

N

MEAN

Mayor-Council

56

.5702

Council-Manager

170

.6359

Table 5.37

T

Degrees of
freedom

-5.7384

224

Significance
(2-tailed)
.0000

ANOVA – adapted city type by CAOs percentage of total involvement in
administrative activities

Between groups

.198185788

Degrees
of
Freedom
3

Within groups

1.21766444

222

Total

1.41585022

225

Model

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F

Significance

.066061929

12.04

0.00000

.005484975

The five-level multinomial nominal independent variable for city classification
based on the ‘Adapted Cities Framework’ (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated,
Adapted Administrative, and Administrative) is also analyzed to determine if a
relationship exists between it and the dependent variable of percentage of total
involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in administrative related
activities.
For analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA, this analysis indicates an F
score of 12.04 with a significance level of less than .0001, below the .05 threshold for
statistical significance (See Table 5.37). This finding indicates that there is a statistically
significant difference between the groups. The multiple comparison shows that out of the
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six possible combinations using the four different city types (adapted political,
conciliated, adapted administrative, and administrative) the dependent variable in two
combinations are significantly different at the threshold .05 level. Adapted Political cities
(mean of .5645) are significantly lower than both Adapted Administrative cities (mean of
.6400) (.000 significance) and Administrative cities (mean of .6214) (.010 significance).
None of the other four combinations meet the significance threshold of .05.
OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis
The author uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple linear regression to
evaluate the relationship of the dependent variable, percentage of total involvement for
the appointed chief administrative officers in administrative related activities, and the
three research independent variables of government form, city type, and calculated score,
along with the control independent variables of population, urban/suburban/rural status,
and region. An additional dummy variable indicating that the elected mayor completes
the survey is added to control for this variable. Again, the three models are compared
side by side in table 5.38 to allow the reader to examine the relationship between these
three independent variables and the dependent variable.
Each of these models is run with the identified outliers removed16. Based upon
the regressions performed, findings indicate that all three of the models are statistically
significant at the .01 level. For model one, using the nominal variable government form,
the F score is 5.39. The F score for the multinomial variable model two is 4.57. Model
three, using the interval level variable score, has an F score of 5.35. The resulting

16

Including the four identified outliers in the regression analysis does not change
the significance levels in any of the models. All four outlier respondents have much
higher percentages than the means of similar municipalities.
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adjusted-R-square values for each of the three models are .1350 for the nominal variable
(model 1), .1369 for the multinomial nominal level variable (model 2), and .1339 for the
interval level score variable (model 3).
A review of the individual independent variables found in the three models
indicates that in all three models the research variables are found to have a positive and
statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. The government form
research variable in model one, the three city type variables in model two, and the score
variable in model three all indicate a positive relationship that is significant at the .05
threshold level. Model one finds that changing the form of government from mayorcouncil to council manager results in a .062 increase in the percentage of total
involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers in administrative related
activities, controlling for the other independent variables. For model two, the appointed
CAOs percentage of total involvement in Conciliated cities are .052 higher than in the
control type, Adapted Political, cities; Adapted Administrative cities are .074 higher; and,
Administrative cities are .055 higher.
In model three, regression shows that a one point change in the calculated score of
a municipality results in a .002 increase in the percentage of total involvement for the
appointed chief administrative officer in administrative related activities, when other
independent variables are controlled for. None of the coefficients for any of the control
independent variables in any of the three models are found to be statistically significant at
the .05 threshold level.
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Table 5.38

Multiple regression – dep. Var. – CAOs percentage of total involvement in
administrative activities

Independent Variable

Regression #1
(government form)

Regression #2 (city
Regression #3 (score)
type)

N

226

226

226

Constant

.569 ***
(27.25)
.062 ***
(4.55)

.561 ***
(25.67)

.543 ***
(21.79)

government form
score

.002 ***
(4.52)

dummy west

-.027
(-1.25)
-.0002
(-1.16)
.002
(0.15)
-.028
(-1.56)
.012
(0.79)
.028 *
(1.83)
.015
(0.86)

.052 **
(1.97)
.074 ***
(4.79)
.055 ***
(2.99)
-.018
(-0.84)
-.0002
(-1.16)
.002
(0.18)
-.029
(-1.62)
.011
(0.71)
.028
(1.79)
.018
(1.00)

F score

5.39 ***

4.57 ***

5.35 ***

Adjusted R2

.1350

.1369

.1339

Conciliated
Adapted Administrative
Administrative
mayor completing survey
population
dummy suburb
dummy rural
dummy South
dummy mid-west

-.025
(-1.17)
-.0002
(-0.99)
.0003
(0.02)
-.029
(-1.64)
.007
(0.45)
.025
(1.63)
.010
(0.58)

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 leve
Findings for Hypothesis Eight
In the analysis described above, when using the three independent variables for
classify municipalities to compare the dependent variable, percentage of total
involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in administrative related
activities, the research variables are found to have a statistically significant relationship
with the dependent variable. These findings allow us to reject the null hypothesis. The
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adjusted-R-square, or substantive significance, of these regression models indicates that
the independent variables examined in the three regression models each explain
approximately 13.5% of the variation in the dependent variable. The Two Group Mean
T-Test confirms that there is a statistically significant difference between mayor-council
and council-manager municipalities when examining the percentage of total involvement
for the appointed chief administrative officer in administrative related activities. The
appointed CAOs in council-manager cities exhibit a significantly higher percentage of
total involvement in administrative related activities than appointed CAOs in mayorcouncil municipalities. The ANOVA analysis using the five categories of cities from the
‘Adapted Cities Framework’ also confirms the findings in regression model two, that
there is a statistically significant difference between the five types of cities (there were no
appointed CAOs in Political cities) when examining the percentage of total involvement
for the appointed chief administrative officers in administrative related activities. OLS
multiple regression analysis of the three research independent variables finds that in all
three regression models the research variables are both positive and statistically
significant and that the regression models are found to be significant as a whole. Based
upon these findings the author can reject the null hypothesis. The data do demonstrate
that as the as the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total
involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers in Administrative activities
changes.
Hypothesis Nine
In Hypothesis Nine the author proposes that as the institutional form of a
municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief
173

administrative officer in Management activities changes. The author anticipates that as
changes to institutional and structural characteristics of municipalities are made to make
the city more ‘reformed’ or less ‘reformed’ in character, then the chief administrative
officer of that municipality will alter his or her reliance on the elected officials of the
community for management related activities and personally focus different amounts of
his or her own time and energy on these management type activities.
T-Tests and ANOVA analysis
Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table
5.39) show that the mean percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief
administrative officer in management related activities in the 171 council-manager cities
is statistically higher than it is for those CAOs in the 57 mayor-council cities that
responded to the survey17. The mean percentage of total involvement for the appointed
chief administrative officer in management related activities in the 171 council-manager
municipalities responding in the survey is .7800 and the mean percentage of total
involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in management related
activities in the 57 mayor-council respondent cities is significantly lower at .6313.
Analysis results in a t-statistic equal to -7.9249 at 226 degrees of freedom. This resulting
significance is less than .0001, below the threshold of .05; therefore it is shown that there
is a statistically significant difference between the two groups.

17

Including the two identified outliers in the T-test or NOVA analysis did not alter
the findings.
174

Table 5.39

T-test – CAOs percentage of total involvement in management activities

Government Form

N

MEAN

Mayor-Council

57

.6313

Council-Manager

171

.7800

Table 5.40

T

Degrees of
freedom

Significance
(2-tailed)

-7.9249

226

.0000

ANOVA – adapted city type by CAOs percentage of total involvement in
management activities

Between groups

.957168729

Degrees
of
Freedom
3

Within groups

3.3869559

224

Total

4.34412463

227

Model

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F

Significance

.319056243

21.10

0.00000

.015120339

The five-level multinomial independent variable for city classification based on
the ‘Adapted Cities Framework’ (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted
Administrative, and Administrative) is also analyzed to determine if a relationship exists
between it and the dependent variable of percentage of total involvement for the
appointed chief administrative officer in management related activities.
Analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA analysis indicate an F score of
21.10 with a significance level of less than .0001, below the .05 threshold for statistical
significance (See Table 5.40). This finding indicates that there is a statistically significant
difference between the groups. The multiple comparison shows that out of the six
possible combinations from the four different city types (adapted political, conciliated,
adapted administrative, and administrative) three of the combinations are found to be
significantly different at the threshold .05 level of significance. Adapted Political cities
(mean of .6272) are significantly lower than both Adapted Administrative cities (mean of
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.7849) (.000 significance) and Administrative cities (mean of .7671) (.000 significance).
In addition, Conciliated cities (mean of .6668) are also found to be significantly lower
than Adapted Administrative cities (.041 significance). None of the other three
combinations meet the significance threshold of .05.
OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis
The author uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple linear regression to
evaluate the relationship between the dependent variable, percentage of total involvement
for the appointed chief administrative officer in management related activities, and the
three research independent variables of government form, city type, and calculated score,
along with the control independent variables of population, urban/suburban/rural status,
and region. In addition, a dummy variable indicating that the elected mayor rather than
the appointed CAO completes the survey is added to control for this variable. As before,
the three models are compared side by side in table 5.41 to allow the reader to examine
the relationship of these independent variables with the dependent variable.
Each of these models is run with the identified outliers removed18. The findings
of the regressions show that all three of the models are statistically significant at the .01
level of significance. In model one, using the nominal variable government form, the F
score is 11.78. The F score for the multinomial model, model two, is 9.44. For the
interval level variable model, model three, using the variable score, results indicate an F
score of 12.49. The resulting adjusted-R-square values for each of the three models are
.2752 for the nominal variable (model 1), .2710 for the multinomial level variable (model
2), and .2881 for the interval level score variable (model 3).
The two identified outliers had higher percentages than similar cities. Inclusion of
these outliers did not change any significance levels in the models.
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Table 5.41

Multiple regression – Dep. Var. – CAOs percentage of total involvement in
management activities

Independent Variable

Regression #1
(government form)

Regression #2 (city
Regression #3 (score)
type)

N

228

228

228

Constant

.545 ***
(16.18)
.126 ***
(5.85)

.544 ***
(15.30)

.482 ***
(12.25)

government form

.005 ***
(6.23)

score

dummy west

-.067 **
(-1.98)
.0005 **
(2.10)
.036 *
(1.76)
.020
(0.72)
.080 ***
(3.19)
.065 **
(2.55)
.078 ***
(2.75)

.019
(0.45)
.132 ***
(5.39)
.113 ***
(3.85)
-.065 *
(-1.83)
.0005 **
(2.04)
.036 *
(1.75)
.017
(0.61)
.081 ***
(3.21)
.065 **
(2.53)
.079 ***
(2.79)

-.055
(-1.60)
.0006 **
(2.28)
.032
(1.59)
.017
(0.62)
.069 ***
(2.75)
.058 **
(2.33)
.067 **
(2.38)

F score

11.78 ***

9.44 ***

12.49 ***

Adjusted R2

.2752

.2710

.2881

Conciliated
Adapted Administrative
Administrative
mayor completing survey
population
dummy suburb
dummy rural
dummy South
dummy mid-west

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 level
A review of the individual independent variables in the three models indicates that
in all three models the research variables are found to have a statistically significant
relationship with the dependent variable, with the exception of one variable in model two.
The Conciliated cities variable in model two (t score of 0.45) is the only research
independent variable the author finds to not be statistically significant. The Adapted
Administrative and Administrative cities variables in model two both indicate a positive
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and significantly difference in the dependent variable from Adapted Political cities (our
control city type) at the .01 level. The government form research variable in model one
and the score variable in model three both indicate a positive relationship with the
dependent variable that is significant at the .01 level. Model one finds that changing the
form of government from mayor-council to council manager results in a .126 increase in
the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in
management related activities, controlling for the other independent variables. In model
three, a one point changing the calculated score variable one point in a municipality
results in a .005 increase in the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief
administrative officer in management related activities, again controlling for the other
independent variables. In model one the variable indicating that a mayor completes the
survey is shown to be both negative and significant, but this variable is only marginally
significant in model 2 (.10 significance) and not significant at all in model three.
Population has a positive and significant effect on the dependent variable in all three
models. In models one and two a one thousand person rise in population equates to a
.0005 increase in the dependent variable; in model three a one thousand person rise in
population results in a .0006 increase. This suggests that an increase in population has
the effect of increasing the percentage of total effort that a CAO devotes to the
management dimension. Regional differences are also found in all three models. In all
three models a CAO in a municipality located outside of the Northeast region has a
significantly higher percentage of total involvement in management related activities.
This suggests that CAOs in municipalities outside of the Northeast see themselves as
more involved in management activities than appointed CAOs in the Northeast region.
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None of the coefficients for any of the other control independent variables in any of the
three models are found to be statistically significant at the threshold level.
Findings for Hypothesis Nine
In the analysis described above, when using the three independent variables for
classify municipalities to compare the dependent variable, percentage of total
involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in management related
activities, the research variables are found to have a statistically significant relationship
with the dependent variable with one exception, Conciliated cities in regression model
two. The direction of the relationship is positive. The adjusted-R-square, or substantive
significance, of these models indicates that the independent variables in these three
models explain approximately 28% of the variation in the dependent variable. The Two
Group Mean T-Test confirms that there is a statistically significant difference between
mayor-council and council-manager municipalities in the percentage of total involvement
for the appointed chief administrative officer in management related activities. The
appointed CAOs in council-manager cities have a significantly higher percentage of total
involvement in management related activities than do appointed CAOs in mayor-council
municipalities. The ANOVA analysis using the five categories of cities found in the
‘Adapted Cities Framework’ also confirms the findings in regression model two, that
there is a statistically significant difference between the four (there are no appointed
CAOs in Political type cities) types of cities when examining the percentage of total
involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in management related
activities. OLS multiple regression analysis using the three research independent
variables finds that in all three regression models the research variables are statistically
179

significant (except for one individual variable in model two) and the regression models
analyzed are found to be significant as a whole. Based upon these findings the author can
reject the null hypothesis. The data do demonstrate that as the institutional form of a
municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief
administrative officer in management related activities changes.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
Discussion of Findings
In recent years scholars have observed and reported on a number of structural
changes that are taking place in municipalities within the United States (Adrian, 1988;
Moulder, 2008; MacManus & Bullock, 2003; Ebdon & Brucato, 2000; Frederickson,
Logan & Wood, 2003). These various authors suggest that the traditional dichotomous
classification system most scholars commonly use to describe the majority of
municipalities as either mayor-council or council-manager may not prove adequate today
when analyzing the differences found between these communities (DeSantis, 2002). The
intent of this study is to test whether these well documented structural changes, taking
place in many municipalities within the United States in recent decades, has any effect on
important variables found in those communities. The author tests these effects using
three primary independent research variables and a number of operationalized dependent
variables. Three independent variables are tested. First, the author tests the traditional
dichotomy classification system of mayor-council verses council-manager. Second, the
five category classification system put forward by Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood
(2004a) in their book titled The Adapted City: Institutional Dynamics and Structural
Change is analyzed. Lastly, a classification system developed by the author that
evaluates each municipality based upon various institutional and structural features and
then assigns each municipality a score between zero and fifty is also tested.
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Several variables of importance, designed to assist the author in evaluating
distinctions between the various classification forms, are evaluated in this study including
the general fund per capita expenditures, the percent of total time the CAO spends on
management activities, the percent of total time the CAO spends on policy activities, the
percent of total time the CAO spends on political activities, the quality of municipal
services as perceived by the CAO, the percentage of involvement for the CAO in the total
mission related activities of a municipality, the percentage of total involvement for the
CAO in total policy related activities, the percentage of total involvement for the CAO in
total administrative related activities, and the percentage of total involvement for the
CAO of a municipality in total management related activities. Analysis of the data in this
study produces mixed results. Significant differences are found between the various
municipal classification forms in some dependent variables; in other dependent variables
under examination, the data do not indicate any differentiation between forms. In its
entirety, however, this analysis does contribute in a significant way to the overall
knowledge of local government administration.
General Fund Per Capita Expenditures
Hypothesis 1 – The per capita expenditures of a municipality will be
different depending on how the municipality’s institutional form is
classified.
Previous studies in the literature concerning the relationship between form of
government and city expenditures have produced conflicting results. Most of these
studies use the dichotomous system that differentiates municipal form as either mayorcouncil or council-manager. Only one study found uses a more elaborate classification
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system to analyze city expenditures (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2010). Some of these studies
confirm the idea that reformed cities spent less than unreformed cities (Booms, 1966;
Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Lyons, 1978; Stumm & Corrigan, 1998; Jung, 2006) while
others find the exact opposite (Sherbenou, 1961; Nunn, 1966; French, 2004; Coate &
Knight, 2009). For most studies, however, little evidence is found to link government
form with expenditure level; rather, other socio-economic variables are found to be more
closely linked to spending levels in municipalities (Cole, 1971; Liebert, 1974; Dye &
Garcia, 1978; Morgan & Pelissero, 1980; Meier, 1980, Wish, 1986; Farnham, 1986;
Deno & Mehay, 1987; Morgan & Watson, 1995; Campbell & Trunbull, 2003; Jung,
2006; MacDonald, 2008; Carr & Karuppusamy, 2010). Data from this study confirms the
findings of the majority of previous studies; no statistically significant relationship is
found to exist between form of government and expenditure level regardless of what
classification system is utilized. Form of government does not appear to affect the level
that a municipality expends in the general fund on a per capita basis. The only variable
that is found to be statistically significant in any of the three regression models performed
in this study is the variable that indicates that a municipality is located in a suburban area.
Suburban municipalities spent significantly less per capita than urban municipalities in all
three regression models. These findings help to reword the traditional notion that
professional managers operate a municipality more efficiently than elected ones, resulting
in lower expenditure levels.
Multiple regression analysis using the three independent research variables finds
while two of the three regression models analyzed for a relationship between form of
government and expenditure levels are significant as a whole, none of the three models
explains very much of the change in those expenditure levels (R2) and in none of the
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three models did the variables that describe form of government reach a statistically
significant level. The T-test using the dichotomous mayor-council and council-manager
government form variable and the ANOVA analysis using the five-category Adapted
Cities Framework also confirm that no significant differences are found between the
general fund per capita expenditure levels of the different form categories.
Hypothesis one predicts that different classification categories of municipalities
will produce different levels of per capita expenditures. Analysis of the data does not
find that a significant difference exists between the classification of government form that
a municipality is given and the per capita expenditure level found in that municipality.
No relationship is found to exist regardless of what classification system is utilized. Base
upon this information, the null hypothesis is not rejected and hypothesis one cannot be
accepted.
Use of Chief Administrative Officer’s Time
Hypothesis 2 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer
to management activities will change.
Hypothesis 3 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer
to policy activities will change.
Hypothesis 4 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer
to political activities will change.
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Studies by scholars in the past, concerning how CAOs make use of their working
time, have primarily examined the difference between elected mayors and appointed
CAOs in municipalities in the United States (Wright, 1969; Newell & Ammons, 1987;
Newell, Glass & Ammons, 1995; French & Folz, 2004). Most of these studies
demonstrate that there is a difference in how mayors and appointed managers allocate
their working time between the activities associated with management, policy, and
political activities. The author hypothesizes that as the institutional structure and forms
of a municipality change from less reformed to more reformed in character, the amount
of working time that the CAO of that municipality allocates to management, policy, and
political activities will also change. Data analysis in this study show that in the
population under study (municipalities between 10,000 and 250,000) there is a significant
difference in the amount of time that CAOs allocate to management and political
activities as the institutional form of a municipal government changes from less reformed
to more reformed; however, no statistical difference is found in the amount of time CAOs
allocate to policy activities.
Results found in this study tend to confirm the differences noted in previous
studies concerning the percentage of total working CAOs devote to management
activities in mayor-council and council manager municipalities (Wright, 1969; Blubaugh,
1987; Newell & Ammons, 1987; French & Folz, 2004; Killian & Choudhury, 2010).
Multiple regression models using the three independent variables described in this study,
indicate that the government form variable, the city type variable, and the score variable
are all statistically significant. Regression coefficients for these models indicate (with the
exception of moving from political to adapted political cities) that as a municipality
becomes more reformed, the CAO in that municipality tends to spend more of his or her
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total working time on management activities. The T-test and ANOVA analysis both
confirm that there is a significant difference between CAOs for this variable between
mayor-council and council-manager cities as well as some significant differences
between the five types of cities. The regression model analysis also show that there is a
significant difference between the percentage of time allocated to management activities
between elected and appointed CAOs within mayor-council form cities (T-score of
3.7549 and .0004 significance). Elected mayors in these cities spend 38.9% of their time
on these activities and appointed CAOs spend almost 58%.
Multiple regression analysis also reveals that a significant difference exists in the
percentage of working time devoted to political type activities by CAOs in the different
forms of government studied. Multiple regression models run using the three
independent variables described in this study indicate that the government form variable,
the city type variable, and the score variable are all statistically significant. Regression
coefficients for these variables indicate that as a municipality adopts more reformed
institutional structures, CAOs in those municipalities tend to spend less of their working
time on political activities. Again, the T-test and ANOVA analysis confirm this
conclusion. There is a significant difference between elected and appointed CAOs in
mayor-council municipalities (T-score of -3.8409 and significance of .0003); appointed
CAOs in mayor-council cities spent only 9.4% of their time on political activities while
elected mayors spent 19.8%.
When it comes to the percentage of time that CAOs allocate to policy activities,
however, the results are different. None of the three independent variables used in this
study to describe government form are found to be significant in predicting the
percentage of time a CAO devotes to policy activities in any of the three regression
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models. In almost all classifications all CAOs spent, statistically speaking, an identical
percentage of their time on policy related activities. Analysis shows that even between
the elected and appointed CAOs in mayor-council cities there is not a highly significant
difference (T-score of -1.871 and significance of .0665); elected officials allocate 36.8%
and appointed CAOs allocate 29.4% of their time to policy related activities.
The results of this study indicate that some changes in how CAOs allocate their
time has taken place over the past twenty-five years (See Table 6.1).

Table 6.1

Comparison of CAOs Time Allocation Percentages

Newell &
Ammons
1985
French &
Folz
2004
Current
Study
2011

Management

Policy

Political

council-manager

51%

32%

17%

mayor-council

44%

26%

30%

council-manager

56%

31%

13%

mayor-council

37%

27%

36%

council-manager

55%

31%

15%

mayor-council

50%

32%

12%

Note: may not add to 100% due to rounding and use of different cases
The largest change over time that is observed in Table 6.1 above is in the amount
of time allocated by CAOs in mayor-council municipalities to political activities. The
12% of total time that CAOs in mayor-council cities report spending on political
activities now is much lower than that reported in either the Newell or Ammons (1987) or
the French and Folz (2004) studies. This may be the result of the presence of more
appointed CAOs in mayor-council cities; however, when the study data is summarized
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using the 49 elected mayors and the 211 appointed CAOs the author still finds that
elected mayors allocation of total time to political activities has dropped from the 30%
found in the Newell and Ammons study, and the 36% found in the French and Folz study,
to 19.3% in this study. A similar explanation can be put forward for the change that is
seen by CAOs in mayor-council cities in management related activities. Results from
this study indicate that CAOs in these mayor-council cities spend slightly more time now
in management related activities than they did in the prior two studies. Again, this could
be the result of more appointed CAOs now present in mayor-council cities. CAOs in all
municipalities, regardless of how they are classified as to form, spent approximately the
same amount of time on policy related activities. This contradicts the findings from the
earlier study conducted by French and Folz (2004). One major difference in results
between the two data sets is in the percentage of time CAOs in mayor-council cities
allocate to policy activities. This could be the result of more appointed CAOs in mayorcouncil cities, however, analysis does not indicate a statistically significant difference of
time spent on policy activities between elected and appointed CAOs in mayor-council
cities within this study (T-score of -1.871 and significance of .0665). Elected officials
actually allocate more time to policy activities in these municipalities (36.8%) than
appointed CAOs (29.4%); but, it was only significant at the .10 level. It simply appears
that elected CAOs are taking a more active role in policy related activities today than
they have in the past.
Overall, analysis of the data in this study support Hypotheses two and four but do
not support Hypothesis three. As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to
management and political activities changes, however, the amount of total working time
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devoted by the chief administrative officer to policy related activities does not change.
Generally, CAOs devote more of their working time to management related activities as
the municipality’s institutional form become more reformed in structure. Conversely, as
the municipality’s institutional form becomes less reformed in structure, CAOs spend
more time in political type activities. Changing the institutional structure of a
municipality from less reformed to more reformed, does not change the percentage of
time that the CAO spends on policy related activities. Based on this analysis, Hypotheses
two and four are accepted and Hypothesis three is not accepted.
Form of Government and Provision of Public Services
Hypothesis 5 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
perception of the chief administrative officer about the quality of services
offered within their municipality will change.
The author anticipated that as the institutional structure of a municipality changes
from less to more reform in character, the perception of the CAO concerning the quality
of services in meeting the citizens’ needs will also change. Multiple regression
conducted on the calculated quality of service score for each municipality using each of
the three research independent variables in this study, indicate that there is a significant
difference. The regression model using the dichotomous variable of mayor-council
verses council-manager shows that CAOs in council-manager cities tend to view service
quality less favorably than CAOs in mayor-council cities. When the calculated structural
score variable is used in the regression model a similar result is observed. As more
reformed structures are put into place, the CAO tends to view the service quality less
favorably. The regression model using the adapted cities types shows somewhat mixed
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results. The relationship takes on a more curvilinear relationship. Only in the Adapted
Political type cities does a significant difference exist in the CAOs quality rating with
Political cities (the control variable); CAOs in Adapted Political cities perceive a higher
quality of services than CAOs in Political cities. Although not significant, the
relationship in Conciliated cities is likewise positive. For both Adapted Administrative
and Administrative cities, however (again although not significant), coefficients indicate
that CAOs in these type cities perceived services in a less favorable light than CAOs in
Political cities. In all three regression models, the variable used to control for the
presence of an appointed CAO in a mayor-council municipality is both highly significant
and negative, meaning appointed CAOs in these cities tend to have a more negative view
of service quality then did elected CAOs in similar communities. A T-test performed
between appointed and elected CAOs in mayor-council municipalities confirms this
observation (T-score of -2.3804 and significance of .0206). Regression analysis for all
three models also indicates that the total number of services offered within a community
as well as the region of the country the municipality is located in has a significant effect
on the CAOs perception of service quality. The more services a municipality offers the
lower the quality score. CAOs in cities located outside of the Northeast region rate the
quality of services offered in their communities significantly higher than do CAOs in the
Northeast. Although only found to be significant at the .10 level, a municipalities
population is also found to be positively related to service quality rating in all three
regression models. The results of this study help confirm the conclusions of some studies
that show that there is a relationship between form of government and service
performance or output (Dye & Garcia, 1978; Sanders, 1978; Abney & Lauth, 1986;
Rodriguez, 2007); and also confirm results from studies that note that differences are
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more related to geographical location, population size, or other characteristics (Dye &
Garcia, 1978; Sanders, 1979; Hayes & Chang, 1990).
Analysis performed in this study supports Hypothesis five. Changing the
institutional structure of a municipality from less to more reformed, does change the
perception of the chief administrative officer concerning the quality of services offered
within their municipality. Based on this analysis, Hypothesis five is accepted.
Division of Responsibility and Form of Government
Hypothesis 6 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in
Mission activities will change.
Hypothesis 7 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in Policy
activities will change.
Hypothesis 8 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in
Administrative activities will change.
Hypothesis 9 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the
percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in
Management activities will change.
Although the idea of the politic-administration dichotomy is one of the most
enduring theoretical constructs in public administration (Svara, 1998), many scholars
contend that it did not exist as a reality among the earliest classical writers (Rosenbloom,
2008; Lynn, 2001; Svara, 1999a). Scholars over the past decades have found both
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normative and empirical issues in strictly using the dichotomy within the context of local
government (Bosworth, 1958; Loveridge, 1968; Ammons & Newell, 1988; and
Golembiewski & Gabris, 1994; Montjoy & Watson, 1995; Dunn & Legge, 2002; Zhang
& Feiock, 2009; Svara, 1985). James Svara (1985) put forward a model that suggested
that, rather than a strict dichotomy existing between elected and appointed officials, a
blending of responsibilities in politics and administration is actually taking place. This
‘Dichotomy-Duality’ model, as he calls it, dissects this relationship in local government
into four distinct conceptual dimensions of responsibility: Mission, Policy,
Administrative, and Management. Svara defines the functions associated with each of
these dimensions and operationalizes them into various activities that can be measured
(Svara, 1995). Originally, Svara visualized the Mission and Management dimensions as
primarily the domain of the elected officials (Mission) and the appointed manager
(Management), and referred to these as the dichotomy portion of the model. The Policy
and Administrative dimensions he envisioned as consisting of a joint sharing of
responsibility, or as the duality portion of the model. In latter writings Svara notes much
more of a blending of responsibilities within all four dimensions; Svara refers to this as
the Complementary model (Svara, 1999a). The author in this study uses Svara’s four
model dimensions and their related activities as dependent variables to examine how the
appointed CAO in a municipality perceives the relationship between herself and the
elected board or council that serves that same municipality. For each of the four
dimensions (Mission, Policy, Administrative, and Management), the author performs
analysis to examine how institutional changes affect the mixture of responsibilities in
each.
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Numerous past studies have reaffirmed the utility of the basic dichotomy-duality
model in helping to explain how responsibilities are shared between appointed managers
and elected officials in the local government setting (Browne, 1985; Protasel, 1995;
Svara, 1988b; Svara, 1995; Svara, 1999b; Demir, 2009). The author anticipated that as
the institutional structures of a municipality changes from less to more reformed in
character, the percentage of total involvement shared between the CAO and the council
will change as well, for each of the four dimensions in the model. Data from this study
indicate that, in the population under study (municipalities between 10,000 and 250,000
with an appointed CAO), there is a significant difference in the percentage of total
involvement for the CAO in the Policy, Administrative, and Management dimension
activities as the institutional form of a municipal government changes from less to more
reformed; however, no statistical difference is found in the percentage of total
involvement for the CAO in the Mission dimension. Unlike what was anticipated by the
author, no significant difference is found concerning the percentage of total involvement
for the CAO when the activities associated with the Mission dimension are analyzed.
Multiple regression analysis using the percentage of total involvement for appointed
CAOs in the Mission related dimension activities as the dependent variable, do not
indicate any significant relationship with any of the three independent research variables.
Coefficients for the dichotomous government form variable did reach significance levels
of .10 as did the interval level variable scoring the numerous reform structural changes
and one of the five city type variables; however, none of the research variables reached
the threshold level set at .05. In all three regression models, the most significant
variables are those indicating that the municipality is located in a suburb and those
indicating that the city is located in a region outside of the Northeast. A CAO located in
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a suburb is likely to participate in Mission activities at a significantly higher percentage
rate than a CAO in an urban location. Similarly, a CAO working in a region outside of
the Northeast is likely to participate in Mission activities at a higher rate than a CAO
located in the Northeast region. Overall, however, our models, even though significant,
do not explain very much of the difference (only about 7%).
A significant difference is found, however, between the research variables and the
percentage of total involvement for the CAO in activities associated with the Policy
dimension. Multiple regression models are run using the three independent research
variables described in this study against the dependent variable for CAO involvement in
the Policy dimension. Results from all three models show that the dichotomous
government form variable, the multinomial city type variable, and the calculated score
variable are all statistically significant; in addition, the models as a whole are also
significant. The coefficients of all three of these variables indicate that as a municipality
adopts more reform institutional structures, appointed CAOs in those municipalities
increase their percentage of total involvement in Policy dimension activities. Both the Ttest and ANOVA analysis for this hypothesis confirm this relationship. The control
variables used in the regression analysis, indicating that a municipality is located in a
suburban location and in a region other than the Northeast, are also significant in all three
models. An appointed CAO in a suburban location is likely to have a higher percentage
of total involvement in Policy dimension activities than a similar CAO located in an
urban area. Similarly, an appointed CAO in the South, Mid-west, or West regions of the
country is likely to have a higher percentage of total involvement in the Policy dimension
activities than a CAO working in the Northeast region of the country. Results show that
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all three regression models, as a whole, are significant and explain between 10.79% and
12.73% of the variation of the dependent variable.
A significant difference is also found in the relationships between the independent
and dependent variables using multiple regression analysis and percentage of total
involvement of the CAO in Administrative dimension activities as the dependent
variable. Multiple regression models using the three independent research variables
described in this study show all three independent variables individually significant and
the models as a whole also significant. All of the individual coefficients for these
variables are significant and indicate that as a municipality adopts more reform
institutional structures, appointed CAOs in those municipalities increase their percentage
of total involvement in activities associated with the Administrative dimension. Unlike,
however, the author finds in the Mission and Policy dimension regression models
discussed above, none of the other control variables in this model indicate any significant
relationship. The T-test and ANOVA analysis for this dependent variable confirm that a
significant difference exists between the percentages of total involvement for
Administrative activities of appointed CAOs in mayor-council verses council-manager
municipalities, and also between the adapted city types. These three regression models as
a whole are significant and explain between 13.39% and 13.69% of the variation of the
dependent variable.
Results also indicate a significant difference in the final of the four responsibility
dimensions examined within this study, the percentage of total involvement for the CAO
looking at the activities associated with the Management dimension. Multiple regression
models using the three independent research variables described in this study show that
for the dichotomous government form variable, the multinomial city type variable, and
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the calculated score variable, all are statistically significant. The coefficients of all three
of these variables indicate that as a municipality adopts more reform institutional
structures, appointed CAOs in municipalities tend to increase their percentage of total
involvement in activities associated with the Management dimension. Both the T-test
and ANOVA analysis perform for this hypothesis confirm this relationship as significant.
Several of the control variables used within these three regression models is also found to
be statistically significant at the threshold .05. As is true in the regression analysis using
both the Mission and Policy dimension variables, CAOs in the South, Mid-west, and
West regions demonstrate a significantly higher percentage of total involvement level in
activities associated with the Management dimension. The variable measuring suburban
location, unlike in the Mission and Policy dimensions, does not meet the threshold
significance level of .05 in any of the three models analyzed. Two control variables,
however, are found significant in the Management dimension analyses that are not found
significant in any of the other three dimensions. Population of a municipality is both
positive and significant in predicting the percentage of total involvement that an
appointed CAO contributes in the Management dimension. As a municipality’s
population increases, the appointed CAO of that municipality is more likely to achieve a
higher percentage of total involvement in Management dimension activities. In addition,
in regression model one using the dichotomous mayor-council and council-manager
research variable, if an elected mayor completes the survey (assigning the ratings of
involvement for the appointed CAO) then that appointed CAOs score is likely to indicate
a lower percentage of involvement in management activities than if an appointed CAO
assigns his own ratings. The variable measuring this effect is significant at the .10 level
for the city type model (model 2) as well, but is not significant at all for the score variable
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(model 3). This suggests that, at least between mayor-council and council-manager
cities, the mayor of those cities rate the appointed CAOs as being less involved in
management dimension activities than the appointed CAOs rate themselves. When we
capture and compare how mayors in the same 19 municipalities (where the mayor
reported for his appointed CAO) rate their own percentage of involvement relative to the
council, results show that these mayors view their own involvement (59.1%) as almost
identical to the CAOs that they rate (59.4%). This gives us some explanation as to why
this control variable is significant in the regression model. Mayors in these councilmanager cities may see themselves as sharing some of the management responsibility
with the appointed CAO, thus the lower CAO rating.
Overall the results from this study regarding the percentage of total involvement
by the appointed CAO in Svara’s four dimensions of responsibility are mixed. Analysis
of the data support Hypotheses seven, eight, and nine but do not support Hypothesis six.
As the institutional form of a municipality changes from less to more reformed in
character, the percentage of the appointed CAOs total involvement, as perceived by the
appointed CAO of that municipality, for activities related to the Policy, Administrative,
and Management dimensions change as well, however, the percentage of involvement for
CAOs in the Mission dimension does not change. Based upon this analysis, Hypotheses
seven (Policy), eight (Administrative), and nine (Management) are accepted but
Hypothesis six (Mission) is not accepted.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
This study is intended to test whether the well documented structural changes that
have taken place in many, if not most, of the municipalities across the United States over
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recent decades has had any effect on a number of important variables within those
communities. To examine this question, three primary methods that classify
municipalities from less reformed in character to more reformed in character are
employed: 1) whether a city operates under a mayor-council or council-manager form of
government; 2) how a municipality is classified as to form using the Adapted Cities
Framework developed by Frederickson et al. (2004b); and, 3) the rating score that a
municipality attains using a classification system that assigns point values to various
institutional and structural features for each municipality and then assigns that
municipality a value score between zero and fifty points. These three different
classification schemes are compared and contrasted. Information concerning each
municipality’s per capital expenditures and the percentage of time devoted to the
management, policy, and political roles by the CAO of each form is evaluated.
Additionally, each respondent’s perceptions concerning the quality of services offered
within the municipality and the percentage of total involvement that the appointed CAO
in that municipality exhibits for the Mission, Policy, Administrative, and Management
dimensions, as described by Svara (1985) is analyzed and discussed. When appropriate,
comparison of the study’s findings with the findings of past literature is also presented.
Data from this study confirms what the majority of data from previous studies has
found; no statistically significant relationship exists between how a city’s institutional
form is classified and the per capita expenditure levels found in that municipality. Data
examined in this study show that structural changes made in a municipality that attempt
make a city either more or less reformed in character do not make a difference in regard
to that municipalities per capita expenditure level. This finding, of course, does not fully
answer the question of whether one classification form is more ‘efficient’ than another,
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but only if one spent more per capita than another. Future research needs to look at
expenditures at a much more micro level than the entire general fund, as this study does,
and needs to look at different specific aspects of the municipality in order to determine a
better picture of efficiency. Police, fire, and public works departments, for example, are
not the same in scope or function across all municipalities in urban, suburban, or rural
areas. If efficiency is defined as inputs divided by outputs, then both of these terms must
be defined fully and examined in order to produce an accurate measurement of efficiency
for use in analysis.
Examining the way that CAOs in municipalities allocate their total working time
between the management, policy, and political roles in their communities, data from this
study demonstrates that changing institutional structures from less to more reformed does
make a difference, but only in the management and political roles, not in the policy role.
Comparing data from this study with previous studies also indicates that how these CAOs
allocate their time between these three roles has changed over the past twenty years.
Data indicates that while the time allocations between the three roles for CAOs in council
manager cities has remained fairly consistent over this period of time, time allocations for
CAOs in mayor-council cities has experienced substantial changes, especially in the
percentage of time the CAO devotes to the management and political roles. This change
remains evident even when the author performs analysis that separates elected CAOs
(mayors) from appointed CAOs within mayor-council municipalities. CAOs in mayorcouncil municipalities devote more time today to the management role and they devote
less time today to the political role than the results of past studies show. Some of this
difference may be attributed to the presence of more appointed CAOs in mayor-council
municipalities today than in the past, however, not all of the change can be accounted for
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this way. It appears that elected mayors in mayor-council cities are today devoting more
of their working time to the management role and less to the political role than in years
past. Future research needs to explore this trend and search for reasons that it is
occurring. It may be that the expectations and norms associated with elected mayors in
these type cities has changed over time so that managing the day to day operations of the
community, like budgeting and coordinating departmental activities, has grown simply
more important in today’s world than political activities, such as giving speeches and
attending ceremonies. Another area for possible future research comes from the finding
that CAOs in the three regions located outside of the Northeast (Mid-west, South, and
West) all spent significantly more of their total working time on political activities than
CAOs in the Northeast. Future research needs to examine why this occurs. Are CAOs in
these regions expected to be more politically involved? Do specific job requirements
demand more time to be spent in speech giving or attending ceremonies, or have changes
in public expectations contributed to this deviation?
Analysis in this study finds that a significant difference does exist in the
perception of the CAOs when it comes to the quality of services that are offered to the
public by their municipalities. Generally, the CAOs perception of the quality of services
within the municipality declines as the institutional structure of a municipality adopts
more reformed characteristics. Those COAs that are appointed also rate the quality of
municipal services significantly lower than do elected mayor CAOs. The number of
services that a municipality offers also has a negative effect on the perceived quality of
services. A municipality located in the South or Mid-west, as compared to the Northeast
region, shows a positive and significant effect on ratings. Future research needs to
examine in more detail the rationale behind the appointed CAOs relatively negative view
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of municipal services. Developing methods to measure the expectations of both
appointed and elected CAOs could allow researchers to reveal differences in baseline
perceptions from which service quality ratings are made. If researchers can measure that
mayors have a lower quality expectation baseline than appointed managers, this finding
could help explain why mayors rate existing services at a higher level than their
appointed CAO counterparts.
Using the four dimensions of responsibility from the dichotomy-duality model
developed by James Svara (1985), data from this study indicates that a significant
difference exists in how CAOs perceive the mixture of total involvement responsibility
between themselves and their councils in the Policy, Administrative, and Management
dimensions, but not in the Mission dimension. Based upon the results from data analyzed
in this study, as the institutional structure of a municipal adopts more reformed structural
characteristics, the CAO of that municipality will perceive his percentage of total
involvement, relative to the city council, to increase in the Policy, Administrative, and
Management dimensions. Although the data also show that the same relationship is true
when looking at the Mission dimension, this change is not at the .05 significance level set
in this study. Svara suggests that, “four alternative patterns of relative contributions from
the council and the manager” (Svara, 1995, p. 39) are suggested to exist based on
previous research. These four models are graphically depicted in APPENDIX E of this
study and include the ‘Council Dominance’, ‘Dichotomy’, ‘Dichotomy-Duality’, and
‘Executive Dominance’ Models. In only Svara’s Executive Dominance Model is the
CAO depicted as contributing more than 50% of the total involvement, relative to
council, in the Mission, as well as, in the other three dimensions of responsibility. Data
from this study indicate, however, that in every instance, no matter how a municipality is
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classified, CAOs perceive that they dominate every one of the four dimensions, including
the Mission dimension. Analysis, described previously, does show that for the Policy,
Administrative, and Management dimensions, there are significant differences between
municipalities as the institutional structures they adopt changes from less to more
reformed, however, in the Mission dimension municipalities do not change significantly.
These findings suggest that CAOs in cities with a population from 10,000 to 250,000 are
likely to view themselves as more involved in the activities described by these four
dimensions than the councils that they work for, and this is true regardless of the
institutional structure that a municipality adopts. The percentage of total involvement for
CAOs in these municipalities fall somewhere between Svara’s Dichotomy-Duality and
Executive Dominance models, for the most part; with the Mission dimension closer to the
Executive Dominance model. These results are similar to the findings of Svara (1995),
however, Svara was only looking at council-manager cities in that study. The inclusion
in this study of CAOs operating in mayor-council form communities contributes
additional information to the literature. Future research needs to investigate why these
appointed CAOs in mayor-council government municipalities perceive their contribution
to these four dimensions of responsibility so highly. What formal and informal
institutional structures or professional norms contribute to this perception? Analysis of
these CAOs can give insight into the relationships that exist between councils and
appointed CAOs regardless of the form a government formally adopts.
This study test whether the well documented structural changes taking place in
many municipalities across the United States in recent decades has affected important
variables associated with those municipalities. The analysis results in mixed findings.
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Measured differences that are tested among municipalities classified in three
different ways based on institutional reform structural characteristics, show that in six of
the nine hypotheses tested, significant differences are found. The amount of working
time that a CAO allocates to management and political activities is linked in a significant
relationship with the degree that a municipality adopts structural characteristics
associated with reformed local government. Likewise, the quality of services provided
by a municipality, as perceived by the CAO, is related in a positive manner with how
structurally reformed a municipality is measured. The CAOs percentage share of total
involvement in the dimension of Policy, Administrative, and Management, are also found
to be related in a positive fashion to how reformed a municipality’s structure is measured.
For three of the tested hypotheses, however, no significant difference is found. The percapital expenditures of a municipality are not found to be significantly related to the
degree to which a municipality has adopted reformed characteristics. Similarly, the
amount of time that a CAO allocates to policy related activities does not significantly
change as the structural characteristics of a municipality change; neither does the
perceived percentage of involvement for the CAO in the Mission dimension activities.
This analysis has accomplished several of the goals outlined in Chapter One.
Data has been examined using more complex methods of measuring the institutional
structures of municipalities in order to compare and contrast these municipalities. This
data has tested whether these institutional structural changes have any effect on a number
of important variables found within these communities. Findings in this study have
revealed that some differences do exist in a number of important areas. While not every
variable tested provides evidence that structural reform changes in municipalities make a
difference, substantial evidence on six of the nine areas examined has emerge. This study
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has examined local municipalities in the United States with a population between 10,000
and 250,000 and provided valuable information about those communities which enhances
the existing literature concerning local government in the United States at the municipal
level.
.
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Mississippi State University Confidential Survey for Municipalities
Thank you for agreeing to complete this survey that serves as a major component of my doctoral
dissertation. Please answer the following questions as completely and accurately as possible. All
responses are strictly confidential and will be use only for my dissertation research.
For the purposes of this survey the term CAO (or chief administrative officer) will refer to a person hired to
fill the position of either city manager, city administrator, or other position with similar administrative
duties. The term council refers to an elected legislative body for the municipality and may also be called
council, commission, aldermen, selectmen, etc.
1)

Name of City or Town ______________________________State _________________________

2)

Please provide the following information concerning your municipality:
A) What is the population of your city/town __________________________
B) Has the population, over the past ten years, in your municipality (Check one):
Increased significantly _____
Decreased significantly _____
Remained the same _____
C) How would you describe your municipality (circle one):
1
Urban

2

3

Suburban

Rural

D) What is your adopted form of government (circle one)
1

2

3

Council-Manager

Mayor-Council

Other

(Please list if other)____________________________________
E. What is your total annual municipal budget (in thousands)?
Revenues $________________

Expenditures $________________
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F. What amount (in actual dollars or percent) of the municipal budget is devoted to the
following departments:
Public works

$____________

_________%

Parks and Recreation

$____________

_________%

Public Transportation

$____________

_________%

Police and Fire

$____________

_________%

Education

$____________

_________%

Other

$____________

_________%

G. What is your municipality’s Property Tax Rate
________________ mills
Or
______________ cents per $100 valuation
H. What is the estimated median annual household income of your municipality?
$__________________

I.

What is the estimated unemployment rate in your municipality? ________________%

J.

How many employees are in your municipal workforce?
i. Full Time ________
ii. Part Time________
iii. Contracted Employees (if any) __________

K. What is the estimated percentage of homes in the municipality built prior to 1960?
Less than 10% ____

10% to 25% ____
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more than 25% ____

3)

In this study we are interested in the involvement levels of various key officials in a number
of important municipal activities. For yourself and each applicable official listed below,
please describe how that you perceive that person(s) level of involvement for each the
following activities (mark one for each applicable row):
The Perceived Involvement Level
Activity
0
1
2
3
4
5
None
Very
Low
Average High Very
Low
High
A) Determining the
Mayor
0
1
2
3
4
5
Purpose and Services of
Municipal Government
CAO
0
1
2
3
4
5

B) Developing
Strategies of Future
Development of the
Municipality
C) Setting Long-Term
Fiscal Priorities for the
Municipality

D) Developing Annual
Goals and Objectives
for Municipal
Programs
E) The Budget Process

F) Identifying Current
Issues that Require
Attention by the
Municipal Government
G) Developing
Solutions to Current
Issues

H) Evaluating the
Accomplishment of
Specific Programs

Council

0

1

2

3

4

5

Mayor

0

1

2

3

4

5

CAO

0

1

2

3

4

5

Council

0

1

2

3

4

5

Mayor

0

1

2

3

4

5

CAO

0

1

2

3

4

5

Council

0

1

2

3

4

5

Mayor

0

1

2

3

4

5

CAO

0

1

2

3

4

5

Council

0

1

2

3

4

5

Mayor

0

1

2

3

4

5

CAO

0

1

2

3

4

5

Council

0

1

2

3

4

5

Mayor

0

1

2

3

4

5

CAO

0

1

2

3

4

5

Council

0

1

2

3

4

5

Mayor

0

1

2

3

4

5

CAO

0

1

2

3

4

5

Council

0

1

2

3

4

5

Mayor

0

1

2

3

4

5

CAO

0

1

2

3

4

5

Council

0

1

2

3

4

5
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The Perceived Involvement Level
Activity

I) Resolving
Citizens
Complaints about
Services
J) Implementing
Programs and
Delivering Services

K) Changing
Management
Practices or
Reorganizing City
Government
L) Hiring Decisions
About Department
Heads

M) Hiring
Decisions:
Employees below
Department Head
Level

4)

0
None

1
Very
Low

2
Low

3
Average

4
High

5
Very
High

Mayor

0

1

2

3

4

5

CAO

0

1

2

3

4

5

Council

0

1

2

3

4

5

Mayor

0

1

2

3

4

5

CAO

0

1

2

3

4

5

Council

0

1

2

3

4

5

Mayor

0

1

2

3

4

5

CAO

0

1

2

3

4

5

Council

0

1

2

3

4

5

Mayor

0

1

2

3

4

5

CAO

0

1

2

3

4

5

Council

0

1

2

3

4

5

Mayor

0

1

2

3

4

5

CAO

0

1

2

3

4

5

Council

0

1

2

3

4

5

It is important for us to know about the quality of services provided within your
municipality. Please assess the services listed in the following chart that are provided by
your municipality and give us your opinion regarding your perception of the adequacy of
each service using the following scale (mark one for each service listed):
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SERVICE

A) Health/Inspection Services
B) Garbage Collection
C) Water Service
D) Sewer Service
E) Public Transportation
F)

Education

G) Parks and Recreation
H) Public Libraries
I)

Cultural Activities

J)

Police Protection

K) Fire Protection
L)

5)

Public Housing

0
No Service
Available

1
Available
but less than
desirable

2
Available and
meets the
needs of
citizens

3
Exceeds
Citizens
Needs

0

1

2

3

0

1

2

3

0

1

2

3

0

1

2

3

0

1

2

3

0

1

2

3

0

1

2

3

0

1

2

3

0

1

2

3

0

1

2

3

0

1

2

3

0

1

2

3

We would also like to know more about you. Please provide the following information about
yourself:
A) What is your position (circle one):
1
2
Mayor

City Manager

3

4

City Administrator

Other

(Please list if other)____________________________________

B) What is your highest level of education (check one):
High School/GED ____ Some College ____ 4 Year College Degree ____
Masters Degree ____ PhD ____
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Professional Degree (Law-Med) ____

C) What is the field of study for your highest degree (check one):
Public Administration ____ Business ____ Engineering ____ Finance____
Other____

D) How many years have you served in your current position __________
E) What was the title of your Previous Position

_________________________________

F) In a normal workweek how many hours would you devote to municipal work related
activities?
________________________hours
G) We are interested in how you spend your working time. Please estimate the percentage
of your working time that you actually devote now to the following 3 broad activity
areas and ,if given a choice, how you would prefer to spend your time. (These
percentages should add to 100%)

How You Actually Spend Your
Time
Policy Activities:
(Includes all meetings with
council members, agenda
setting, and policy
development, policy proposal,
and policy advise)
Management Activities:
(Includes staffing, budgeting,
coordination of departments
evaluating, directing, etc)
Political Activities:
(Includes ceremonies, public
relations, meetings with other
governmental officials at other
levels of government,
speeches, etc)
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How Would You Prefer
to Allocate Your Time

%

%

%

%

%

%

H) Using the scale below please rate your perception of the level of trust that the residents of
your municipality have in the local government. (circle one)

Level of Citizen
Trust
I)

Very
Low

Low

Average

High

Very High

1

2

3

4

5

Using the scale below please rate your perception of how professional the top
administrative staff (those that directly report to Mayor or CAO) of the municipality rank.
(circle one)

Level of Top
Staff
Professionalism

Very
Low

Low

Average

High

Very High

1

2

3

4

5

J) Concerning administrative organizational matters within your municipality, whom would
you consider to be the most pivotal person or persons (check one):

Mayor

CAO

Council

Department

Heads

In our study we need to obtain information about the institutional structure of your municipality.
Please check the appropriate box for each of the following questions concerning the structural
characteristics of your municipality:
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6)

Please answer the following questions concerning the Mayor:

Characteristic

YES

NO

NA

NO

NA

A) Does the municipality have the position of Mayor (or
its equivalent)?
B) Is the Mayor directly elected by the citizens?
C) Does the Mayor serve a term of 4 or more years in
length?
D) Is the Mayor selected by the council?
E) Does the Mayor serve as a voting member of the
council?
F)

Is the Mayor allowed to veto council decisions?

G) Can the Mayor’s veto be overridden by a super
majority of council members?
H) Does the Mayor serve in a full time capacity?
I)

Does the Mayor have a staff?

J)

If he has staff, is it professional staff?

K) Is it secretarial staff?

7)

Please answer the following questions concerning the Council:

Characteristic

YES

A) Are most council members elected in at-large
elections?
B) Are most council members elected in ward or district
elections?
C) Do council members serve in a full time capacity?
D) Do council members have a staff?
E) Do council members serve a term that is four or more
years in length?
F) How many council members serve on your council? __________________
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8)

Please answer the following questions about the municipal staff:
A) Does the municipality authorize the appointment of a Chief Administrative Officer
(regardless of title such as city manager, municipal manager, city administrative officer,
etc) (CAO)?
Yes____ No____
If no, skip to question 7D; If yes then:
B) If appointment of a CAO is authorized, by what method is it allowed?
City Charter____ Ordinance____ State Statute____ Resolution____ Custom____

C) Please check the appropriate box in the following chart concerning the CAO.

Mayor

i.

Who appoints the CAO?

ii.

Who can remove the CAO?

iii.

Who does the CAO report
to?

Council

Mayor w/
Council
Consent

D) Who do the following staff members directly report to:

Staff Position
i.

Police Chief

ii.

Fire Chief

iii.

City Attorney

iv.
v.

Assistant City
Manager/CAO
City Clerk/Secretary

vi.

City Treasurer

vii.

Other Operating
Department Heads

Reports directly to (check box):
Mayor
CAO
Council
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NA

E.

Who is responsible for appointing most key officials
Mayor____
CAO____

F.

Council____

Mayor & Council jointly____

CAO & Council jointly____

Who prepares the annual budget?
Mayor____

CAO____

Other____

(Please explain other)_________________________________
G.

Who presents the annual budget?
Mayor____

CAO____

Other____

(Please explain other)_________________________________
9)

Please answer the following about the municipality in general
YES

NO

A) Is a civil service system present in the
municipality?
B) Are any employees represented by a union?
C) Is a bidding system for purchases present in the
municipality?
D) Are municipal elections partisan?
E) Are standing council committees authorized?
10)

Would you like to receive a copy of the results of this survey? (If yes, please supply an e-mail
address where results may be sent).
Yes____ No____
Your e-mail address ___________________________________________________

11)

We have a few supplemental Information questions about you we would like to ask if you
choose to answer them:
A) What is your Gender :
1

2

Female

Male

B) What is your Race:
1
Caucasian

2

3

African-American

Hispanic

(Please list if other) ____________________________________
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4
Other

C) What is your Marital Status:
1

2

3

Single

Married

4

Divorced

Widowed

D) What is your Political Preference:
1

2

Republican

3

Democrat

4

Independent

No affiliation

5
Other

(please list if other)________________________
E) How would you describe your political ideology :
1
Very Liberal

2
Liberal

3
Moderate

Conservative

4

5
Very Conservative

INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT
PURPOSE: The purpose of this research is to study the effects that various institutional structural
differences have on the professional, policy, and managerial roles of Mayors and City Administrators.
PROCEDURES: Your name has been selected because of your role and position in local government. If
you agree to participate in this research you will be asked to complete either a printed or web based survey.
Only the researcher and his faculty advisor will have access to the survey results. If you so desire and
indicate on the survey instrument, a summary of survey information will be provided to you.
DURATION: Your time commitment to participate in this interview should equal approximately 15-20
minutes; which is the time required to complete the survey.
CONFIDENTIALITY: As a public employee or elected official, your responses may be subject to open
records requirements. If for any reason you wish to have a pseudonym assigned to you and your answers
kept confidential, we will be pleased to do so. Feel free to contact the researcher at 662-325-8677 or
rde55@pspa.msstate.edu to make any arrangements.
RISKS: There are not any foreseeable risks or discomforts to you as a participant in this research.
BENEFITS: Some benefits that may accrue from this research include a better understanding of the
relationship between institutional structures and forms of local governments and the various policy making
and decision making roles performed by key players. This study in its final form will become available to
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all who wish to see it. All or parts of the final results from this study will be submitted for publication
either as a whole or as articles for scholarly and professional journals.
WITHDRAWAL: Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary and refusal to participate will
involve no penalty. If you agree to participate, you may refuse to answer any question on the survey at
your discretion. You may withdraw from the study at any time by informing the researcher of your wish to
do so either verbally or in writing.
CONCERNS: If you have any further questions in regard to this research, you may contact Robert
Eskridge at 662-325-8677 (office), 662-325-2716 (fax), or e-mail rde55@pspa.msstate.edu or you may
contact Dr. P. Edward French at 662-325-2711 (office), 662-325-2716 (fax), or e-mail
efrench@pspa.msstate.edu .. For information regarding your rights as a research subject, please contact the
Office of Regulatory Compliance at Mississippi State University at 662-325-3994.
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CODE BOOK
1.

City Name

2.

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

= 1.00
= 2.00
= 3.00
= 4.00
= 5.00
= 6.00
= 7.00
= 8.00
= 9.00
= 10.00
= 11.00
= 12.00
= 13.00
= 14.00
= 15.00
= 16.00
= 17.00
= 18.00
= 19.00
= 20.00
= 21.00
= 22.00
= 23.00
= 24.00
= 25.00

Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

3. Region
1.
2.
3.
4.

Northeast
South
Midwest
West
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= 26.00
= 27.00
= 28.00
= 29.00
= 30.00
= 31.00
= 32.00
= 33.00
= 34.00
= 35.00
= 36.00
= 37.00
= 38.00
= 39.00
= 40.00
= 41.00
= 42.00
= 43.00
= 44.00
= 45.00
= 46.00
= 47.00
= 48.00
= 49.00
= 50.00

4. Wave
1.
2.
3.

First Wave
Second Wave
Third Wave

5. Population – coded as pop
6. Status of the population – coded as popchg
1.
2.
3.

increased significantly
decreased significantly
remained the same

7. Is the municipality in an urban, suburban, or rural setting – coded as urbsubrur
1.
2.
3.

urban
suburban
rural

8. Form of government – coded as govform
0.
1.

mayor-council
council-manager

9. Total budget revenue in millions – coded as budrev
10. Total budget expenditures in millions – coded as budexp
11. Per Capita expenditures (total exp/ population; 10/5) – coded as prcapex
12. Per Capita revenues (total rev/ population; 9/5) – coded as prcaprev
13. How much of the budget is devoted to public works in millions - coded as
budpubwk
14. How much of the budget is devoted to public works in percentage - coded as
budpubwkper
15. How much of the budget is devoted to parks and recreation in millions - coded as
budparks
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16. How much of the budget is devoted to parks and recreation in percentage - coded
as budparksper
17. How much of the budget is devoted to public transportation in millions - coded
as budtrans
18. How much of the budget is devoted to public transportation in percentage coded as budtransper
19. How much of the budget is devoted to police and fire in millions - coded as
budsafet
20. How much of the budget is devoted to police and fire in percentage - coded as
budsafetper
21. How much of the budget is devoted to education in millions - coded as budedu
22. How much of the budget is devoted to education in percentage - coded as
budeduper
23. How much of the budget is devoted to something other than listed in millions coded as budother
24. How much of the budget is devoted to something other than listed in percentage coded as budotherper
25. Property tax rate in mills – coded as proptxmill
26. Property tax rate in cents per $100 – coded as proptxcents
27. Estimated median household income (in thousands) – coded as mhsinc
28. Estimated unemployment rate (in percent) – coded as unempl
29. Number of full time employees that work for the municipality – coded as
fullemp
30. Number of part time employees that work for the municipality – coded as
partemp
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31. Number of contract employees that work for the municipality – coded as
contremp
32. Percentage of homes built prior to 1960 – coded as built
1.
2.
3.

less than 10%
10% to 25%
over 25%

33. Activity level of MAYOR in “Determining the purpose and services of
municipal government”– coded as mpurpose
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

34. Activity level of CAO in “Determining the purpose and services of municipal
government”– coded as caopurpose
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

35. Activity level of COUNCIL in “Determining the purpose and services of
municipal government”– coded as ccpurpose
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

230

36. Activity level of MAYOR in “Developing Strategies of future development of
the municipality”– coded as mstrategy
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

37. Activity level of CAO in “Developing Strategies of future development of the
municipality”– coded as caostrategy
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

38. Activity level of COUNCIL in “Developing Strategies of future development of
the municipality”– coded as ccstrategy
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

39. Activity level of MAYOR in “Setting long-term fiscal priorities for the
municipality”– coded as mfiscal
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high
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40. Activity level of CAO in “Setting long-term fiscal priorities for the
municipality”– coded as caofiscal
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

41. Activity level of COUNCIL in “Setting long-term fiscal priorities for the
municipality”– coded as ccfiscal
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

42. Total activity level score for the MAYOR for MISSION activities (total sum of
responses in 33, 36, 39 – coded as mmission
43. Total activity level score for the CAO for MISSION activities (total sum of
responses in 34, 37, 40 – coded as coamission
44. Total activity level score for the COUNCIL for MISSION activities (total sum of
responses in 35, 38, 41 – coded as ccmission
45. Activity level of MAYOR in “Developing annual goals and objectives for
municipal programs”– coded as mgoals
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high
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46. Activity level of CAO in “Developing annual goals and objectives for municipal
programs”– coded as caogoals
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

47. Activity level of COUNCIL in “Developing annual goals and objectives for
municipal programs”– coded as ccgoals
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

48. Activity level of MAYOR in “The budget process”– coded as mbudp
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

49. Activity level of CAO in “The budget process”– coded as caobudp
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high
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50. Activity level of COUNCIL in “The budget process”– coded as ccbudp
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

51. Activity level of MAYOR in “Identifying current issues that require attention by
the municipal government”– coded as missue
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

52. Activity level of CAO in “Identifying current issues that require attention by the
municipal government”– coded as caoissue
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

53. Activity level of COUNCIL in “Identifying current issues that require attention
by the municipal government”– coded as ccissue
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high
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54. Activity level of MAYOR in “Developing solutions to current issues”– coded as
msolv
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

55. Activity level of CAO in “Developing solutions to current issues”– coded as
caosolv
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

56. Activity level of COUNCIL in “Developing solutions to current issues”– coded
as ccsolv
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

57. Total activity level score for the MAYOR for POLICY activities (total sum of
responses in 45, 48, 51, 54 – coded as mpolicy
58. Total activity level score for the CAO for POLICY activities (total sum of
responses in 46, 49, 52, 55 – coded as coapolicy
59. Total activity level score for the COUNCIL for POLICY activities (total sum of
responses in 47, 40, 53, 56 – coded as ccpolicy
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60. Activity level of MAYOR in “Evaluating the accomplishment of specific
programs” – coded as meval
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

61. Activity level of CAO in “Evaluating the accomplishment of specific programs”
– coded as caoeval
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

62. Activity level of COUNCIL in “Evaluating the accomplishment of specific
programs” – coded as cceval
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

63. Activity level of MAYOR in “Resolving citizens complaints about services”–
coded as mresolv
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high
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64. Activity level of CAO in “Resolving citizens complaints about services”– coded
as caoresolv
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

65. Activity level of COUNCIL in “Resolving citizens complaints about services”–
coded as ccresolv
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

66. Activity level of MAYOR in “Implementing programs and delivering services” –
coded as mimple
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

67. Activity level of CAO in “Implementing programs and delivering services” –
coded as caoimple
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high
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68. Activity level of COUNCIL in “Implementing programs and delivering services”
– coded as ccimple
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

69. Total activity level score for the MAYOR for ADMINISTRATION activities
(total sum of responses in 60, 63, 66 – coded as madmin
70. Total activity level score for the CAO for ADMINISTRATION activities (total
sum of responses in 61, 64, 67 – coded as coaadmin
71. Total activity level score for the COUNCIL for ADMINISTRATION activities
(total sum of responses in 62, 65, 68 – coded as ccadmin
72. Activity level of MAYOR in “Changing management practices or reorganizing
city government” – coded as mchange
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

73. Activity level of CAO in “Changing management practices or reorganizing city
government” – coded as caochange
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high
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74. Activity level of COUNCIL in “Changing management practices or reorganizing
city government” – coded as ccchange
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

75. Activity level of MAYOR in “Hiring decisions about department heads”– coded
as mdhhire
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

76. Activity level of CAO in “Hiring decisions about department heads”– coded as
caodhhire
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

77. Activity level of COUNCIL in “Hiring decisions about department heads”–
coded as ccdhhire
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high
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78. Activity level of MAYOR in “Hiring decisions: employees below department
head” – coded as mhire
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

79. Activity level of CAO in “Hiring decisions: employees below department head”
– coded as caohire
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

80. Activity level of COUNCIL in “Hiring decisions: employees below department
head” – coded as cchire
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

none
very low
low
average
high
very high

81. Total activity level score for the MAYOR for MANAGEMENT activities (total
sum of responses in 72, 75, 78 – coded as mmgmt
82. Total activity level score for the CAO for MANAGEMENT activities (total sum
of responses in 73, 76, 79 – coded as caomgmt
83. Total activity level score for the COUNCIL for MANAGEMENT activities (total
sum of responses in 74, 77, 80 – coded as ccmgmt
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84. Quality of Health/Inspection Services – coded hltsvc
0.
1.
2.
3.

no service available
available but less than desirable
available and meets the needs of citizens
exceeds citizens needs

85. Quality of Garbage Collection Services – coded garbsvc
0.
1.
2.
3.

no service available
available but less than desirable
available and meets the needs of citizens
exceeds citizens needs

86. Quality of Water Services – coded watrsvc
0.
1.
2.
3.

no service available
available but less than desirable
available and meets the needs of citizens
exceeds citizens needs

87. Quality of Sewer Services – coded wwsvc
0.
1.
2.
3.

no service available
available but less than desirable
available and meets the needs of citizens
exceeds citizens needs

88. Quality of Public Transportation Services – coded transsvc
0.
1.
2.
3.

no service available
available but less than desirable
available and meets the needs of citizens
exceeds citizens needs

89. Quality of Education Services – coded edusvc
0.
1.
2.
3.

no service available
available but less than desirable
available and meets the needs of citizens
exceeds citizens needs
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90. Quality of Parks and Recreation Services – coded pnrsvc
0.
1.
2.
3.

no service available
available but less than desirable
available and meets the needs of citizens
exceeds citizens needs

91. Quality of Public Libraries Services – coded libsvc
0.
1.
2.
3.

no service available
available but less than desirable
available and meets the needs of citizens
exceeds citizens needs

92. Quality of Cultural Activities Services – coded culsvc
0.
1.
2.
3.

no service available
available but less than desirable
available and meets the needs of citizens
exceeds citizens needs

93. Quality of Police Protection Services – coded polsvc
0.
1.
2.
3.

no service available
available but less than desirable
available and meets the needs of citizens
exceeds citizens needs

94. Quality of Fire Protection Services – coded firesvc
0.
1.
2.
3.

no service available
available but less than desirable
available and meets the needs of citizens
exceeds citizens needs

95. Quality of Public Housing Services – coded housesvc
0.
1.
2.
3.

no service available
available but less than desirable
available and meets the needs of citizens
exceeds citizens needs

96. Total number of available listed services offered by the municipality (from 8495; 0-12 services) – coded totsvc
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97. Total sum of scores for all services (sum total the ratings in 84 -95) – coded
sumscore
98. Overall quality rating score for municipal services (total sum in 97 divided by
number of services available in 96) – coded qualscore
99. What is your position – coded position
1.
2.
3.
4.

Mayor
City Manager
City Administrator
Other

100. What is your highest level of education – coded educate
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

High School / GED
Some College
4 Year College Degree
Masters Degree
PhD
Professional Degree (Law/Medicine)

101. What is the field of study for your highest degree – coded edfield
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Public Administration
Business
Engineering
Finance
Other

102. How many years have you served in your current position – coded tenure
103. What was the title of your previous position – coded prevpos
104. In a normal workweek how many hours would you devote to municipal work related
activities – coded workave
105. Percentage of your time actually spent on ‘Policy’ activities – coded actplcy
106. Percentage of your time actually spent on ‘Management’ activities – coded actmgmt
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107. Percentage of your time actually spent on ‘Political’ activities – coded actpoltc
108. Percentage of your time you would like to spend on ‘Policy’ activities – coded
likeplcy
109. Percentage of your time you would like to spend on ‘Management’ activities – coded
likemgmt
110. Percentage of your time you would like to spend on ‘Political’ activities – coded
likepoltc
111. What is your perception of the level of trust that residents of your municipality have
in local government – coded trust
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Very Low
Low
Average
High
Very High

112. What is your perception of how professional the top administrative staff of the
municipality rank – coded profes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Very Low
Low
Average
High
Very High

113. Concerning administrative matters within your municipality, whom would you
consider to be the most pivotal person or persons – coded pivotal
1.
2.
3.
4.

Mayor
CAO
Council
Department Heads

114. Does the municipality have the position of Mayor – coded mayor
1.
2.

Yes
No
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115. How does the Mayor obtain his office – coded elecmayor
1.
2.

elected by citizens
appointed by council

116. Does the Mayor serve a term of 4 or more years in length – coded termmayor
1.
2.

4 years or more
Less than 4 years

117. Does the Mayor serve as a voting member of council – coded votemayor
1.
2.

Yes
No

118. Is the Mayor allowed to veto council decisions – coded vetomayor
1.
2.

Yes
No

119. Can the Mayor’s veto be overidden by a supermajority of council – coded
overmayor
1.
2.

Yes
No

120. Does the Mayor serve in a full time or part time capacity – coded posimayor
1.
2.

Full Time
Part Time

121. Does the Mayor have a staff – coded staffmayor
1.
2.

Yes
No

122. If the Mayor has a staff, is it professional or secretarial – coded typstfmayor
1.
2.

professional
secretarial

245

123. Are most council members elected at-large or in ward or district elections – coded
eleccc
1.
2.

at-large
ward or districts

124. Do council members serve full time or part time – coded posicc
1.
2.

full time
part time

125. Do council members have a staff – coded staffcc
1.
2.

Yes
No

126. Do the council members serve a term of 4 or more years in length – coded termcc
1.
2.

4 years or more
Less than 4 years

127. How many council members serve on your council – coded numcc
128. Does the municipality authorize the appointment of a Chief Administrative Officer
(CAO) – coded cao
0.
1.

No
Yes

129. By what method is appointment of a CAO authorized – coded authcao
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

City Charter
Ordinance
State Statute
Resolution
Custom

130. Who appoints the CAO – coded apptcao
1.
2.
3.

Mayor
Council
Mayor with Council consent
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131. Who can remove the CAO – coded removecao
1.
2.
3.
4.

Mayor
Council
Mayor with Council consent
Both Jointly

132. Who does the CAO report to – coded rptcao
Mayor
1.
2.
Council
3.
Mayor with Council consent
4.
Both Jointly
133. Who does the Police Chief report to – coded rptpolch
1.
2.
3.

Mayor
CAO
Council

134. Who does the Fire Chief report to – coded rptfirech
1.
2.
3.

Mayor
CAO
Council

135. Who does the City Attorney report to – coded rptattrny
1.
2.
3.

Mayor
CAO
Council

136. Who does the Assistant City Manager (Asst’ CAO) report to – coded rptastcao
1.
2.
3.

Mayor
CAO
Council

137. Who does the City Clerk/ Secretary report to – coded rptcsec
1.
2.
3.

Mayor
CAO
Council
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138. Who does the City Treasurer report to – coded rptctytres
1.
2.
3.

Mayor
CAO
Council

139. Who do other operating department heads report to – coded rptdepthds
1.
2.
3.

Mayor
CAO
Council

140. Count for reporting of department heads to MAYOR (133-139) – coded dhmayorct
141. Count for reporting of department heads to CAO (133-139) – coded dhcaoct
142. Count for reporting of department heads to COUNCIL (133-139) – coded
dhcouncilct
143. Who is responsible for appointing most key officials – coded apptkey
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Mayor
Council
Mayor and Council jointly
CAO
CAO and Council jointly

144. Who prepares the annual budget – coded prepbud
1.
2.
3.

Mayor
CAO
Other

145. Who presents the annual budget to council – coded presbud
1.
2.
3.

Mayor
CAO
Other

146. Is a civil service system present in the municipality – coded civilsvc
1.
2.

Yes
No
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147. Are any employees represented by a union – coded union
1.
2.

Yes
No

148. Is a bidding system for purchases present in the municipality – coded bid
1.
2.

Yes
No

149. Are municipal election partisan or non-partisan – coded munelec
1.
2.

Partisan
Non Partisan

150. Are standing council committees authorized – coded scomm
1.
2.

Yes
No

151. What is your gender – coded gender
1.
2.

Male
Female

152. What is your race – coded race
1.
2.
3.
4.

Caucasian
African-American
Hispanic
Other

153. What is your marital status – coded marital
1.
2.
3.
4.

Single
Married
Divorced
Widowed
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154. What is your political preference – coded party
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Republican
Democrat
Independent
No Affiliation
Other

155. How would you describe your political ideology – coded ideology
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Very Liberal
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Very Conservative

156. Score on the city rating scale for form of government – coded a1form
0 points – mayor-council form
20 points – council-manager form
157. Score on the city rating scale for who appoints the CAO – coded b4aptcao
0 points – cao is not authorized
2 points – mayor appoints the cao
4 points – mayor appoints cao with the council consent
6 points – council appoints the cao
158. Score on the city rating scale for who CAO reports to – coded b7rptcao
0 points – the cao reports to the mayor
2 points – the cao reports to the council
159. Score on the city rating scale for Mayor serving full or part time – coded c10ptmyr
0 points – mayor serves in a full time capacity
2 points – mayor serves in a part time capacity
160. Score on the city rating scale for how the mayor is elected – coded c12elecmyr
0 points – mayor is directly elected by citizens
2 points – mayor is appointed by the city council
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161. Score on the city rating scale for Council serving full or part time – coded d14ptcc
0 points – council serves in a full time capacity
2 points – council serves in a part time capacity
162. Score on the city rating scale for how council is elected – coded d16eleccc
0 points – council is elected by districts or wards
2 points – council is elected in at-large elections
163. Score on the city rating scale for whether the Mayor serves on council – coded
e18myrsvc
0 points – mayor does not serve on the city council
2 points – mayor does serve on the city council
164. Score on the city rating scale for Mayor having veto power – coded f20veto
0 points – mayor has veto power
1 point – mayor does not have veto power
165. Score on the city rating scale for term length of Mayor – coded g22mterm
0 points – mayor serves for 4 year term or longer
1 point – mayor serves for a term of less than 4 years
166. Score on the city rating scale for term length of council – coded g24ccterm
0 points – council serves for 4 year term or longer
1 point – council serves for a term of less than 4 years
167. Score on the city rating scale for who prepares the budget – coded h26budp
0 points – mayor prepares the budget
1 point – cao prepares the budget
168. Score on the city rating scale for who department heads report to – coded i28dhprt
0 points – department heads report to the mayor
1 point – department heads report to the cao
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169. Score on the city rating scale for who appoints key officials – coded j30apptkey
0 points – mayor only appoints most key officials
1 point – mayor and council share authority to appoint most key offials
2 points – CAO and council share power to appoint most key officials
3 points – CAO only appoints most key officials
170. Score on the city rating scale for the size of council – coded k34ccsize
0 points – council is composed of more than 7 members
1 point – council is composed of 7 or fewer members
171. Score on the city rating scale for standing committee allowed – coded k36scath
0 points – standing council committees are authorized
1 point – standing council committees are not authorized
172. Score on the city rating scale for Mayor having staff – coded l38mstaff
0 points – mayor has staff
1 point – mayor does not have staff
173. Score on the city rating scale for council having staff – coded l40ccstaff
0 points – council has staff
1 point – council does not have staff
174. Total score for all of the structural characteristics of a city (total sum of responses in
156 – 173) – coded as score
175. The type of city from worksheet using original adapted cities rating system – coded
ctytype
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Political
Adapted Political
Conciliated
Adapted Administrative
Administrative

176. Total general fund operating budget expenditures in millions – coded as gfexp
177. Per Capita general fund operating expenditures (gfexp/ pop; 176/5) – coded as
gfprcapex
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178. City typology using the Nelson & Svara typology rating system (uses
information from variables 8, 115, 128, and 130 to calculate type) – coded as
stype
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Mayor-council
Mayor-administrator-council
Mayor-council administrator
Mayor and council-administrator
Empowered mayor-council-manager
Mayor-council-manager
Council (mayor) - manager

179. The calculated alternative total score for all of the structural characteristics of a
city (total sum of responses in 156 – 173) with the removal of the 20 points
given for council/manager form in variable 156 – coded as altscore
180. The average household size – coded as ahsz
181. The percentage of families living below the poverty level – coded as pov
182. The percentage of owner occupied housing units – coded as prcoohu
183. The median value of owner occupied housing – coded as mvhs
184. The percentage of the population that is age 65 or older – coded as prc65
185. The percentage of the population that are minority – coded as prcminor
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APPENDIX C
INVOLVEMENT LEVEL BY RATING
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Figure C.1

Total Involvement Levels by Rating: mayor-council cities

Figure C.2

Total Involvement Levels by Rating: council-manager cities
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Figure C.3

Total Involvement Levels by Rating: Adapted Political cities

Figure C.4

Total Involvement Levels by Rating: Conciliated cities
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Figure C.5

Total Involvement Levels by Rating: Adapted Administrative cities

Figure C.6

Total Involvement Levels by Rating: Administrative cities
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APPENDIX D
INVOLVEMENT LEVEL BY PERCENTAGES
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Figure D.1

Total Involvement Levels by Percentages: mayor-council cities

Figure D.2

Total Involvement Levels by Percentages: council-manager cities
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Figure D.3

Total Involvement Levels by Percentages: Adapted Political cities

Figure D.4

Total Involvement Levels by Percentages: Conciliated cities
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Figure D.5

Total Involvement Levels by Percentages: Adapted Administrative cities

Figure D.6

Total Involvement Levels by Percentages: Administrative cities
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APPENDIX E
SVARA’S FOUR MODELS
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Figure E.1

Svara’s Council Dominance Model

Figure E.2

Svara’s Dichotomy Model
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Figure E.3

Svara’s Dichotomy-Duality Model

Figure E.4

Svara’s Executive Dominance Model
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